Do we need a “new” international convention that helps to avoid trafficking in organs? Some “criminal (and civil) law aspects” - Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine – updated or outdated?

Abstract: § 1 «Do we need a “new” international convention that helps to avoid trafficking in organs? Some criminal (and civil) law aspects”» - «Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine – updated or outdated?». § 2 Some important connections: on the one hand, between the 1997 Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine; the 2002 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin; and, on the other hand, the problem of trafficking in organs, tissues and cells and trafficking in human beings for the purpose of the removal organs. Some connections. § 3 The «international undisputed principle». § 4 Trafficking in organs, tissues and cells; and trafficking in human beings for the purpose of the removal organs. Criminal Law and Civil Law. § 5 Promote organ donation. § 6 The necessity to collect reliable data on both trafficking cases. § 7 The necessity for an internationally agreed definition of trafficking in OTC: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine – updated or outdated? § 8 The (inter)national and (il)legal organ («tissue and cell») trade: some cases and some conclusions. § 9 Do we need a new international convention to prevent trafficking in organs, tissues and cells (OTC)? § 10 Of course we need a «new» international convention to prevent trafficking in organs, tissues and cells (OTC). § 11 At the present moment, we do not need a «new» international convention to prevent trafficking in human beings for the purpose of the removal organs. § 12 The Portuguese case. § 13 «Final conclusions.» § Resumo: § 1 «Precisamos de uma "nova" convenção internacional que ajude a evitar o tráfico de órgãos? Alguns aspectos de lei criminal (e civil)» - «Convenção sobre Direitos Humanos e Biomedicina - Actualizada ou desactualizada?». § 2 Algumas conexões importantes: por um lado, entre a Convenção do Conselho da Europa de 1997 sobre Direitos Humanos e Biomedicina; o Protocolo Adicional de 2002 à Convenção sobre os Direitos do Homem e da Biomedicina relativo ao transplante de órgãos e tecidos de origem humana, e, por outro lado, o problema do tráfico de órgãos, tecidos e células e tráfico de seres humanos para fins de remoção dos órgãos. § 3 O «indiscutível princípio internacional». § 4 O Tráfico de órgãos, tecidos e células; e o tráfico de seres humanos para fins de remoção dos órgãos. Direito Penal e Direito Civil. § 5 Promover a doação de órgãos. § 6 A necessidade de colectar dados fidedignos sobre os dois casos de tráfico. § 7 A necessidade de uma definição internacionalmente acordada de tráfico de OTC: Convenção sobre Direitos Humanos e Biomedicina - actualizada ou desactualizada? § 8 A (inter)nacional e (il)legal comercialização de órgãos («de tecidos e de células»): alguns casos e algumas conclusões. § 9 Será que precisamos de uma nova convenção internacional para prevenir o tráfico de órgãos, tecidos e células (OTC)? § 10 É claro que precisamos de uma «nova» convenção internacional para prevenir o tráfico de órgãos, tecidos e células (OTC). § 11 No presente momento, não precisamos de uma «nova» convenção internacional para impedir o tráfico de seres humanos para fins de remoção dos órgãos. § 12 O caso Português. § 13 «As conclusões finais.»

Punitive damages in Brazilian law and the boundaries between criminal and civil liabilities

This article demonstrates the existence of civil responsibility with punitive purposes in Brazilian Law, explaining how it was introduced by jurisdictional activity in cases involving moral damages. Next, it points out main problems this situation represents to Brazilian Law from the standpoint of our juridical dogmatics and public policies. Additionally, it proposes the execution of an empirical research for comprehension of the structure and fundamentals of jurisprudence on the punitive character of civil responsibility for moral damages and establishes criteria for use in this research based on theories of punishment. Finally, it positions the problem of punitive function of civil responsibility in the broader ambit of relationships and boundaries between civil and criminal responsibility.

Quantification of standards of proof thresholds in criminal and civil litigation

Standards of proof in law serve the purpose of instructing juries as to the expected levels of confidence in determinations of fact. In criminal trials, to reach a guilty verdict a jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, and in civil trials by a preponderance of the evidence. The purposes of this study are to determine the quantitative thresholds used to make these determinations; to ascertain the levels of juror agreement with basic principles of justice; and to try to predict thresholds and beliefs by juror personality characteristics. Participants read brief case descriptions and indicated thresholds in percentages, their beliefs in various principles, and completed three personality measures. A 92-94% threshold in criminal and an 80% threshold in civil matters was found; but prediction by personality was not supported. Significant percentages of jurors disavowed the presumptions of innocence and right to counsel.

Annotation taken, in the perspective of criminal and constitutional law, as well as in criminology, to the decision of the portuguese constitutional court, of January 13, 2011 – with respect to the problems of “consent” and “medical act”

1 – Summary of the decision taken by the Portuguese Constitutional Court, of January 13, 2011; 2 – Complete text of the decision of the Portuguese Constitutional Court, of January 13, 2011, Judge Maria João ANTUNES (Reporter), Judge Carlos Pamplona de OLIVEIRA, Judge José Borges SOEIRO, Judge Gil GALVÃO, Judge Rui Manuel Moura RAMOS (President) –in terms of the tribunalconstitucional.pt, August 1, 2011; 3 – Brief annotation to the problem of the “medical act”; 3.1 – Plus some conclusions on the brief annotation to the problem of the “medical act”; 3.2 – Brief annotation to the problem of “consent”– continuation of the previous comments; 4 – Conclusions. It must never be forgotten that “consent” does not stand as the only cause of exclusion of unlawfulness.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

A treatise on the law of sale of personal property with references to the American decisions and to the French code and civil law

Spine title: Benjamin on sales.

The Influence of ICC Arbitral Decisions on Canadian Law: Comparative Study between Civil Law and Common Law Jurisdictions

L’objectif de cette recherche est de démontrer que les décisions arbitrales de la Chambre de commerce internationale peuvent être considérées comme une source potentielle de droit au Canada. Il existe actuellement une incertitude quant au droit matériel utilisé en arbitrage international pour résoudre les différends commerciaux. Bien que l’utilisation de la lex mercatoria pour résoudre un litige soit une option, elle se heurte à de nombreuses incertitudes terminologiques et conceptuelles. L’utilisation d’une approche méthodologique de la lex mercatoria permettrait une classification de ses sources en deux branches: (1) le droit statutaire international et (2) le stare decisis des tribunaux d’arbitrage commercial international. Une telle approche méthodologique conférerait plus de certitude quant à l’application d’un droit uniforme. De plus, elle faciliterait l’étude de l’interlégalité entre les règles de la lex mercatoria et le droit matériel interne. Plus particulièrement, elle permet de comparer les similitudes et les différences des règles du droit matériel entre les décisions arbitrales internationales, le droit statutaire international et les juridictions canadiennes de common law et de droit civil. Cette comparaison rend possible une évaluation de l’influence potentielle des décisions arbitrales de la Chambre de commerce internationale sur le droit matériel canadien et si cette influence est plus importante en droit civil ou en common law.

Beneficial owner: do direito tributário internacional ao civil law

O presente Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso se propõe a analisar o instituto denominado Beneficiário Efetivo (Beneficial Owner), levando-se em considerações doutrinas nacionais e estrangeiras, os principais casos envolvendo o referido conceito, e comparando sua aplicabilidade nos países common law e civil law. Assim, pretende-se: conceituar o instituto denominado Beneficiário Efetivo; apontar a problemática que envolve o referido instituto demonstrando a importância da sua compreensão; estudar os principais casos internacionais sobre o assunto; demonstrar a diferença de se aplicar o conceito em comento em países common e civil law, bem como analisar a sua aplicabilidade na hipótese de o tratado internacional não prever Beneficial Ownership Clause.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of the risk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in a particular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on the corporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of therisk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in aparticular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on thecorporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

The law and economics of good faith in the civil law of contract

Good faith plays a central role in most legal systems, yet appears to be an intractable concept. This article proposes to analyse it economically as the absence of opportunism in circumstances which lend themselves to it. One of the objectives underlying the law of contract on an economic view is to curtail opportunism. In spelling out what this means, the paper proposes a three-step test: bad faith is present where a substantial informational or other asymmetry exists between the parties, which one of them turns into an undue advantage, considered against the gains both parties could normally expect to realise through the contract, and where loss to the disadvantaged party is so serious as to provoke recourse to expensive self-protection, which significantly raises transactions costs in the market. The three-step test is then used to analyse a set of recent decisions in international commercial transactions and three concepts derived from good faith: fraud, warranty for latent defects and lesion.

The Law and Economics of the Civil Law of Mandate

Présentation à la Annual Law & Economics Conference 2007, Université de Bologne.

The Economics Of Civil Law Contract And Of Good Faith

Prepared for the Symposium in honour of Michael J. Trebilcock, 1-2 October 2009, in Toronto