Evaluating New Policy Instruments of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards : Footprints, Credit Transferring and Credit Trading

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Evaluating New Policy Instruments of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards : Footprints, Credit Transferring and Credit Trading

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Water quality trading: credit stacking and ancillary benefits

Ecosystems can provide many services. Wetlands, for example, can help mitigate water pollution from point sources as well as non-point sources, serve as habitat for wildlife, sequester carbon and serve as a place for recreation. Studies have found that these services can have substantial value to society. The sale of ecosystem credits has been found to be a possible way to finance construction investments in wetlands and easements to farmers to take their land out of production. At the same time, selling one ecosystem service credit may not always be enough to justify the investment. Traditionally market participants have only been allowed to sell a single credit from one piece of land, but recently there have been discussions about the possibility of selling more than one credit from a piece of land because it potentially could lead to more efficient ecosystem service provision. Selling multiple credits is sometimes referred to as credit stacking. This paper is an empirical study of the potential for credit stacking applied to the services provided by wetlands in the Upper Mississippi River Basin, specifically nitrogen, phosphorus and wildlife credits. In the setting of our study where costs are discrete rather than continuous we found that wetlands are a cost-effective way to reduce the nitrogen loads from wastewater treatment plants and that stacking nitrogen, phosphorus and wildlife credits may improve social welfare while leading to a higher level of ecosystem services. However, for credit stacking to be welfare improving we found that there needs to be a substantial demand for the credit that covers the majority of the investment in wetlands, while the credit aggregator has a choice between what ecosystem projects to undertake. If the credit that covers the majority of investment is sold first and is the sole basis of the investment decision and the objective is to improve welfare, a sequential implementation of ecosystem credits is not recommended; it would not lead to an increase in the total amount of ecosystem services provided though it would increase profit for the credit producer.

Forward rates : predictive power and trading strategies

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2014

Credit markets and the propagation of monetary policy shocks

This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents. We show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.

Paper money and national distress: William Huskisson and the early theories of credit, speculation and crises

This paper examines the explanation of commercial crises offered by William Huskisson in 1810 in the wake of the debate on the Bullion Report. Huskisson argued that the suspension of convertibility made it possible to extend issues of paper currency beyond its proper limits. Such an expansion, being in the interest of all parties concerned, would actually take place and stimulate excessive speculations, which would eventually prove unsustainable and bring generalized ruin and distress. Although some elements of this explanations were not new (having been anticipated by writers sucha as James Currie in 1793, William Roscoe in 1793, William Anderson in 1797 and an anonymous in 1796), Huskisson's explanation is more systematic and better organized, and his emphasis on the endogenous character of the crisis and on the instability of the dynamics of trade and credit makes it an interesting foreshadower of the theories of crises that were advanced half a century later.

Endogenous Credit Cycles and Financial Dampening in an Adverse Selection Economy

We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.

On the impact of leverage constraints on asset prices and trading volume

Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volumein stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion of asset returnsand the correlations between trading volume, price changes and pricelevels) to support theories where agents are not rational expected utilitymaximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in factconsistent with a standard infite horizon perfect information expectedutility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar tothose found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharpcontrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differencesthat are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futuresmarkets. We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize theintegral of their discounted utility from consumption under both budgetand leverage con-straints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou(1997), we find a closed form solution, up to a negative constant, for theequilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where theconstraint is non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdingsvolatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are increasingfunctions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of theprice-volume relation.

Credit rationing and crowding out during the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare's Bank, 1702-1862

Crowding-out during the British Industrial Revolution has long been one of the leadingexplanations for slow growth during the Industrial Revolution, but little empirical evidence exists to support it. We argue that examinations of interest rates are fundamentally misguided, and that the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century private loan market balanced through quantity rationing. Using a unique set of observations on lending volume at a London goldsmith bank, Hoare s, we document the impact of wartime financing on private credit markets. We conclude that there is considerable evidence that government borrowing, especially during wartime, crowded out private credit.

The Impact of a Corporate Name Change on Stock Price and Trading Volume of Canadian Companies

This thesis examines the impact of a corporate name change on stock price and trading volume of Canadian companies around the announcement date, the approval date, and the adoption date over the time period from 1997 to 2011. Name changes are classified into six categories: major and minor, structural and pure, diversified and focused, accompanied with a change in ticker symbol and without a change in ticker symbol, “Gold” name addition and deletion, and different reasons for name changes (e.g., merger and acquisition, change of structure, change of strategy, and better image). The thesis uses the standard event study methodology to perform abnormal return and trading volume analyses. In addition, regression analysis is employed to examine which type of a name change has the largest impact on cumulative abnormal returns. Sample stocks exhibit a significant positive abnormal return one-day prior to the approval day and one day after the adoption date. Around the approval date we observe significant abnormal returns for stocks with a structural name change. On the day after the adoption date we document abnormal returns for stocks with major, minor, structural, pure, focused, and ticker symbol name changes. If a merger or acquisition is the reason for a name change, companies tend to experience a significant positive abnormal return one-day before the approval date and on the adoption date. If a change of structure is the reason for a name change, companies exhibit a significant positive abnormal return on the approval date and a significant negative abnormal return on the adoption date. In case of a change of strategy as the reason for a name change, companies show a significant negative abnormal return around the approval date and a significant positive abnormal return around the adoption date.