Sovereign rescheduling probabilities in emerging markets: a comparison with credit rating agencies' ratings

This study estimates default probabilities of 124 emerging countries from 1981 to 2002 as a function of a set of macroeconomic and political variables. The estimated probabilities are then compared with the default rates implied by sovereign credit ratings of three major international credit rating agencies (CRAs) – Moody's Investor's Service, Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings. Sovereign debt default probabilities are used by investors in pricing sovereign bonds and loans as well as in determining country risk exposure. The study finds that CRAs usually underestimate the risk of sovereign debt as the sovereign credit ratings from rating agencies are usually too optimistic.

Credit rating agencies' roles have to be reassessed

With the disintermediation of the financial markets, credit rating agencies filled the informational need of investors on the creditworthiness of borrowers. They acquired their privileged position in the financial market through their intellectual technology and reputational capital. To a large extent, they have gradually dissipated the authority of state regulators and supervisory authorities with their increasing reliance on credit ratings for regulatory purposes. But the recent credit crisis revives the question on whether states should retake their authorities and how far rating agencies should be subjected to competition, transparency and accountability constraints imposed by the public and the market on state regulators and supervisory authorities. Against this backdrop, this article critically explores the key concerns with credit rating agencies' functions to regulate financial market for further assessment

Essays on credit rating agencies and the assessment of sovereign risk

Sovereign ratings have only recently regained attention in the academic debate. This seems to be somewhat surprising against the background that their influence is well-known and that rating decisions have often been criticized in the past (as for example during the Asian crisis in the 90s). Sovereign ratings do not only assess the creditworthiness of governments: They are also included in the calculation of ratings for sub-sovereign issuers whereby their rating is usually restricted to the upper bound of the sovereign rating (sovereign ceiling). Earlier studies have also shown that the downgrade of a sovereign often leads to contagion effects on neighbor countries. This study focuses first on misleading incentives in the rating industry before chapter three summarizes the literature on the influence and determinants of sovereign ratings. The fourth chapter explores empirically how ratings respond to changes in sovereign debt across specific country groups. The fifth part focuses on single rating decisions of four selected rating agencies and investigates whether the timing of decisions gives reason for herding behavior. The final chapter presents a reform proposal for the future regulation of the rating industry in light of the aforementioned flaws.rn

Regulation and the Management of Expectations - Rating Agencies Revisited

In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, scholars have begun to revise their conceptions of how market participants interact. While the traditional “rationalist optic” posits market participants who are able to process decisionrelevant information and thereby transform uncertainty into quantifiable risks, the increasingly popular “sociological optic” stresses the role of uncertainty in expectation formation and social conventions for creating confidence in markets. Applications of the sociological optic to concrete regulatory problems are still limited. By subjecting both optics to the same regulatory problem—the role of credit rating agencies (CRAs) and their ratings in capital markets—this paper provides insights into whether the sociological optic offers advice to tackle concrete regulatory problems and discusses the potential of the sociological optic in complementing the rationalist optic. The empirical application suggests that the sociological optic is not only able to improve our understanding of the role of CRAs and their ratings, but also to provide solutions complementary to those posited by the rationalist optic.

Análisis del mercado del rating de las emisiones de titulación en España (1993-2011)

[ES] La calificación crediticia externa es un elemento clave para el buen fin de las operaciones de titulización. No obstante, las agencias de calificación han sido objeto de una intensa controversia, cuestionándose su fiabilidad y objetividad. En este trabajo abundamos en esta cuestión, analizando la distribución de los ratings otorgados a las emisiones de bonos de titulización llevadas a cabo en España (1993-2011), uno de los países más activos en cuanto al volumen de emisiones, llegaron a ocupar el segundo puesto a nivel europeo y el tercero a nivel mundial. Aportamos evidencia sobre ciertas anomalías entre las que cabe destacar la estructura oligopolística del mercado del rating, la fragilidad desde una perspectiva histórica de las calificaciones otorgadas, y la existencia de patrones no homogéneos en la elección de la agencia de calificación, tanto si se tiene en cuenta la sociedad gestora, como el colateral de respaldo.

Does rating shopping exist in spanish securitization issues?

[EN] Debt issue credit ratings can lead to conflicts of interest as the issuer itself is entrusted with contracting and compensating the rating agency. Into the bargain, the credit rating agency may be involved in designing the issues that the same agency subsequently rates. Credit rating agencies thus could have incentives to rate issues advantageously. Given the economic importance of this issue, in this paper we have proposed to analyze this phenomenon, known as rating shopping in academic literature, for Spanish market securitization issues for the period of time comprehensive from January 1993 to December 2011. In sum 3,665 published ratings are been analysed, for an issued nominal amount of 791,090 million Euros. The results show an association between the credit rating agency contracted and the mean rating awarded. Significant differences are observed in the ratings associated to the contracting manager (or special purpose vehicle SPV- manager firm), to the number of ratings or to the type of collateral. Furthermore, a pattern compatible with rating shopping was observed for some types of collateral: abnormally high market shares associated with certain agencies awarding unusually generous ratings. However, this phenomenon is not seen to be widespread on the rating market associated to Spanish securitization issues.

Credit rating agency regulation after the UK's EU membership referendum

Assesses the implications of the UK's decision to withdraw from the EU for the regulation of its credit rating industry. Discusses the current rules of the Credit Rating Agencies Regulations 2010. Considers how the likelihood that a "post-Brexit" UK will be increasingly dependent on its financial services sector might affect the approach taken towards its regulation.

The universal credit rating group:the viability of a response

The role played by the Big Three credit rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch) in the creation of the recent Financial Crisis has been well documented, as too has their conduct in the aftermath of the Crisis where they contributed to the prolonging of the effects of the systemic breakdown. Also, with a string of record fines and cease-and-desist orders in the wake of the Crisis lending weight to the notion that the Big Three have no plans of performing any more ethically, there are a number of organisations that are endeavouring to provide a better alternative to the stranglehold of the Big Three. In the first instalment of the Viability of a Response series we were introduced to the International Non-Profit Credit Rating Agency who, through the amalgamation of forward-looking and non-profit ideals, intends to inject some much needed ethical consideration into the process of providing ratings that are crucial to the marketplace . In this edition of the series, we will be introduced to the Universal Credit Rating Group (UCRG) which is an alliance between Dagong Global Ratings, RusRating, and Egan-Jones Rating Company. We will start by learning more about this alliance that is due to come into effect in the next few years, and then the article will examine the reality of the situation to come to a conclusion on what the Group’s chances of success may be.

Multirating decision model validation: the relevance of the quality of the securitization issues

Rating enables the information asymmetry existing in the issuer-investor relationship to be reduced, particularly for issues with a high degree of complexity, as is the case of securitizations. However, there may be a serious conflict of interest between the issuer’s choice and remuneration of the agency and the credit rating awarded, resulting in lower quality and information power of the published rating. In this paper, we propose an explicative model of the number of ratings requested, by analyzing the relevance of the number of ratings to measure the reliability, where multirating is shown to be associated to the quality, size, liquidity and the degree of information asymmetry relating to the issue. Thus, we consider that the regulatory changes that foster the widespread publication of simultaneous ratings could help to alleviate the problem of rating model arbitrage and the crisis of confidence in credit ratings in general and in the securitization issues, in particular.

Modell zur Förderung des Wettbewerbs und der Transparenz auf dem Ratingmarkt unter Berücksichtigung der Besonderheiten der deutschen Bankenstruktur

This paper provides a model for the international market of credit ratings in order to promote transparency of rating methodologies and combat the oligopolistic market structure where Standard & Poor‘s, Moody‘s and Fitch Ratings collectively comprise approximately 85 percent of the market. For the German credit market this paper strongly advises the establishment of at least three centralistic credit rating agencies (CRAs), set up and run independently by the large bank institutions – „Großbanken“, „Sparkassen“ and „Genossenschaftsbanken“. By acting as CRAs, universal banks could not only decrease their costs but would also be able to increase competition and transparency. These new credit rating agencies would be subject to the Basel II internal ratings-based (IRB) surveillance standards that go far beyond the Basel II standard approach with its external ratings by the dominating three US-american CRAs. Due to the fact that the new Basle Accord has already been implemented in Europe, this model could be applied all over Europe and possibly even worldwide, assuming the US were to adopt the new capital adequacy rules. This would lead to an increase in the number of CRAs and hence to more competition, as the barriers to entry in the rating industry would not apply to these new institutions because of their expertise in the credit market. The fact that the IRB-criteria already have to be disclosed by law would make the methodologies transparent and subject to approval by national regulators such as the „Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht“ (BaFin) in Germany. Hence the requirement to set up a new monitoring committee in Europe would become obsolete.

The Effect of Reputation Shocks to Rating Agencies on Corporate Disclosures

This paper explores the effect of credit rating agency’s (CRA) reputation on the discretionary disclosures of corporate bond issuers. Academics, practitioners, and regulators disagree on the informational role played by major CRAs and the usefulness of credit ratings in influencing investors’ perception of the credit risk of bond issuers. Using management earnings forecasts as a measure of discretionary disclosure, I find that investors demand more (less) disclosure from bond issuers when the ratings become less (more) credible. In addition, using content analytics, I find that bond issuers disclose more qualitative information during periods of low CRA reputation to aid investors better assess credit risk. That the corporate managers alter their voluntary disclosure in response to CRA reputation shocks is consistent with credit ratings providing incremental information to investors and reducing adverse selection in lending markets. Overall, my findings suggest that managers rely on voluntary disclosure as a credible mechanism to reduce information asymmetry in bond markets.

Técnicas de rating em contexto de crise no setor bancário português

Dissertação para a obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças Orientador: Mestre Adalmiro Álvaro Malheiro de Castro Andrade Pereira

O papel das agências de rating e a dívida pública portuguesa

Durante as últimas décadas observou-se o crescimento da importância das avaliações fornecidas pelas agências de rating, sendo este um fator decisivo na tomada de decisão dos investidores. Também os emitentes de dívida são largamente afetados pelas alterações das classificações atribuídas por estas agências. Esta investigação pretende, por um lado, compreender se estas agências têm poder para conseguirem influenciar a evolução da dívida pública e qual o seu papel no mercado financeiro. Por outro, pretende compreender quais os fatores determinantes da dívida pública portuguesa, bem como a realização de uma análise por percentis com o objetivo de lhe atribuir um rating. Para a análise dos fatores que poderão influenciar a dívida pública, a metodologia utilizada é uma regressão linear múltipla estimada através do Método dos Mínimos Quadrados (Ordinary Least Squares – OLS), em que num cenário inicial era composta por onze variáveis independentes, sendo a dívida pública a variável dependente, para um período compreendido entre 1996 e 2013. Foram realizados vários testes ao modelo inicial, com o objetivo de encontrar um modelo que fosse o mais explicativo possível. Conseguimos ainda identificar uma relação inversa entre o rating atribuído por estas agências e a evolução da dívida pública, no sentido em que para períodos em que o rating desce, o crescimento da dívida é mais acentuado. Não nos foi, no entanto, possível atribuir um rating à dívida pública através de uma análise de percentis.