External administration in corporate insolvency and reorganisation: The insider alternative

This article considers the merits of alternative policy approaches to management of companies in insolvency administration, in particular from an identity economics theoretical perspective. The use of this perspective provides a novel assessment of the policy alternatives for insolvency administration, which can be characterized as either following the more flexible United States Chapter 11-style debtor-in-possession arrangement, or relying on the appointment of an external administrator or trustee to manage the insolvent company who automatically displaces incumbent management. This analysis indicates that stigma and reputational damage from automatic removal of managers in voluntary administration leaders to "identity loss" and that an insider alternative to the current external administration approach could be a beneficial policy change.

The Australian corporate rescue provisions : how do they compare?

A notable feature of corporate legislative development in western countries for the past 30 years is the various mechanisms introduced to facilitate the survival of company structures facing insolvency. Australia’s corporate rescue version, called a “voluntary administration”, is now contained in Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), although first introduced in 1993. The Australian provisions apply to all corporate entities and commence with a short moratorium followed by a meeting of creditors. At the creditors’ meeting a “rescue” plan called a deed of company arrangement may be entered into, or, alternatively the company may be liquidated. The voluntary administration provisions have become a significant part of Australia’s corporate insolvency landscape and are critical to the operation of corporate law outside of insolvency. Australia does not have a specialist bankruptcy court, rather it utilises the English approach where insolvency practitioners are accountants and appointed to the insolvent company as administrators. In Australia, insolvency practitioners must be registered with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”), the corporate and securities regulator. A voluntary administration is usually commenced by the board of directors appointing an insolvency practitioner to the company. There exists no opportunity for a voluntary administration to commence at the creditors’ or court’s behest. This chapter seeks to address the comparative necessity of Australia’s corporate regime.

The Australian insolvency regime revisited: a precis of the next leap forward

Australian corporate insolvency laws contained within Chapter 5 of the Corporations Act are currently being reviewed with respect to four principal areas identified by Australian Government Treasury. The four themes of review include employee ‘benefit’ enhancements; seeking to deter misconduct of company officers; rules around insolvency practitioner disclosure with respect to their remuneration and related independence issues; and some minor proposed changes to the voluntary administration procedure, widely regarded as requiring only minor adjustment. At this time, the draft legislation is not available for general release and is being discussed within the Australian Government appointed Insolvency Law Advisory Group. The next steps are public comment for review of draft legislation and then operation of the legislative change. These are expected to occur in 2007. This paper seeks to outline the likely issues associated with the expected reforms of the Australian insolvency regime.

Seen but not heard? The significance of shareholders under Pt 5.3A of the Corporations Act

The article considers the interests of company members as stakeholders in the event of a company entering voluntary administration and suggests that while shareholders hold a residual interest, they nonetheless have an interest in ensuring that that the company is rescued and perhaps therefore have a role to play in the rescue of the company’s business. In doing so it argues that there is some inconsistency in recent changes in Ch 5 regarding the role of shareholders with some changes recognising their role while others have sought to downplay it.

Submission to the Productivity Commission issues paper business set-Up, transfer and closure

The Commission has been asked to identify appropriate options for reducing entry and exit barriers including advice on the potential impacts of the personal/corporate insolvency regimes on business exits...

Submission to the Productivity Commission draft report business set-up, transfer and closure

The Commission has released a Draft Report on Business Set-Up, Transfer and Closure for public consultation and input. It is pleasing to note that three chapters of the Draft Report address aspects of personal and corporate insolvency. Nevertheless, we continue to make the submission to national policy inquiries and discussions that a comprehensive review should be undertaken of the regulation of insolvency and restructuring in Australia. The last comprehensive review of the insolvency system was by the Australian Law Reform Commission (the Harmer Report) and was handed down in 1988. Whilst there have been aspects of our insolvency laws that have been reviewed since that time, none has been able to provide the clear and comprehensive analysis that is able to come from a more considered review. Such a review ought to be conducted by the Australian Law Reform Commission or similar independent panel set up for the task. We also suggest that there is a lack of data available to assist with addressing questions raised by the Draft Report. There is a need to invest in finding out, in a rigorous and informed way, how the current law operates. Until there is a willingness to make a public investment in such research with less reliance upon the anecdotal (often from well-meaning but ultimately inadequately informed participants and others) the government cannot be sure that the insolvency regime we have provides the most effective regime to underpin Australia’s commercial and financial dealings, nor that any change is justified. We also make the submission that there are benefits in a serious investigation into a merged regulatory architecture of personal and corporate insolvency and a combined personal and corporate insolvency regulator.

Phoenix activity: Regulatory challenges and the law

Remedying the mischief of phoenix activity is of practical importance. The benefits include continued confidence in our economy, law that inspires best practice among directors, and law that is articulated in a manner such that penalties act as a sufficient deterrent and the regulatory system is able to detect offenders and bring them to account. Any further reforms must accommodate and tolerate legal phoenix activity. Phoenix activity pushes tolerance of entrepreneurial activity to its absolute limits. The wisest approach would be to front end the reforms so as to alleviate the considerable detection and enforcement burden upon regulatory bodies. There is little doubt that breach of the existing law is difficult and expensive to detect; and this is a significant burden when regulators have shrinking budgets and are rapidly losing feet on the ground. This front end approach may need to include restrictions on access to limited liability. The more limited liability is misused, the stronger the argument to limit access to limited liability. This paper proposes that such an approach is a legitimate next step for a robust and mature capitalist economy.

The conundrum of phoenix activity in Australia: Is further reform necessary?

Corporate phoenixing activity is estimated to cost the Australian economy $1-3 billion dollars annually. Significant questions arise as to whether existing legal frameworks are adequate to deal with phoenix activity, and whether further reform is necessary. Bills proposing reform appear to be languishing amid doubts as to their potential effectiveness. This paper will examine the conundrum presented by phoenix activity, the importance of further reform and the impact of the lack of a statutory definition of ‘phoenix activity’ on a regulatory environment that not only uses the term, but punishes offenders accused of it.

The certainty of tax in insolvency : where does the ATO fit?

There are several ways that the Commissioner of Taxation may indirectly obtain priority over unsecured creditors. This is contrary to the principle of pari passu, a principle endorsed by the 1988 Harmer Report as one that is a fundamental objective of the law of insolvency. As the law and practice of Australia's taxation regime evolves, the law is being drafted in a manner that is inconsistent with the principle of pari passu. The natural consequence of this development is that it places at risk the capacity of corporate and bankruptcy laws to coexist and cooperate with taxation laws. This article posits that undermining the consistency of Commonwealth legislative objectives is undesirable. The authors suggest that one means of addressing the inconsistency is to examine whether there is a clearly aligned theoretical basis for the development of these areas of law and the extent that alignment addresses these inconsistencies. This forms the basis for the recommendations made around such inconsistencies using statutory priorities as an exemplar.

Cross-border insolvency

Panellist commentary on delivered conference papers on the topic of Cross-border Insolvency.