Insider Trading in Germany - Do Corporate Insiders Exploit Inside Information?

Our study focuses on the question whether corporate insiders in Germany exploit inside information while trading in their company’s stock. In contrast to prior international studies, which are not able to link insider transactions to a formal definition of inside information, we relate insider transactions to subsequent releases of inside information via ad-hoc news disclosures. We find evidence that corporate insiders as a group seem to trade on inside information. Moreover, members of the supervisory board seem to be most active in exploiting inside information, since they realize exceptionally high profits with their frequent front-running transactions.

Firms vs. insiders as traders of last resort

We explore the role of corporate insiders vs. firms as traders of last resort. We develop a simple model of insider trading in which insiders provide price support, as well as liquidity, in security markets. Consistent with the model predictions we find that in the US markets insiders trading activities have a clear impact on return distributions. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence on insiders transactions and firm transactions affecting returns in a different manner. In particular, while insiders transactions (both purchases and sales) have a strong impact on skewness in the short run and to a lesser extent in short run volatility, company repurchases only have a clear impact on volatility, both in the short and the long run. We provide explanations for this asymmetry.

Corporate bankruptcy and managers' self-serving behavior

We investigate whether insiders of bankrupt firms hold less stock or reduce their stockholdings compared to what we observed for insiders of similar firms that do not go bankrupt. We find little evidence of such time-series and cross-sectional differences in spite of the fact that the stock value of bankrupt firms falls by more than ninety percent in the five years preceding bankruptcy. One implication of our results is that the amount of stock owned and the magnitude of the trades undertaken by corporate insiders of both bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms appear to provide no information about firm value.

Moral hazard and dynamics of insider ownership stakes

In this paper, I analyze the ownership dynamics of N strategic risk-averse corporate insiders facing a moral hazard problem. A solution for the equilibrium share price and the dynamics of the aggregate insider stake is obtained in two cases: when agents can crediblycommit to an optimal ownership policy and when they cannot commit (time-consistent case). Inthe latter case, the aggregate stake gradually adjusts towards the competitive allocation. The speed of adjustment increases with N when outside investors are risk-averse, and does not depend on it when investors are risk-neutral. Predictions of the model are consistent with recent empirical findings.

Do insiders get abnormal returns? : event studies on the trades of insiders of the firms with differentiated corporate governance of the São Paulo stock exchange

The subject insider trading is controversial. This paper presents series of event studies carried through on the trades with stocks of the firm carried by insiders with the objective to detect abnormal returns, based on the access to privileged information. The sample is composed by trades performed by insiders of the companies with stocks negotiated in the São Paulo Stock Exchange, that are classified as firms with differentiated corporate governance. Indication that trades performed by insiders resulted in abnormal returns compared to the statistically significant expected ones, as in the purchases of common shares; or for selling of preferred stocks.

Investment, duration, and exit strategies for corporate and independent venture capital-backed start-ups

We propose a model of investment, duration, and exit strategies for start-ups backed by venture capital (VC) funds that accounts for the high level of uncertainty, the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, and the discount rate. Our analysis predicts that start-ups backed by corporate VC funds remain for a longer period of time before exiting and receive larger investment amounts than those financed by independent VC funds. Although a longer duration leads to a higher likelihood of an exit through an acquisition, a larger investment increases the probability of an IPO exit. These predictions find strong empirical support.

Promoting while checking self-interest : a conflict-based governance approach to rebalance corporate power disequilibria in Canada and the United States

La délégation du pouvoir de gestion aux administrateurs et aux gestionnaires, une caractéristique intrinsèque à la gestion efficace de grandes entreprises dans un contexte de capitalisme, confère une grande discrétion à l’équipe de direction. Cette discrétion, si elle n’est pas surveillée, peut mener à des comportements opportunistes envers la corporation, les actionnaires et les autres fournisseurs de capital qui n’ont pas de pouvoir de gestion. Les conflits entre ces deux classes d’agents peuvent émerger à la fois de décisions de gouvernance générale ou de transactions particulières (ie. offre publique d’achat). Dans les cas extrêmes, ces conflits peuvent mener à la faillite de la firme. Dans les cas plus typiques, ils mènent l’extraction de bénéfices privés pour les administrateurs et gestionnaires, l’expropriation des actionnaires, et des réductions de valeur pour la firme. Nous prenons le point de vue d’un petit actionnaire minoritaire pour explorer les méchanismes de gouvernance disponibles au Canada et aux États‐Unis. Après une synthèse dans la Partie 1 des théories sous‐jacentes à l’étude du pouvoir dans la corporation (séparation de la propriété et du contrôle et les conflits d’agence), nous concentrons notre analyse dans la Partie 2 sur les différents types de méchanismes (1) de gouvernance interne, (2) juridiques et (3) marchands, qui confèrent du pouvoir aux deux classes d’agents. Nous examinons comment les intérêts de ces deux classes peuvent être réalignés afin de prévenir et résoudre les conflits au sein de la firme. La Partie 3 explore un équilibre dynamique de pouvoir corporatif qui cherche à minimiser le potentiel d’opportunisme toute en préservant une quantité de discrétion suffisante pour la gestion efficace de la firme. Nous analysons des moyens pour renforcer les protections des actionnaires minoritaires et proposons un survol des pistes de réforme possibles.

Corporate Education and the Role of the Chief Learning Officer

This paper aims to present an overview on characteristics, roles and responsibilities of those who arc in charge. of the Corporate Educational Systems in several organizations from distinct industries in Brazil, based on a research carried out by the authors. The analysis compares what is available in the literature on this subject so that it may provide insights on how Brazilian companies have dealt with the difficult task of developing competences in their employees. Special attention is given to the Chief Learning Officer`s role (or the lack of it) - someone who was supposed to be in charge of the employees` development processes in a given organization. The results show that this role has not been a clear or unanimous concept yet, neither in terms of the functions to be performed nor the so-called strategic importance given to this sort of executive. This research is both exploratory and descriptive, and due to the use of intentional sample, the inferences are limited. Despite these limitations, its comments may enrich the discussion on this subject.

Pricing corporate bonds in Brazil: 2000 to 2004

This paper analyzes the factors that influence the issuing price of debentures in Brazil in the period from year 2000 to 2004, applying a factor model, in which exogenous variables explain return and price behavior. The variables in this study include: rating, choice of index, maturity, country risk, basic interest rate, long-term and short-term rate spread, the stock market index, and the foreign exchange rate. Results indicate that the index variable, probability of default and bond`s maturity influence pricing and points out associations of long-term bonds with better rating issues. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Non-linear pathways of corporate environmental management: a survey of ISO 14001-certified companies in Brazil

A study was conducted to verify whether the theory on the evolution of corporate environmental management (CEM) is applicable to organizations located in Brazil. Some of the most important proposals pertaining to the evolution of CEM were evaluated in a systematic fashion and integrated into a typical theoretical framework containing three evolutionary stages: reactive, preventive and proactive. The validity of this framework was tested by surveying 94 companies located in Brazil with ISO 14001 certification. Results indicated that the evolution of CEM tends to occur in a manner that is counter to what has generally been described in the literature. Two evolutionary stages were identified: 1) synergy for eco-efficiency and 2) environmental legislation view, which combine variables that were initially categorized into different theoretical CEM stages. These data, obtained from a direct study of Brazilian companies, suggest that the evolution of environmental management in organizations tends to occur in a non-linear fashion, requiring a re-analysis of traditional perceptions of CEM development, as suggested by Kolk and Mauser (2002). (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.