The implementation of corporate governance in Germany and Brazi l: a comparative case study

The recent promotion of best corporate governance standards by several different government institutions and non-for profit organizations resulted in the implementation of more sophisticated governance mechanisms. As consequence to the separation of ownership and control the concept of agency theory arose. Agency theory argues that without out proper control mechanism managers would behave exploit owners due to information asymmetry. Regulators have promoted corporate governance mechanisms in order to address this issue. This paper aims to contrast the implementation of best corporate governance practices in Germany and Brazil on the example of two practical examples. With this purpose in mind, this paper analyzed two companies listed in the main stock exchange in Germany and Brazil throughout a period of 5 years. In order to measure the degree of corporate governance practices implemented 3 different parameters have been chosen. In line with great part of the literature the parameters considered to be relevant are; composition, procedures and deviation from the local corporate governance code. The comparison of the data revealed that board composition in the two analyzed companies is similar regarding the proportion of independent representatives but does distinguish in size. While committees are related to the same topics it can be implied that Natura’s board is more involved in the actual management of the company. Lastly, Beiersdorf has been able to comply to a larger extend with the recommendations of the local German code than Natura to the recommendations published by Brazilian code of the IBGC.

Corporate governance and compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs):evidence from two MENA stock exchanges

This study examines the influence of corporate governance structures on the levels of compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements by companies listed on the stock exchanges of two leading MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries, Egypt and Jordan. This study employs a cross-sectional analysis of a sample of non-financial companies listed on the two stock exchanges for the fiscal year 2007. Using an unweighted disclosure index, the study measures the levels of compliance by companies listed on the two stock exchanges investigated.Univariate and multivariate regression analyses are used to estimate the relationships proposed in the hypotheses. In addition, the study uses semi-structured interviews in order to supplement the interpretation of the findings of the quantitative analyses. An innovative theoretical foundation is deployed, in which compliance is interpretable through three lenses - institutional isomorphism theory, secrecy versus transparency (one of Gray’s accounting sub-cultural values), and financial economics theories. The study extends the financial reporting literature, cross-national comparative financial disclosure literature, and the emerging markets disclosure literature by carrying out one of the first comparative studies of the above mentioned stock exchanges. Results provide evidence of a lack of de facto compliance (i.e., actual compliance) with IFRSs disclosure requirements in the scrutinised MENA countries. The impact of corporate governance mechanisms for best practice on enhancing the extent of compliance with mandatory IFRSs is absent in the stock exchanges in question. The limited impact of corporate governance best practice is mainly attributed to the novelty of corporate governance in the region, a finding which lends support to the applicability of the proposed theoretical foundation to the MENA context. Finally, the study provides recommendations for improving de facto compliance with IFRSs disclosure requirements and corporate governance best practice in the MENA region and suggests areas for future research.

Intellectual capital disclosures and corporate governance:an empirical examination

Empirical examinations of the links between corporate governance and intellectual capital are underresearched, particularly from the context of emerging economies where corporate governance mechanisms tend to be largely ceremonial due to family dominance. This study aims to address this gap in the intellectual capital disclosure (ICD) literature by undertaking an empirical examination of the relationship between corporate governance and the extent of ICD of Bangladeshi companies. Inter alia, the key findings of this study suggest that there is a non-linear relationship between family ownership and the extent of ICD. This research also found that foreign ownership, board independence, and the presence of audit committees are positively associated with the extent of ICD. Conversely, family duality (i.e., where the positions of CEO and chairperson are occupied by two individuals from the same family) is negatively associated with the extent of ICD.

Corporate governance, accountability and mechanisms of accountability: an overview

Purpose – This paper aims to review traditional corporate governance and accountability research, to suggest opportunities for future research in this field. Design/methodology/approach – The first part adopts an analytical frame of reference based on theory, accountability mechanisms, methodology, business sector/context, globalisation and time horizon. The second part of the paper locates the seven papers in the special issue in a framework of analysis showing how each one contributes to the field. The paper presents a frame of reference which may be used as a “roadmap” for researchers to navigate their way through the prior literature and to position their work on the frontiers of corporate governance research. The paper is primarily discursive and conceptual. Findings – The paper encourages broader approaches to corporate governance and accountability research beyond the traditional and primarily quantitative approaches of prior research. Broader theoretical perspectives, methodological approaches, accountability mechanism, sectors/contexts, globalisation, and time horizons are identified. Research limitations/implications – Greater use of qualitative research methods are suggested, which present challenges particularly of access to the “black box” of corporate boardrooms. Originality/value – Drawing on the analytical framework, and the papers in the special issue, the paper identifies opportunities for further research of accountability and corporate governance. Keywords Corporate governance, Management accountability, Research Paper type General review

Three essays in Swiss corporate governance

This dissertation is a combination of three relatively independent chapters on the subject of corporate governance. Corporate governance is presently at the epicenter of the global financial crisis. The lack of regulation and the misalignment of objectives have greatly contributed to the major crisis we are now in. Most governance research has been conducted in the United States in a context of widely held corporations and great executive power. It does not reflect the variety of situations around the world and we question the validity of this model in other contexts. The aim of this dissertation is to look at other governance models, in particular the Swiss corporate governance not only from a practical point of view, but also from a multi-theoretical approach. Traditional corporate governance literature has focused on the Anglo-American model that mainly follows the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) in a shareholder-manager context, and overlooked other approaches. We focus on three different aspects of corporate governance using three different theories. First, we look at the ownership type of various corporations, using the agency theory in a context where issues between shareholders predominate over the typical shareholder-manager relationship. Second, we explore the adoption process of several governance mechanisms that, due to changes in legislation, has taken place in Switzerland since 2002. We use the institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), in a context where the environmental pressures are particularly high. Finally, we spotlight the board of directors as a key element of the governance of publicly listed corporations. Particularly, we focus on the independence of the board of directors, using a combination of the agency and resource dependence theories (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).

Effective corporate governance : experimental evidence on international auditors'judgments and the contribution of financial accounting education

1 Summary This dissertation deals with two major aspects of corporate governance that grew in importance during the last years: the internal audit function and financial accounting education. In three essays, I contribute to research on these topics which are embedded in the broader corporate governance literature. The first two essays consist of experimental investigations of internal auditors' judgments. They deal with two research issues for which accounting research lacks evidence: The effectiveness of internal controls and the potentially conflicting role of the internal audit function between management and the audit committee. The findings of the first two essays contribute to the literature on internal auditors' judgment and the role of the internal audit function as a major cornerstone of corporate governance. The third essay theoretically examines a broader issue but also relates to the overall research question of this dissertation: What contributes to effective corporate governance? This last essay takes the perspective that the root for quality corporate governance is appropriate financial accounting education. r develop a public interest approach to accounting education that contributes to the literature on adequate accounting education with respect to corporate governance and accounting harmonization. The increasing importance of both the internal audit function and accounting education for corporate governance can be explained by the same recent fundamental changes that still affect accounting research and practice. First, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX, 2002) and the 8th EU Directive (EU, 2006) have led to a bigger role for the internal audit function in corporate governance. Their implications regarding the implementation of audit committees and their oversight over internal controls are extensive. As a consequence, the internal audit function has become increasingly important for corporate governance and serves a new master (i.e. the audit committee) within the company in addition to management. Second, the SOX (2002) and the 8th EU Directive introduced additional internal control mechanisms that are expected to contribute to the reliability of financial information. As a consequence, the internal audit function is expected to contribute to a greater extent to the reliability of financial statements. Therefore, effective internal control mechanisms that strengthen objective judgments and independence become important. This is especially true when external- auditors rely on the work of internal auditors in the context of the International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 610 and the equivalent US Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 65 (see IFAC, 2009 and AICPA, 1990). Third, the harmonization of international reporting standards is increasingly promoted by means of a principles-based approach. It is the leading approach since a study of the SEC (2003) that was required by the SOX (2002) in section 108(d) was in favor of this approach. As a result, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) commit themselves to the development of compatible accounting standards based on a principles-based approach. Moreover, since the Norwalk Agreement of 2002, the two standard setters have developed exposure drafts for a common conceptual framework that will be the basis for accounting harmonization. The new .framework will be in favor of fair value measurement and accounting for real-world economic phenomena. These changes in terms of standard setting lead to a trend towards more professional judgment in the accounting process. They affect internal and external auditors, accountants, and managers in general. As a consequence, a new competency set for preparers and users of financial statements is required. The basil for this new competency set is adequate accounting education (Schipper, 2003). These three issues which affect corporate governance are the initial point of this dissertation and constitute its motivation. Two broad questions motivated a scientific examination in three essays: 1) What are major aspects to be examined regarding the new role of the internal audit function? 2) How should major changes in standard setting affect financial accounting education? The first question became apparent due to two published literature reviews by Gramling et al. (2004) and Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright (2004). These studies raise various questions for future research that are still relevant and which motivate the first two essays of my dissertation. In the first essay, I focus on the role of the internal audit function as one cornerstone of corporate governance and its potentially conflicting role of serving both management and the audit committee (IIA, 2003). In an experimental study, I provide evidence on the challenges for internal auditors in their role as servant for two masters -the audit committee and management -and how this influences internal auditors' judgment (Gramling et al. 2004; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2004). I ask if there is an expectation gap between what internal auditors should provide for corporate governance in theory compared to what internal auditors are able to provide in practice. In particular, I focus on the effect of serving two masters on the internal auditor's independence. I argue that independence is hardly achievable if the internal audit function serves two masters with conflicting priorities. The second essay provides evidence on the effectiveness of accountability as an internal control mechanism. In general, internal control mechanisms based on accountability were enforced by the SOX (2002) and the 8th EU Directive. Subsequently, many companies introduced sub-certification processes that should contribute to an objective judgment process. Thus, these mechanisms are important to strengthen the reliability of financial statements. Based on a need for evidence on the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms (Brennan & Solomon, 2008; Gramling et al. 2004; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2004; Solomon & Trotman, 2003), I designed an experiment to examine the joint effect of accountability and obedience pressure in an internal audit setting. I argue that obedience pressure potentially can lead to a negative influence on accountants' objectivity (e.g. DeZoort & Lord, 1997) whereas accountability can mitigate this negative effect. My second main research question - How should major changes in standard setting affect financial accounting education? - is investigated in the third essay. It is motivated by the observation during my PhD that many conferences deal with the topic of accounting education but very little is published about what needs to be done. Moreover, the Endings in the first two essays of this thesis and their literature review suggest that financial accounting education can contribute significantly to quality corporate governance as argued elsewhere (Schipper, 2003; Boyce, 2004; Ghoshal, 2005). In the third essay of this thesis, I therefore focus on approaches to financial accounting education that account for the changes in standard setting and also contribute to corporate governance and accounting harmonization. I argue that the competency set that is required in practice changes due to major changes in standard setting. As the major contribution of the third article, I develop a public interest approach for financial accounting education. The major findings of this dissertation can be summarized as follows. The first essay provides evidence to an important research question raised by Gramling et al. (2004, p. 240): "If the audit committee and management have different visions for the corporate governance role of the IAF, which vision will dominate?" According to the results of the first essay, internal auditors do follow the priorities of either management or the audit committee based on the guidance provided by the Chief Audit executive. The study's results question whether the independence of the internal audit function is actually achievable. My findings contribute to research on internal auditors' judgment and the internal audit function's independence in the broader frame of corporate governance. The results are also important for practice because independence is a major justification for a positive contribution of the internal audit function to corporate governance. The major findings of the second essay indicate that the duty to sign work results - a means of holding people accountable -mitigates the negative effect of obedience pressure on reliability. Hence, I found evidence that control .mechanisms relying on certifications may enhance the reliability of financial information. These findings contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms. They are also important in the light of sub-certification processes that resulted from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 8th EU Directive. The third essay contributes to the literature by developing a measurement framework that accounts for the consequences of major trends in standard setting. Moreovér, it shows how these trends affect the required .competency set of people dealing with accounting issues. Based on this work, my main contribution is the development of a public interest approach for the design of adequate financial accounting curricula. 2 Serving two masters: Experimental evidence on the independence of internal auditors Abstract Twenty nine internal auditors participated in a study that examines the independence of internal auditors in their potentially competing roles of serving two masters: the audit committee and management. Our main hypothesis suggests that internal auditors' independence is not achievable in an institutional setting in which internal auditors are accountable to two different parties with potentially differing priorities. We test our hypothesis in an experiment in which the treatment consisted of two different instructions of the Chief audit executive; one stressing the priority of management (cost reduction) and one stressing the priority of the audit committee (effectiveness). Internal auditors had to evaluate internal controls and their inherent costs of different processes which varied in their degree of task complexity. Our main results indicate that internal auditors' evaluation of the processes is significantly different when task complexity is high. Our findings suggest that internal auditors do follow the priorities of either management or the audit committee depending on the instructions of a superior internal auditor. The study's results question whether the independence of the internal audit function is actually achievable. With our findings, we contribute to research on internal auditors' judgment and the internal audit function's independence in the frame of corporate governance.

Promoting while checking self-interest : a conflict-based governance approach to rebalance corporate power disequilibria in Canada and the United States

La délégation du pouvoir de gestion aux administrateurs et aux gestionnaires, une caractéristique intrinsèque à la gestion efficace de grandes entreprises dans un contexte de capitalisme, confère une grande discrétion à l’équipe de direction. Cette discrétion, si elle n’est pas surveillée, peut mener à des comportements opportunistes envers la corporation, les actionnaires et les autres fournisseurs de capital qui n’ont pas de pouvoir de gestion. Les conflits entre ces deux classes d’agents peuvent émerger à la fois de décisions de gouvernance générale ou de transactions particulières (ie. offre publique d’achat). Dans les cas extrêmes, ces conflits peuvent mener à la faillite de la firme. Dans les cas plus typiques, ils mènent l’extraction de bénéfices privés pour les administrateurs et gestionnaires, l’expropriation des actionnaires, et des réductions de valeur pour la firme. Nous prenons le point de vue d’un petit actionnaire minoritaire pour explorer les méchanismes de gouvernance disponibles au Canada et aux États‐Unis. Après une synthèse dans la Partie 1 des théories sous‐jacentes à l’étude du pouvoir dans la corporation (séparation de la propriété et du contrôle et les conflits d’agence), nous concentrons notre analyse dans la Partie 2 sur les différents types de méchanismes (1) de gouvernance interne, (2) juridiques et (3) marchands, qui confèrent du pouvoir aux deux classes d’agents. Nous examinons comment les intérêts de ces deux classes peuvent être réalignés afin de prévenir et résoudre les conflits au sein de la firme. La Partie 3 explore un équilibre dynamique de pouvoir corporatif qui cherche à minimiser le potentiel d’opportunisme toute en préservant une quantité de discrétion suffisante pour la gestion efficace de la firme. Nous analysons des moyens pour renforcer les protections des actionnaires minoritaires et proposons un survol des pistes de réforme possibles.

Corporate governance and cost of capital: evidence from Pakistani listed firms

This thesis investigates the effectiveness of Corporate Governance (CG) reforms in Pakistan. Using a sample of 160 Pakistani firms from 2003 to 2013 and governance data collected manually from the annual reports, this thesis investigates seven closely related and important corporate issues that are related to the compliance of governance rules. Specifically, it aims to : (i) investigate the degree of CG compliance with 2002 Pakistani Code of CG (PCCG); (ii) determine whether the introduction of 2002 PCCG has improved Pakistani CG practices; (iii) investigate the determinants of CG compliance and disclosure for Pakistani listed firms; (iv) test the nexus between CG compliance with the 2002 PCCG and firms’ cost of capital (COC); (v) investigate the impact of different individual CG mechanisms on listed firms COC; (vi) examine how different ownership structures impact on firms’ COC; and (vii) analyse relationship between CG structures and Cost of Equity (COE) as well as Cost of Debt (COD) for Pakistani listed firms. These empirical investigations report some important results. First, the reported findings suggest that Pakistani firms have responded positively to governance disclosure requirements over the eleven year period from 2003 to 2013. The results also show that the introduction of the PCCG in 2002 has improved CG standards by Pakistani listed firms. Second, the reported results related to the determinants of CG compliance demonstrate that significant and positive association between institutional, government and foreign ownership with CG compliance. However, findings relating to the determinants of CG compliance show a negative and significant association between board size and block ownership with CG compliance and disclosure. The study finds no significant relationship between director ownership, audit firm size and the presence of female board members with the constructed Pakistan Corporate Governance Index (PCGI). Third, the investigation on the relationship between CG and COC report a significantly negative nexus between PCGI and firms’ COC. The investigation on the association between ownership structures and COC report a negative and significant nexus between block ownership with firms’ COC. Further, a number of robustness analyses performed in this study suggest that the empirical results reported in this study are generally robust to the alternative CG variables, alternative COC variables and potential endogeneity problems.

Corporate governance : value creation and performance in credit unions

In this study, we examine the relationship between good corporate governance practices and the creation of value/performance of credit unions from 2010 to 2012. The objective was to create and validate a corporate governance index for credit unions, and to then analyse the relationship between good governance practices and the creation of value/performance. The problem question is: do good corporate governance practices provide value creation for credit unions? The research started by creating indices from factor analysis to identify latent dependent variables related to value creation and performance; next indices were created from the principal component analysis for the creation of independent latent variables related to corporate governance. Finally, based on panel data from regression models, the influence of the variables and indices related to corporate governance on the indices of value creation and performance was verified. Based on the research, it became evident that the Corporate Governance Index (IGC) is mainly impacted by Executive Management, with 40.31% of the IGC value, followed by the Representation and Participation dimension, with 34.07% of the IGC value. The contribution for academics was the creation of the Corporate Governance Index (IGC) applied for credit unions. As for the contribution to the system of credit unions, the highlight was the effectiveness of the mechanisms for economic-financial and asset management adopted by BACEN, credit unions and OCEMG.

The impact of culture and corporate governance in dividend policy: evidence from emerging and developed countries

The present research aims to analyse the impact of corporate governance and cultural dimensions in dividend policy. The corporate governance and dividend policy have a close relationship, in that both are evidenced in literature to mitigate agency problems. Cultural factors are also related to agency problems. The existence of agency problems and their solutions differs across countries and it is related to the implementation of the mechanisms of governance. So, cultural factors may have influence on corporate governance and dividend policy. Our sample consists in 1 232 companies belonging to the main indices of 38 countries classified as emerging or developed. To measure the quality of firm level corporate governance, we use the ASSET4 Corporate Governance Performance Index, developed by Thomson Reuters, and as proxy of culture we use three cultural dimensions developed by Geert Hofstede, namely uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and indulgence. We obtained significant empirical evidence that firms with high quality of corporate governance pay higher dividends. With regard to cultural factors, we confirm that in countries with high levels of masculinity and uncertainty avoidance, the dividend payout ratio is lower. On the other hand, countries with high level of indulgence have higher dividend payout ratio. However, we verify that the impact of cultural effects is minimized when the firms have a high quality level of corporate governance. Additionally, we found that the impact of corporate governance and cultural factors in dividend policy differs when dealing with emerging or developed countries.