E-contracting with price configuration for Web services and QoS

The large amount of information in electronic contracts hampers their establishment due to high complexity. An approach inspired in Software Product Line (PL) and based on feature modelling was proposed to make this process more systematic through information reuse and structuring. By assessing the feature-based approach in relation to a proposed set of requirements, it was showed that the approach does not allow the price of services and of Quality of Services (QoS) attributes to be considered in the negotiation and included in the electronic contract. Thus, this paper also presents an extension of such approach in which prices and price types associated to Web services and QoS levels are applied. An extended toolkit prototype is also presented as well as an experiment example of the proposed approach.

The US experience in contracting out security and lessons for other countries

The United States has gone further than any country in the "privatization of security". Other countries may find the economic or financial logic in the use of contractors persuasive. The US experience with contracting out security, particularly in Iraq, was problematic, and can serve as a cautionary tale in order that other countries might learn how to avoid the pitfalls.

Modeling the Diffusion of Energy Performance Contracting

The Portuguese Energy Policy considers the development of a commercially viable and competitive market for energy performance contracting (EPC) as a main mechanism to achieve the objectives of energy efficiency improvement. This paper proposes a study to investigate how to achieve widespread adoption of energy performance contracting by means of system dynamics modelling and simulation. To explore and gather insights on this question, a system dynamics model representing the system of the Portuguese EPC market at industry level will be created. The simulation of that model will provide a helpful basis for analysing and explaining the development of key variables, and accelerating learning on the managerial, organizational and political adaptation processes that foster the diffusion of EPC adoption. The first phase of this research project aims at identifying and analysing the key factors and critical cause-effect relations that drive the adoption of EPC. With this purpose, a qualitative content analysis on relevant documents was performed and a set of interviews was conducted. That data was analysed to capture the critical variables and its interrelation to formulate a preliminary representation of the system structure as stock and flow diagrams.

Multi-agent Simulation of Bilateral Contracting in Competitive Electricity Markets

Traditional vertically integrated power utilities around the world have evolved from monopoly structures to open markets that promote competition among suppliers and provide consumers with a choice of services. Market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. Electricity can be traded in both organized markets or using forward bilateral contracts. This article focuses on bilateral contracts and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral trading in competitive markets. Special attention is devoted to the negotiation process, demand response in bilateral contracting, and risk management. The article also presents a case study on forward bilateral contracting: a retailer agent and a customer agent negotiate a 24h-rate tariff. © 2014 IEEE.

Multi-agent simulation of bilateral contracting in competitive electricity markets

Traditional vertically integrated power utilities around the world have evolved from monopoly structures to open markets that promote competition among suppliers and provide consumers with a choice of services. Market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. Electricity can be traded in both organized markets or using forward bilateral contracts. This article focuses on bilateral contracts and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral trading in competitive markets. Special attention is devoted to the negotiation process, demand response in bilateral contracting, and risk management. The article also presents a case study on forward bilateral contracting: a retailer agent and a customer agent negotiate a 24h-rate tariff. © 2014 IEEE.

Multi-agent Simulation of Bilateral Contracting in Competitive Electricity Markets

Traditional vertically integrated power utilities around the world have evolved from monopoly structures to open markets that promote competition among suppliers and provide consumers with a choice of services. Market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. Electricity can be traded in both organized markets or using forward bilateral contracts. This article focuses on bilateral contracts and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral trading in competitive markets. Special attention is devoted to the negotiation process, demand response in bilateral contracting, and risk management. The article also presents a case study on forward bilateral contracting: a retailer agent and a customer agent negotiate a 24h-rate tariff.

Contracting : ein komplettierendes Finanzierungsinstrument für innovative technische Energieversorgungslösungen

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2011

Multi-agent contracting with countervailing incentives and limited liability

We consider a principal who deals with a privately informed agent protected by limited liability in a correlated information setting. The agent's technology is such that the fixed cost declines with the marginal cost (the type), so that countervailing incentives may arise. We show that, with high liability, the first-best outcome can be effected for any type if (1) the fixed cost is non-concave in type, under the contract that yields the smallest feasible loss to the agent; (2) the fixed cost is not very concave in type, under the contract that yields the maximum sustainable loss to the agent. We further show that, with low liability, the first-best outcome is still implemented for a non-degenerate range of types if the fixed cost is less concave in type than some given threshold, which tightens as the liability reduces. The optimal contract entails pooling otherwise.

Optimal contracting with private information on cost expectation and variability

We study the screening problem that arises in a framework where, initially, the agent is privately informed about both the expected production cost and the cost variability and, at a later stage, he learns privately the cost realization. The speci c set of relevant incentive constraints, and so the characteristics of the optimal mechanism, depend nely upon the curvature of the principal s marginal surplus function as well as the relative importance of the two initial information problems. Pooling of production levels is optimally induced with respect to the cost variability when the principal's knowledge imperfection about the latter is sufficiently less important than that about the expected cost.

Contracting Institutions and Development

The quality of contracting institutions has been thought to be of second-order importance next to the impact that good property rights institutions can have on long-run growth. Using a large range of proxies for each type of institution, we find a robust negative link between the quality of contracting institutions and long-run growth when we condition on property rights and a number of additional macroeconomic variables. Although the result remains something of a puzzle, we present evidence which suggests that only when property rights institutions are good do contracting institutions appear also to be good for development. Good contracting institutions can reduce long-run growth when property rights are not secured, presumably because the gains from the (costly) contracting institutions cannot be realised. This suggests that contracting institutions can benefit growth, and that the sequence of institutional change can matter.

Contracting over Prices

We defi ne a solution concept, perfectly contracted equilibrium, for an intertemporal exchange economy where agents are simultaneously price takers in spot commodity markets while engaging in non-Walrasian contracting over future prices. In a setting with subjective uncertainty over future prices, we show that perfectly contracted equi- librium outcomes are a subset of Pareto optimal allocations. It is a robust possibility for perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes to di er from Arrow-Debreu equilibrium outcomes. We show that both centralized banking and retrading with bilateral contracting can lead to perfectly contracted equilibria.

Debt enforcement and relational contracting

We examine how third-party debt enforcement affects the emergence and performance ofrelational contracts in credit markets. We implement an experiment with finitely repeatedcredit relationships in which borrowers can default. In the weak enforcement treatmentdefaulting borrowers can keep their funds invested. In the strong enforcement treatmentdefaulting borrowers have to liquidate their investment. Under weak enforcement fewerrelationships emerge in which loans are extended and repaid. When such relationships doemerge they exhibit a lower credit volume than under strong enforcement. These findingssuggest that relational contracting in credit markets requires a minimum standard of thirdpartydebt enforcement.

Cooperatives and Contracting in Agriculture: The Case of West Liberty Foods, October 2005

The West Liberty Foods turkey cooperative was formed in 1996 to purchase the assets and assume operations of Louis Rich Foods (an investor-owned processing rm), which, at the time, announced the imminent shutdown of its West Liberty, Iowa, processing facility. We study the creation and performance of this �new generation� cooperative using eld interviews with grower members and company management. We describe changes, before and after the buyout, in the contractual apparatus used for procuring live turkeys, and in the communication requirements, work expectations, and nancial positions of growers. During the private ownership period, most of the inputs (except labor and facilities) were provided by the rm; there was substantial supervision of the growers' actions; growers faced little price and production risk; and growers' equity was due largely to ownership of land and other farm assets. Our interviews reveal that, after cooperative formation, growers were exposed to considerable additional risk; monitoring of growers by the rm was less intensive; grower time and effort commitments to turkey production increased substantially; and a signicant fraction of rm (cooperative) equity came from growers' willingness to leverage their farm and personal assets (and hence indirectly their existing relationships with local lenders). We argue that some of these changes are consistent with a nancial contract where asset pledging and its corollary risk generate higher work effort by growers and a reduction in agency rents. These economies likely compensate for an organizational deadweight loss traditionally associated with cooperative governance.