873 resultados para contract types
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In this working paper is presented information on the Portuguese labour market developed with the support of the European project WORKS-“Work organisation and restructuring in the knowledge society”. Is still a on the process article and thus commentaries are welcome. The structure is based on the following topics: a) The employment policy (Time regimes - time use, flexibility, part-time work, work-life balance -, and the work contracts regimes – wages, contract types, diversity); b) Education and training (skilling outcomes, rules on retraining and further training, employability schemes, transferability of skills); c) Equal opportunities (relevance of equal opportunity regulation for restructuring outcomes, the role of gender and age regulation); d) Restructuring effects (policy on transfer of personnel, policy on redundancies, and participation or voice in restructuring).
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Tämän diplomityön päämääränäoli laatia suunnitelma voimalaitoksen toimittamiseksi EPCM-toimitustavalla. Työn keskeisiksi tavoitteiksi asetettiin EPCM-toimitustapaan perustuvan toimitustapakonseptin muodostaminen, toimituksiin liittyvien terminologian selkeyttäminen ja harmonisointi sekä voimalaitoksen suhteellisen kustannusrakenteen laatiminen. Työssä tutkittiin voimalaitostoimituksissa tavanomaisesti käytettyjä sopimustyyppejä, kiinteähintaista sopimusta ja kustannusvoittolisäsopimusta sekä harvinaisemmin käytettyjä kattohinta- ja tavoitekustannussopimusta. Vallitsevat toimitustavat, EPC- ja EPCM-toimitustavat sekä monitoimittajatapa, esiteltiin ja niiden vahvuudet sekä heikkoudet selvitettiin. Projektin ominaisuuksilla, markkinoilla ja tilaajan kyvyllä, asiantuntemuksella sekä resursseilla todettiin olevan vaikutusta toimitustavan valintaan. Lisäksi tehtiin katsaus voimalaitostoimitusten kehitystrendeihin ja projektin riskienhallintaan. Voimalaitoksen laitosjärjestelmäjako kehitettiin ja sitä soveltamalla määritettiin voimalaitoksen suhteellinen kustannusrakenne. Kattilaitoksen osuus voimalaitoksen rakentamiskustannuksista todettiin merkittävimmäksi. Laitosjärjestelmien laitekustannusten havaittiin olevan korkeimmat. EPCM-toimitustapamalli kehitettiin teoriaosan pohjalta ja sen rakenne, organisaatio, sopimustyypit ja -suhteetsekä toimituksen riskien jako kuvattiin. Voimalaitoksen rakentamiskustannuksia vertailtiin eri toimitustavoilla ja EPCM-toimitustapamalli todettiin EPC-toimitustapaa edullisemmaksi.
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Competitive Dialogue (CD) is a new contract award procedure of the European Community (EC). It is set out in Article 29 of the 'Public Sector Directive' 2004/18/EC. Over the last decades, projects were becoming more and more complex, and the existing EC procedures were no longer suitable to procure those projects. The call for a new procedure resulted in CD. This paper describes how the Directive has been implemented into the laws of two member states: the UK and the Netherlands. In order to implement the Directive, both lawmakers have set up a new and distinct piece of legislation. In each case, large parts of the Directive’s content have been repeated ‘word for word’; only minor parts have been reworded and/or restructured. In the next part of the paper, the CD procedure is examined in different respects. First, an overview is given on the different EC contract award procedures (open, restricted, negotiated, CD) and awarding methods (lowest price and Most Economically Advantageous Tender, MEAT). Second, the applicability of CD is described: Among other limitations, CD can only be applied to public contracts for works, supplies, and services, and this scope of application is further restricted by the exclusion of certain contract types. One such exclusion concerns services concessions. This means that PPP contracts which are set up as services concessions cannot be awarded by CD. The last two parts of the paper pertain to the main features of the CD procedure – from ‘contract notice’ to ‘contract award’ – and the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure. One advantage is that the dialogue allows the complexity of the project to be disentangled and clarified. Other advantages are the stimulation of innovation and creativity. These advantages are set against the procedure’s disadvantages, which include high transaction costs and a perceived hindrance of innovation (due to an ambiguity between transparency and fair competition). It is concluded that all advantages and disadvantages are related to one of three elements: communication, competition, and/or structure of the procedure. Further research is needed to find out how these elements are related.
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There is growing evidence that client firms expect outsourcing suppliers to transform their business. Indeed, most outsourcing suppliers have delivered IT operational and business process innovation to client firms; however, achieving strategic innovation through outsourcing has been perceived to be far more challenging. Building on the growing interest in the IS outsourcing literature, this paper seeks to advance our understanding of the role that relational and contractual governance plays in achieving strategic innovation through outsourcing. We hypothesized and tested empirically the relationship between the quality of client-supplier relationships and the likelihood of achieving strategic innovation, and the interaction effect of different contract types, such as fixed-price, time and materials, partnership and their combinations. Results from a pan-European survey of 248 large firms suggest that high-quality relationships between clients and suppliers may indeed help achieve strategic innovation through outsourcing. However, within the spectrum of various outsourcing contracts, only the partnership contract, when included in the client contract portfolio alongside either fixed-price, time and materials or their combination, presents a significant positive effect on relational governance and is likely to strengthen the positive effect of the quality of client-supplier relationships on strategic innovation.
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The economic rationale for public intervention into private markets through price mechanisms is twofold: to correct market failures and to redistribute resources. Financial incentives are one such price mechanism. In this dissertation, I specifically address the role of financial incentives in providing social goods in two separate contexts: a redistributive policy that enables low income working families to access affordable childcare in the US and an experimental pay-for-performance intervention to improve population health outcomes in rural India. In the first two papers, I investigate the effects of government incentives for providing grandchild care on grandmothers’ short- and long-term outcomes. In the third paper, coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato, and Marcos Vera-Hernandez, we use an experimental framework to consider the the effects of financial incentives in improving maternal and child health outcomes in the Indian state of Karnataka.
Grandmothers provide a significant amount of childcare in the US, but little is known about how this informal, and often uncompensated, time transfer impacts their economic and health outcomes. The first two chapters of this dissertation address the impact of federally funded, state-level means-tested programs that compensate grandparent-provided childcare on the retirement security of older women, an economically vulnerable group of considerable policy interest. I use the variation in the availability and generosity of childcare subsidies to model the effect of government payments for grandchild care on grandmothers’ time use, income, earnings, interfamily transfers, and health outcomes. After establishing that more generous government payments induce grandmothers to provide more hours of childcare, I find that grandmothers adjust their behavior by reducing their formal labor supply and earnings. Grandmothers make up for lost earnings by claiming Social Security earlier, increasing their reliance on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and reducing financial transfers to their children. While the policy does not appear to negatively impact grandmothers’ immediate economic well-being, there are significant costs to the state, in terms of both up-front costs for care payments and long-term costs as a result of grandmothers’ increased reliance on social insurance.
The final paper, The Role of Non-Cognitive Traits in Response to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial of Obstetrics Care Providers in India, is coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato and Marcos Vera-Hernandez. We report the results from “Improving Maternal and Child Health in India: Evaluating Demand and Supply Side Strategies” (IMACHINE), a randomized controlled experiment designed to test the effectiveness of supply-side incentives for private obstetrics care providers in rural Karnataka, India. In particular, the experimental design compares two different types of incentives: (1) those based on the quality of inputs providers offer their patients (inputs contracts) and (2) those based on the reduction of incidence of four adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (outcomes contracts). Along with studying the relative effectiveness of the different financial incentives, we also investigate the role of provider characteristics, preferences, expectations and non-cognitive traits in mitigating the effects of incentive contracts.
We find that both contract types input incentive contracts reduce rates of post-partum hemorrhage, the leading cause of maternal mortality in India by about 20%. We also find some evidence of multitasking as output incentive contract providers reduce the level of postnatal newborn care received by their patients. We find that patient health improvements in response to both contract types are concentrated among higher trained providers. We find improvements in patient care to be concentrated among the lower trained providers. Contrary to our expectations, we also find improvements in patient health to be concentrated among the most risk averse providers, while more patient providers respond relatively little to the incentives, and these difference are most evident in the outputs contract arm. The results are opposite for patient care outcomes; risk averse providers have significantly lower rates of patient care and more patient providers provide higher quality care in response to the outputs contract. We find evidence that overconfidence among providers about their expectations about possible improvements reduces the effectiveness of both types of incentive contracts for improving both patient outcomes and patient care. Finally, we find no heterogeneous response based on non-cognitive traits.
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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics
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Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.
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Despite the professed claims of microcredit alleviating poverty, little is known about what kind of credit contract is suitable for extremely poor households, also called the ultra-poor. To fill this knowledge gap, we initiated a field experiment in the river islands of northern Bangladesh, where a substantial portion of dwellers could be categorized as ultra-poor due to cyclic floods. We randomly offered four types of loans to such dwellers: regular small cash loans with one-year maturity, large cash loans with three-year maturity both with and without a one-year grace period, and in-kind livestock loans with three-year maturity and a one-year grace period. We compared uptake rates as well as the determinants of uptake and found that the uptake rate is the lowest for the regular contract, followed by the in-kind contract. Contrary to prior belief, we also found that the microcredit demand by the ultra-poor is not necessarily small, and in particular the ultra-poor are significantly more likely to join a microcredit program than the moderately poor if a grace period with longer maturity is attached to a large amount of credit, irrespective of whether the credit is provided in cash or in kind. This paper provides evidence that a typical microcredit contract with one-year maturity and without a grace period is not attractive to the ultra-poor. Microfinance institutions may need to design better credit contracts to address the poor's needs.
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"January 1981."
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.
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In this study, we investigated the relationships between psychological contract breach, affective commitment, and two types of employee performance (i.e. civic virtue behaviour and in-role performance). It was predicted that an experience of contract breach can severely hurt the affective commitment of the employees and this, in turn, results in poor in-role performance and less civic virtue behaviours. Results revealed that affective commitment had differential mediating effects on the two types of employee performance. That is, affective commitment mediated the relationship between breach and self-reported and supervisor-rated civic virtue, but not the relationship between breach and in-role performance.
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The present study addresses the call for theory-based investigations on workplace familism. It contributes to the literature by proposing and testing the moderating role of workplace familism between psychological contract breach and civic virtue behaviour. We surveyed 267 full-time employees and found main effects of both types of workplace familism (i.e. workplace organisational and workplace supervisor familism) and breach of relational obligations on civic virtue behaviour. Workplace supervisor familism also moderated the relationship between breach and civic virtue behaviour, with the negative relationship between breach and civic virtue behaviour stronger when workplace supervisor familism was high. This suggests that employees with a high level of workplace supervisor familism may feel a sense of betrayal and, therefore, respond more negatively to contract breach. Implications for practice and directions for future research are discussed.
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While the literature has suggested the possibility of breach being composed of multiple facets, no previous study has investigated this possibility empirically. This study examined the factor structure of typical component forms in order to develop a multiple component form measure of breach. Two studies were conducted. In study 1 (N = 420) multi-item measures based on causal indicators representing promissory obligations were developed for the five potential component forms (delay, magnitude, type/form, inequity and reciprocal imbalance). Exploratory factor analysis showed that the five components loaded onto one higher order factor, namely psychological contract breach suggesting that breach is composed of different aspects rather than types of breach. Confirmatory factor analysis provided further evidence for the proposed model. In addition, the model achieved high construct reliability and showed good construct, convergent, discriminant and predictive validity. Study 2 data (N = 189), used to validate study 1 results, compared the multiple-component measure with an established multiple item measure of breach (rather than a single item as in study 1) and also tested for discriminant validity with an established multiple item measure of violation. Findings replicated those in study 1. The findings have important implications for considering alternative, more comprehensive and elaborate ways of assessing breach.