A Logic Framework of Normative-based Contract Management

We explore of the feasibility of the computationally oriented institutional agency framework proposed by Governatori and Rotolo testing it against an industrial strength scenario. In particular we show how to encode in defeasible logic the dispute resolution policy described in Article 67 of FIDIC.

It's all in the contract: Rethinking feminist critiques of contract

This article examines contemporary feminist arguments about contract. It does not aim to advance new arguments for or against contract but to call into question the dominant feminist position which is that contract has to be cast aside and/or that alternative approaches to contract have to be developed in order to advance the position of women. In a reworking of Elizabeth Kingdom's anti-essentialist approach to rights, Sullivan argues that a feminist but non-essentialist approach to contract is both possible and desirable. Sullivan explores a number of concrete situations in the Australian context where contract approaches have been deployed in law and public policy and demonstrates that contract may be detrimental or advantageous to the position of women. Sullivan argues, therefore, for a strategic and critical feminist approach to the utilisation of the language and practice of contract.

An integrated system to support electricity tariff contract definition

This paper presents an integrated system that helps both retail companies and electricity consumers on the definition of the best retail contracts and tariffs. This integrated system is composed by a Decision Support System (DSS) based on a Consumer Characterization Framework (CCF). The CCF is based on data mining techniques, applied to obtain useful knowledge about electricity consumers from large amounts of consumption data. This knowledge is acquired following an innovative and systematic approach able to identify different consumers’ classes, represented by a load profile, and its characterization using decision trees. The framework generates inputs to use in the knowledge base and in the database of the DSS. The rule sets derived from the decision trees are integrated in the knowledge base of the DSS. The load profiles together with the information about contracts and electricity prices form the database of the DSS. This DSS is able to perform the classification of different consumers, present its load profile and test different electricity tariffs and contracts. The final outputs of the DSS are a comparative economic analysis between different contracts and advice about the most economic contract to each consumer class. The presentation of the DSS is completed with an application example using a real data base of consumers from the Portuguese distribution company.

No right to perform a contract?

Thesis submitted in Trinity Term 2001 for the degree of Master of Philosophy, Worcester College, Oxford

Contract law

Livro editado para celebrar dos 10 anos da Faculdade de Direito da UNL

Contract-program evaluation: Impact of the DRG classification system on hospitals' outputs

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Psychological contract in non-governmental organizations

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Taxonomic guide to the polychaetes of the northern Gulf of Mexico / prepared by Joan M. Uebelacker and Paul G. Johnson, editors ; prepared under MMS contract 14-12-001-29091 for Minerals Management Service, U.S. Dept. of the Interior.

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Venture capital meets contract theory: risky claims or formal control?

This paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of formal control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. We argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain formal control in order to avoid excessive interference. Hence, we predict that risky claims should be be negatively correlated to control rights, both along the life of a start-up and across deals. This challenges the idea that risky claims should a ways be associated to more formal control, and is in line with contractual terms increasingly used in venture capital, in corporate venturing and in partnership deals between biotech start-ups and large drug companies. The paper provides a theoretical explanation to some puzzling evidence documented in Gompers (1997) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), namely the inclusion in venture capital contracts of contingencies that trigger both a reduction in VC control and the conversion! of her preferred stocks into common stocks.

The Social contract with endogenous sentiments

Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.