Consumer welfare effects of introducing and labeling genetically modified food

Non-hypothetical valuations obtained from experimental auctions in three United States and two European locations were used to calculate welfare effects of introducing and labeling of genetically modified food. Under certain assumptions, we find that introduction of genetically modified food has been welfare enhancing, on average, for United States consumers but not so for Europeans and while mandatory labeling has been beneficial for European consumers, such a policy would be detrimental in the United States. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Consumer welfare and the loss induced by withholding information: The case of BSE in Italy

The paper develops a measure of consumer welfare losses associated with withholding it formation about a possible link between BSE and vCJD. The Cost of Ignorance (COI) is measured by comparing the utility of the informed choice with the utility of the uninformed choice, under conditions of improved information. Unlike previous work that is largely based on a single equation demand model, the measure is obtained retrieving a cost,function from a dynamic Almost Ideal Demand System. The estimated perceived loss for Italian consumers due to delayed information ranges from 12 percent to 54 percent of total meat expenditure, depending on the month assumed to embody correct beliefs about the safety level of beef.

Energy efficiency standard and labeling program and consumer welfare : a case of the air conditioner market in China

Improving energy efficiency is an unarguable emergent issue in developing economies and an energy efficiency standard and labeling program is an ideal mechanism to achieve this target. However, there is concern regarding whether the consumers will choose the highly energy efficient appliances because of its high price in consequence of the high cost. This paper estimates how the consumer responds to introduction of the energy efficiency standard and labeling program in China. To quantify evaluation by consumers, we estimated their consumer surplus and the benefits of products based on the estimated parameters of demand function. We found the following points. First, evaluation of energy efficiency labeling by the consumer is not monotonically correlated with the number of grades. The highest efficiency label (Label 1) is not evaluated to be no less higher than labels 2 and 3, and is sometimes lower than the least energy efficient label (Label UI). This goes against the design of policy intervention. Second, several governmental policies affects in mixed directions: the subsidies for energy saving policies to the highest degree of the labels contribute to expanding consumer welfare as the program was designed. However, the replacement for new appliances policies decreased the welfare.

Unilateral versus coordinated effects:comparing the impact on consumer welfare of alternative merger outcomes

The nature of tacitly collusive behaviour often makes coordination unstable, and this may result in periods of breakdown, during which consumers benet from reduced prices. This is allowed for by adding demand uncertainty to the Compte et al. (2002) model of tacit collusion amongst asymmetric rms. Breakdowns occur when a rm cannot exclude the possibility of a deviation by a rival. It is then possible that an outcome with collusive behaviour, subject to long/frequent break downs, can improve consumer welfare compared to an alternative with sustained unilateral conduct. This is illustrated by re-examining the Nestle/Perrier merger analyzed by Compte et al., but now also taking into account the potential for welfare losses arising from unilateral behaviour.

Unilateral versus coordinated effects:comparing the impact on consumer welfare of alternative merger outcomes

The nature of tacitly collusive behaviour often makes coordination unstable, and this may result in periods of breakdown, during which consumers benefit from reduced prices. This is allowed for by adding demand uncertainty to the Compte et al. (2002) model of tacit collusion amongst asymmetric firms. Breakdowns occur when a firm cannot exclude the possibility of a deviation by a rival. It is then possible that an outcome with collusive behaviour, subject to long/frequent break downs, can improve consumer welfare compared to an alternative with sustained unilateral conduct. This is illustrated by re-examining the Nestle/Perrier merger analyzed by Compte et al., but now also taking into account the potential for welfare losses arising from unilateral behaviour.

Does generic entry always increase consumer welfare?

This article examines how the nature of competition between brands in a therapeutic category changes after generic entry and provides a framework for analyzing the effect of generic entry on consumer welfare that takes into account the generic free riding problem. It demonstrates that changes in competition along dimensions other than retail price - such as competition in research and development efforts and in promotional activities - may, in certain situations, result in generic entry having an overall negative impact on consumer welfare.

Unveiling Fairness for the Consumer:The Law, Economics and Justice of Expanded Arbitration

In recent years, the US Supreme Court has rather controversially extended the ambit of the Federal Arbitration Act to extend arbitration’s reach into, inter alia¸ consumer matters, with the consequence that consumers are often (and unbeknownst to them) denied remedies which would otherwise be available. Such denied remedies include recourse to class action proceedings, effective denial of punitive damages, access to discovery and the ability to resolve the matter in a convenient forum.

The court’s extension of arbitration’s ambit is controversial. Attempts to overturn this extension have been made in Congress, but to no avail. In contrast to American law, European consumer law looks at pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate directed at consumers with extreme suspicion, and does so on the grounds of fairness. In contrast, some argue that pre-dispute agreements in consumer (and employment) matters are consumer welfare enhancing: they decrease the costs of doing business, which is then passed on to the consumer. This Article examines these latter claims from both an economic and normative perspective.

The economic analysis of these arguments shows that their assumptions do not hold. Rather than being productive of consumer surplus, the use of arbitration is likely to have the opposite effect. The industries from which the recent Supreme Court cases originated not only do not exhibit the industrial structure assumed by the proponents of expanded arbitration, but are also industries which exhibit features that facilitate consumer welfare reducing collusion.

The normative analysis addresses the fairness concerns. It is explicitly based upon John Rawls’ notion of “justice as fairness,” which can provide a lens to evaluate social institutions. This Rawlsian analysis considers the use of extended arbitration in consumer matters in the light of the earlier economic results. It suggests that the asymmetries present in the contractual allocation of rights serve as prima facie evidence that such arbitration–induced exclusions are prima facie unjust/unfair. However, as asymmetry is only a prima facie test, a generalized criticism of the arbitration exclusions (of the sort found in Congress and underlying the European regime) is overbroad.

Section 46(1) and 46(1AA) of the TPA : the struggle of the small against the large

The purpose of this article is to highlight the conflict in the policy objectives of subs 46(1) and subs 46(1AA) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA). The policy objective of subs 46(1) is to promote competition and efficient markets for the benefit of consumers (consumer welfare standard). It does not prohibit corporations with substantial market power using cost savings arising from efficiencies such economies of scale or scope, to undercut small business competitors The policy objective of 46(1AA), on the other hand, is to protect small business operators from price discounting by their larger competitors.. Unlike subs 46(1), it does not contain a ‘taking advantage’ element. It is argued that subs 46(1AA) may harm consumer welfare by having a chilling effect on price competition if this would harm small business competitors.

Examining the covert nature of product placement : implications for public policy

As consumers become better educated and more skeptical of traditional advertising, alternate forms of marketing communication have emerged that aim to influence audiences unobtrusively. One such example is product placement. Product placement has attracted ongoing debate as to whether it is covert, unethical, and influences consumption. The current article examines the nature and practice of product placement in this light. This taxonomy of product placement attributes is based on current marketing practice and examines whether this is, indeed, a covert marketing strategy. Further, it presents a conceptualization of the influence of product placement on consumer welfare. We highlight that the many forms of product placement necessitate independent evaluation to determine ethical and regulatory standards. Operational solutions for developing public policy are offered.

Competition Law in Australia [6th ed.]

Competition Law in Australia, 6th edition provides a comprehensive discussion of the provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) dealing with the regulation of competition and markets in Australia. This book covers disparate topics, such as restrictions in horizontal and vertical agreements, horizontal mergers and acquisitions, misuse of market power, and access to services necessary to compete in upstream or downstream markets. However, the unifying theme of this text is that it is not possible to use a formalistic approach in applying the CCA. The decisions of the courts, and the competition authorities responsible for implementing and enforcing the CCA, underline the need to undertake a detailed substantive economic analysis of the effect of the agreement or conduct at issue on competition, efficiency and consumer welfare.

Le contrat de distribution exclusive et le principe de la concurrence au Canada

Les contrats de distribution exclusive sont couramment utilisés dans la mise en marché des produits. Des doutes et des critiques ont été, pourtant, soulevés relativement à leur validité au regard du droit de la concurrence. Ces ententes et les pratiques qui en découlent paraissent, à première vue, anticoncurrentielles. Le propos de ce mémoire est d’examiner dans quelle mesure les contrats de distribution exclusive peuvent, en fait, stimuler la concurrence et de montrer, en conséquence, qu’ils devraient être considérés licites eu égard au droit de la concurrence. Nous trouvons, d’une part, que les pratiques exclusives sont suspectes vu qu’elles réduisent la liberté contractuelle du producteur et du distributeur. Cette restriction est susceptible d’entraver la concurrence à cause du pouvoir de marché qu’elle crée et elle peut, de ce fait, engendrer le monopole. La Loi sur la concurrence interdit de tels agissements. Les contrats de distribution exclusive peuvent, d’autre part, favoriser réellement la concurrence. Ils constituent un instrument stratégique utilisé par les entrepreneurs dans leur lutte pour accroître leur part de marché. La distribution exclusive, en portant les acteurs commerciaux à chercher les meilleures stratégies, renforce la concurrence. Celle-ci doit être entendue non seulement comme une constante rivalité entre toutes les entreprises, mais elle doit aussi inclure la coopération entre certaines entreprises en vue de mieux concurrencer d’autres à un niveau plus général. Une juste appréciation de la concurrence dans les contrats de distribution exclusive requiert le recours à l’analyse économique du droit. Cette analyse permet une évaluation de la concurrence basée sur le critère de l’efficience économique. En vue de déterminer si une pratique donnée augmente ou non le bien-être général (sur quoi l’analyse de l’efficience met l’accent), les effets négatifs de cette pratique devraient être mis en balance avec ses effets positifs résultant des gains en efficience. C’est dans ce sens que le droit de la concurrence a évolué tant dans l’Union européenne qu’aux États-Unis et au Canada pour permettre les ententes qui entraînent des gains nets d’efficience. Ce qu’on aurait pu condamner autrefois pour entrave à la concurrence, peut maintenant paraître comme une stratégie commerciale licite et saine. Compte tenu de ce récent développement, notre analyse nous conduit à la conclusion que les accords de distribution exclusive devraient être considérés licites dans la mesure où ils améliorent le bien-être du consommateur.

Essais sur les logiciels libres : licences doubles, effets de réseau, et concurrence

This thesis examines the microeconomic consequences of the arrival of open source in the software market. Specifically, it analyzes three features of open source software by using specific models of industrial organization. Open source software is free, and may be modified or duplicated by anyone. The first paper studies the entry of an open source software in a closed source software market. Using a model of horizontal differentiation, the analysis considers a closed source firm's investment in the quality of its software. The introduction of open source on the market reduces the firm's investment in quality and increases the price of its software. Moreover, the entry of open source software may reduce consumer welfare. Post-entry by an open source software, the reduction in market share lowers the firm's incentive to invest in quality. The second paper features vertical differentiation to study a monopolist selling supporting product to its software. The study begins by contrasting the supply of support by an open source provider and a closed source vendor. The model shows that in both cases the levels of support offered are the same. In addition, consumer welfare is higher and profit lower under an open source software. Then, the paper considers the competition in the provision of support. Here, the supply of high level support is greater than under a monopolist. Finally, the monopolist adopts a dual licensing strategy to extract more surplus from developers interested in modifying open source software and redistributing the resulting product. This technique, when the developers place high value on the source code, generates more profit if the monopolist chooses to publish as open source rather than closed source. The last paper studies how a closed source firm is affected by the introduction of an open source benefiting from contributions by users. A vertical differentiation model is used, and reveals that, when contribution of users is present, the closed source vendor may lower its price to a level where it forces the open source out of the market. The firm's lower price not only increases demand for its software, but also induces consumers into switching from open to closed source software therefore reducing the contribution of users.

Nationalism and ideology in an anticonsumption movement

In this research we examine the role of the nationalist ideology of swadeshi in a contemporary anticonsumption movement and show that its deployment is linked to the experiences of colonialism, modernity, and globalization in India. Specifically, we offer a postcolonial understanding of reflexivity and nationalism in an anticonsumption movement opposing Coca-Cola in India. This helps us offer an interpretation of this consumer movement involving spatial politics, temporal heterogeneity, appropriation of existing ideology, the use of consumption in ideology, and attempts to bring together a disparate set of actors in the movement.

Avaliação de desempenho em mercados reguladores de transporte urbano por ônibus :proposição de um modelo aplicável ao caso de Natal

Increased competition in the market of urban transport, characteristic of the Brazilian cities from years 90, has required actions of the managing agencies to ensure the universality of service, enhancing efficiency and consumer welfare. It grows in the Brazilian municipalities, the need to adopt a systematic performance evaluation in terms of management system of indicators and targets appropriate to the regulatory context, which has the purpose of evaluating the accomplishment and compliance by dealers, of the services granted during the contract period, marked by increasingly long periods. The introduction of an index operational performance in permission contracts/concession in urban buses is intended to establish a regulatory performance, giving the contract a pro-competitive feature and to allow the managing agency the systematic and continuous monitoring of the performance of the delegated service to avoid major deviations from desired performance. A performance assessment model of public transportation companies by bus, and applicable to the case of Natal is proposed. Sought to add the particularities found in the transport system in order to assess the performance of enterprises, contribute to improving the service quality to the population and enable decision-makers a detailed knowledge of the behavior of the licensees

Legal and economic interfaces between antidumping and competition policy

Includes bibliography