Protecting the most vulnerable in consumer credit transactions

There are two key ways in which the Australian Uniform Consumer Credit Code seeks to protect consumers in relation to consumer credit transactions. The first is by means of disclosure regulation where information is required to be disclosed to the consumer before the credit contract is entered into and the second is by way of “safety net” provisions, where contracts can be varied or set aside in the event of hardship, a finding that the transaction was unjust, or a finding of unconscionable fees or charges. This article explores the limitations of both of these means of protection, particularly in the case of vulnerable, low-income consumers. In order to highlight the inadequacies of these forms of consumer protection and the need for regulatory reform, we draw on interviews conducted with 30 low-income consumers who had recently signed a credit contract, focusing on their understanding of information disclosed in the contract, as well as their responses to hypothetical unfair terms and their understanding of their rights, for example in the event of an unjust transaction. These interviews were conducted as part of a joint research project between Brotherhood of St Laurence and Griffith University’s Centre for Credit and Consumer Law, funded by Consumer Affairs Victoria.

National consumer credit laws, financial exclusion and interest rate caps : The case for diversity within a centralised framework

Australia is going through a major reform of consumer credit regulation, with the implementation of a proposal to transfer regulatory responsibility from the State and Territory Governments to the Commonwealth Government. While the broad policy approach is supported, the reform process has missed a significant opportunity to engage directly with issues of financial exclusion and with the potential role of regulation to reduce financial exclusion. The imposition of an interest rate cap can limit the impact of financial exclusion. However, the future of the existing interest rate caps is uncertain, given the diversity of approaches, and the heated debate that surrounds this issue. In the absence of support for regulatory initiatives to increase the availability of low cost, small loans, permitting regulatory diversity on this issue of interest rate caps, within an otherwise centralised regulatory framework., can minimise the impact of financial exclusion on consumers.

Preventing consumer credit over-commitment and irresponsible lending in Australia

Mirroring the trends in other developed countries, levels of household debt in Australia have risen markedly in recent years. As one example, the total amount lent by banks to individuals has risen from $175.5 billion in August 1995 to $590.5 billion in August 2005.1 Consumer groups an~ media commentators here have long raised concerns about the risks of increasing levels of household debt and over-commitment, linking these issues at least in part to irresponsible lending practices. And more recently, the Reserve Bank Governor has also expressed concerns about the ability 'of some households to manage if personal or economic circumstances change.2

Lender liability in the Consumer Credit Market

In many countries consumer credit legislation provides for the extension of liability for product failure to the …nancial institution that advances credit to the consumer. In particular, lender liability is imposed on those credit grantors who closely operate with the supplier of the good. This paper provides a rationale for lender-responsibility in the consumer credit market. It shows that, when judicial enforcement is ine¢cient or there is risk of seller liquidation, lender-liability helps to protect consumers who systematically underestimate the probability of product failure and overestimate the extent to which they can obtain compensation.

Informational synergies in consumer credit

Lenders can tap into multiple sources of private information to assess consumer credit risk but little is known about the informational synergies between these sources. Using unique panel data on checking accounts and credit card accounts from the same customers during 2007-2014, we find that activity measures from both account types contain information beyond credit scores and other controls. Checking accounts display warning indications earlier and more accurately than credit card accounts. We also investigate the consistency of information, the reasons for defaults, and selection effects. The evidence highlights sizeable informational synergies that lenders can use to manage credit relationships.

How to advertise consumer credit : complying with the law.

"January 1990"--P. [4] of cover.

A new credit crunch? : the cost of credit for consumers and small businesses in New England : field hearing before the Subcommittee on Consumer Credit and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, October 12, 1994.

Mode of access: Internet.

Inaccurate and unfair billing practices : hearings before Subcommittee on Consumer Credit of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States, Ninety-third Congress, first session, on S. 1630 and S. 1914 ... May 21, 22, 23, and 24, 1973.

Mode of access: Internet.

Report to the Subcommittee on Judiciary of the Advisory Commission on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.

Mode of access: Internet.