984 resultados para construction price
Resumo:
Client owners usually need an estimate or forecast of their likely building costs in advance of detailed design in order to confirm the financial feasibility of their projects. Because of their timing in the project life cycle, these early stage forecasts are characterized by the minimal amount of information available concerning the new (target) project to the point that often only its size and type are known. One approach is to use the mean contract sum of a sample, or base group, of previous projects of a similar type and size to the project for which the estimate is needed. Bernoulli’s law of large numbers implies that this base group should be as large as possible. However, increasing the size of the base group inevitably involves including projects that are less and less similar to the target project. Deciding on the optimal number of base group projects is known as the homogeneity or pooling problem. A method of solving the homogeneity problem is described involving the use of closed form equations to compare three different sampling arrangements of previous projects for their simulated forecasting ability by a cross-validation method, where a series of targets are extracted, with replacement, from the groups and compared with the mean value of the projects in the base groups. The procedure is then demonstrated with 450 Hong Kong projects (with different project types: Residential, Commercial centre, Car parking, Social community centre, School, Office, Hotel, Industrial, University and Hospital) clustered into base groups according to their type and size.
Resumo:
Teachers of construction economics and estimating have for a long time recognised that there is more to construction pricing than detailed calculation of costs (to the contractor). We always get to the point where we have to say "of course, experience or familiarity of the market is very important and this needs judgement, intuition, etc". Quite how important is the matter in construction pricing is not known and we tend to trivialise its effect. If judgement of the market has a minimal effect, little harm would be done, but if it is really important then some quite serious consequences arise which go well beyond the teaching environment. Major areas of concern for the quantity surveyor are in cost modelling and cost planning - neither of which pay any significant attention to the market effect. There are currently two schools of thought about the market effect issue. The first school is prepared to ignore possible effects until more is known. This may be called the pragmatic school. The second school exists solely to criticise the first school. We will call this the antagonistic school. Neither the pragmatic nor the antagonistic schools seem to be particularly keen to resolve the issue one way or the other. The founder and leader of the antagonistic school is Brian Fine whose paper in 1974 is still the basic text on the subject, and in which he coined the term 'socially acceptable' price to describe what we now recognise as the market effect. Mr Fine's argument was then, and is since, that the uncertainty surrounding the contractors' costing and cost estimating process is such that the uncertainty surrounding the contractors' cost that it logically leads to a market-orientated pricing approach. Very little factual evidence, however, seems to be available to support these arguments in any conclusive manner. A further, and more important point for the pragmatic school, is that, even if the market effect is as important as Mr Fine believes, there are no indications of how it can be measured, evaluated or predicted. Since 1974 evidence has been accumulating which tends to reinforce the antagonists' view. A review of the literature covering both contractors' and designers' estimates found many references to the use of value judgements in construction pricing (Ashworth & Skitmore, 1985), which supports the antagonistic view in implying the existence of uncertainty overload. The most convincing evidence emerged quite by accident in some research we recently completed with practicing quantity surveyors in estimating accuracy (Skitmore, 1985). In addition to demonstrating that individual quantity surveyors and certain types of buildings had significant effect on estimating accuracy, one surprise result was that only a very small amount of information was used by the most expert surveyors for relatively very accurate estimates. Only the type and size of building, it seemed, was really relevant in determining accuracy. More detailed information about the buildings' specification, and even a sight to the drawings, did not significantly improve their accuracy level. This seemed to offer clear evidence that the constructional aspects of the project were largely irrelevant and that the expert surveyors were somehow tuning in to the market price of the building. The obvious next step is to feed our expert surveyors with more relevant 'market' information in order to assess its effect. The problem with this is that our experts do not seem able to verbalise their requirements in this respect - a common occurrence in research of this nature. The lack of research into the nature of market effects on prices also means the literature provides little of benefit. Hence the need for this study. It was felt that a clearer picture of the nature of construction markets would be obtained in an environment where free enterprise was a truly ideological force. For this reason, the United States of America was chosen for the next stage of our investigations. Several people were interviewed in an informal and unstructured manner to elicit their views on the action of market forces on construction prices. Although a small number of people were involved, they were thought to be reasonably representative of knowledge in construction pricing. They were also very well able to articulate their views. Our initial reaction to the interviews was that our USA subjects held very close views to those held in the UK. However, detailed analysis revealed the existence of remarkably clear and consistent insights that would not have been obtained in the UK. Further evidence was also obtained from literature relating to the subject and some of the interviewees very kindly expanded on their views in later postal correspondence. We have now analysed all the evidence received and, although a great deal is of an anecdotal nature, we feel that our findings enable at least the basic nature of the subject to be understood and that the factors and their interrelationships can now be examined more formally in relation to construction price levels. I must express my gratitude to the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors' Educational Trust and the University of Salford's Department of Civil Engineering for collectively funding this study. My sincere thanks also go to our American participants who freely gave their time and valuable knowledge to us in our enquiries. Finally, I must record my thanks to Tim and Anne for their remarkable ability to produce an intelligible typescript from my unintelligible writing.
Resumo:
Little attention has been focussed on a precise definition and evaluation mechanism for project management risk specifically related to contractors. When bidding, contractors traditionally price risks using unsystematic approaches. The high business failure rate our industry records may indicate that the current unsystematic mechanisms contractors use for building up contingencies may be inadequate. The reluctance of some contractors to include a price for risk in their tenders when bidding for work competitively may also not be a useful approach. Here, instead, we first define the meaning of contractor contingency, and then we develop a facile quantitative technique that contractors can use to estimate a price for project risk. This model will help contractors analyse their exposure to project risks; and help them express the risk in monetary terms for management action. When bidding for work, they can decide how to allocate contingencies strategically in a way that balances risk and reward.
Resumo:
Gazprom is determined to continue its efforts to build the South Stream gas pipeline regardless of the slump on the European gas market and the fact that there is sufficient capacity already in the existing transport infrastructure. The official inauguration of the maritime section of South Stream was held on 7 December this year, but the construction itself will commence in 2014. The agreements concluded so far, both intergovernmental and between corporations, are necessary for the launch of the construction of the new pipeline, but still do not guarantee that the project will be completed on time. First of all, some legal problems have yet to be resolved, such as the evaluation of the compliance of the planned actions with the ‘third energy package’ or the fact that ecological surveys required under European law need to be carried out. Secondly, given the present situation on the European gas market and medium-term forecasts, the high cost of implementation of this project and the maintenance expenses of existing pipelines – which are not being used to full capacity – the new project seems to be unfeasible. However, Gazprom’s determination in its efforts to build the pipeline proves that Russia is ready to take a high economic risk to maintain its dominant position on the European gas supply market; it will restrict the possibilities of alternative infrastructural projects being implemented (above all, the EU’s Southern Corridor) and use the construction of new pipelines as an instrument of political pressure on the present transit countries (especially Ukraine).
Resumo:
Building construction is a highly competitive and risky business. This competitiveness is compounded where conflicting objectives amongst contracting and subcontracting firms set the stage for an adversarial and potentially destructive business relationship. Clients, especially those from the public sector, need broader tender evaluation criteria to complement the traditional focus on bid price. There is also a need for change in the construction industry—not only to a more cooperative approach between the constructing parties—but also from a confrontationist attitude to a more harmonious relationship between all stakeholders in providing constructed facilities. A strategic alliance is a cooperative relationship between two or more organisations that forms part of their overall strategies, and contributes to achieving their major goals and objectives. Strategic alliances in building construction may provide a useful tool to assist public sector construction managers evaluate tenders and concurrently encourage more cooperative relationships amongst construction stakeholders. This paper begins with an overview of the Australian building construction industry, then reviews the existing strategic alliance literature and describes an analysis framework comprising six attributes of strategic alliances for application to construction organisations—trust, commitment, interdependence, cooperation, communication, and joint problem solving. These attributes are currently being used to collect data from 70 building construction firms in Queensland to assess their respective levels of strategic alliance. Given the trend towards broader indicators of construction firm performance, these attributes are proposed as a tool for use in the tender evaluation process for public works.
Resumo:
Pragmatic construction professionals, accustomed to intense price competition and focused on the bottom line, have difficulty justifying investments in advanced technology. Researchers and industry professionals need improved tools to analyze how technology affects the performance of the firm. This paper reports the results of research to begin answering the question, “does technology matter?” The researchers developed a set of five dimensions for technology strategy, collected information regarding these dimensions along with four measures of competitive performance in five bridge construction firms, and analyzed the information to identify relationships between technology strategy and competitive performance. Three technology strategy dimensions—competitive positioning, depth of technology strategy, and organizational fit—showed particularly strong correlations with the competitive performance indicators of absolute growth in contract awards and contract award value per technical employee. These findings indicate that technology does matter. The research also provides ways to analyze options for approaching technology and ways to relate technology to competitive performance for use by managers. It also provides a valuable set of research measures for technology strategy.
Resumo:
The purpose of this paper is to study the profiling of property, plant and equipment (PPE) contributions in Australia and Malaysia construction companies. A company’s worth is usually based on the listed share price on the stock exchange. In arriving at the net profit, the contribution of PPE in the company’s assets is somehow being neglected. This paper will investigate the followings; firstly the level of PPE contribution in the construction firms by comparing the PPE contributions to the company’s asset as a whole which includes fixed (non-current) assets and current assets. This will determine the true strength of the companies, rather than relying on the share prices alone. Secondly, the paper will determine the trend of company’s asset ownership to show the company’s performance of the PPE ownership during the period of study. The data is based on the selected construction companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and Malaysian Stock Exchange, known as Bursa Malaysia. The profiling will help to determine the strength of the construction firms based on the PPE holding, and the level of PPE ownerships in the two countries construction firms during the period of study.
Resumo:
The construction industry contains two types of estimators the contractors' estimator and the designers' price forecaster. Each has two models of the building in which to systemize his procedures - the production model and the design model. The use of these models is discussed in the light of the industry's particular problems of complexity and uncertainty together with the pressures of the market. It is argued that estimators and forecasters, in order to function effectively in these conditions, are forced to exercise a high degree of subjective judgment. Means of eliciting good heuristics involved in judgment making are considered by reference to the artificial intelligence and construction literature and a methodology is proposed based on these findings. The results of two early trials of the method with students are given, indicating the usefulness of the approach.
Resumo:
This paper describes an analysis of construction project bids to determine (a) the global distribution and (b) factors influencing the distribution of bids. The global distribution of bids was found, by using a battery of ll test statistics, to be approximated by a three-parameter log normal distribution. No global spread parameter was found. A multivariate analysis revealed the year of tender to be the major influencing factor. Consideration of the construction order, tender price and output indices lead to the conclusion that distributional spread reflected the degree of difference in pricing policies between bidders and the skewness of the distributions reflected the degree of competition. The paper concludes with a tentative model of the causal relationships between the factors and distributional characteristics involved.
Resumo:
Construction projects are a high risk business activity. When undertaking projects in an international context, it is further complicated by the risk of fluctuations in the foreign exchange rates (FOREX). Construction business performance is affected by these fluctuations. They affect progress and cause delays, which in turn create problems for subcontractors, namely cost overruns, disputes, arbitration, total abandonment and litigation. FOREX fluctuations also cause the price of raw materials to increase, leading the cost overruns. Managing FOREX risk is critical and past research have focused on the need for adequate insurance, careful planning and management, and foreign exchange futures hedging to overcome issues that have been caused by the FOREX risk. Analysis of FOREX risk in international construction business usually focused only on issues at the project level. There is currently lack of understanding of Organisational Capabilities (OC) to manage the impacts of FOREX risk, which when examined, are seen in isolation. This paper attempts to bridge the gap by discussing the impacts of FOREX fluctuations on the international construction business. The focus is on the OC perspective and the need to develop OC framework to mitigate the risk in sustaining construction business performance.