Argument of Horace Binney, Esq., in the case of Vidal v. the city of Philadelphia : in the Supreme Court of the United States, February, 1844.

Cover title: Charitable uses; argument of Horace Binney.

IOWA Principles and Practices for Charitable Nonprofit Excellence, 2006

Task Force members formulated these principles and practices as a way to promote good management practices, ethical conduct, and public accountability. By compiling the information in this guide, we hope to provide a valuable tool for organizations and individuals as they go about the work of building better Iowa communities.

Pay-as-you-go social security and the distribution of bequests

This paper studies the impact of an unfunded social security system on the distribution of bequests in a framework where savings are due both by life cycle and by random altruistic motivations. We show that the impact of social security on the distribution of bequests depends crucially on the importance of the bequest motive in explaining savings behavior. If the bequest motive is strong, then an increase in the social security tax raises the bequests left by altruistic parents. On the other hand, when the importance of bequests in motivating savings is sufficiently low, theincrease in the social security tax could result in a reduction of the bequests left by altruistic parents under some conditions on the attitude of individuals toward risk and on the relative returns associated with private saving and social security. Some implications concerning the transitional effects of introducing an unfunded social security scheme are also discussed.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Giving Wisely: A Guide to Charitable Giving and Avoiding Charity Fraud, November 2012

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Giving Wisely: A Guide to Charitable Giving and Avoiding Charity Fraud

Consumer Advisory: Charitable Giving, December 2013

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Charitable Giving

The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in France

Optimal tax formulas expressed in "sufficient statistics" are usually calibrated under the assumptionthat the relevant tax elasticities are unaffected by other available policy instruments.In practice though, tax authorities have many more instruments than the mere tax rates andtax elasticities are functions of all these policy instruments. In this paper we provide evidencethat tax elasticities are extremely sensitive to a particular policy instrument: the level of taxenforcement. We exploit a natural experiment that took place in France in 1983, when the taxadministration tightened the requirements to claim charitable deductions. The reform led to asubstantial drop in the amount of contributions reported to the administration, which can becredibly attributed to overreporting of charitable contributions before the reform, rather thanto a real change in giving behaviours. We show that the reform was also associated with asubstantial decline in the absolute value of the elasticity of reported contributions. This findingallows us to partially identify the elasticity of overreporting contributions, which is shown tobe large and inferior to -2 in the lax enforcement regime. We further show using bunching oftaxpayers at kink-points of the tax schedule that the elasticity of taxable income also experienceda significant decline after the reform. Our results suggest that optimizing the tax rate fora given tax elasticity when other policy instruments are not optimized can lead to misleadingconclusions when tax authorities have another instrument that could set the tax elasticity itselfat its optimal level as in Kopczuk and Slemrod [2002].

Avertissement+ charitable à :Mr.: +monsieur+ Cohon :evesque: +évêque+ de Dol en Bretagne , et de fraude en Guyenne

[Mazarinade. 1650]

Altruism, Intergenerational Transfers of Time and Bequests

This paper uses a standard two-period overlapping generation model to examine the behavior of an economy where both intergenerational transfers of time and bequests are available. While bequests have been examined extensively, time transfers have received little or no attention in the literature. Assuming a log-linear utility function and a Cobb-Douglas production function, we derive an explicit solution for the dynamics and show that altruistic intergenerational time transfers can take place in presence of a binding non-negativity constraint on bequests. We also show that with either type of transfers capital is an increasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. However, while with time transfers the labor supply of the young increases with the degree of altruism, with bequests it may decrease