Cardiopulmonary effects and eyeball centralization with low-dose atracurium in spontaneously breathing, anesthetized dogs

The objective was to determine the cardiopulmonary effects and eyeball centralization time obtained with 15 or 30µg kg-1 of atracurium in anesthetized dogs under spontaneous breathing. Eighteen healthy adult mixed-breed dogs were used, which received 0.1mg kg-1 acepromazine and 0.5mg kg-1 morphine IM, followed by 4mg kg-1 propofol IV and maintained on isoflurane anesthesia with spontaneous breathing. Animals received 1mL 0.9% NaCl IV (CG), 15µg kg-1 (G15) or 30µg kg-1 (G30) of atracurium IV. Eyeball centralization time was measured; heart rate (HR), systolic (SAP), mean (MAP) and diastolic (DAP) arterial pressures, respiratory rate (RR), tidal volume (Vt) and minute volume (Vm) were determined every 5min, and pH, arterial CO2 pressure (PaCO2 ), arterial O2 pressure (PaO2 ), hemoglobin oxygen saturation (SaO2 ), bicarbonate (HCO3-) and base excess (BE) every 15min until 60min. Both doses of atracurium produced a similar period of eyeball centralization. Vt in groups treated with atracurium was lower than in CG up to 15min. Vm in G15 differed from CG up to 10min and in G30 up to 25min. No differences were observed for cardiovascular parameters, RR, SaO2, PaO2, HCO3- and BE. pH decreased in CG between 30 and 60min and in G15 and G30 at 15min. G30 differed from CG between 15 and 30min. PaCO2 in GC differed from baseline between 30 and 60min and in G15 differed at 15min. Atracurium at the dose of 15µg kg-1 is adequate for short corneal procedures in inhalant-anesthetized dogs under spontaneous breathing.

A comparative study between centralization and decentralization of diagnostic reasoning in EPS

Dissertação apresentada na Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa de Lisboa para obtenção do grau de mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica e de Computadores

Endogenous spillovers in the trade-off between centralization and decentralization

In this paper, we revisit the classical trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods, in a setting where interregional spillovers depend on the level of a national public good. We compare the standard benevolent planner approach with a political economy in which decisions, in a centralized system, are undertaken by a non-cooperative legislature with no separation of powers. We observe that the policy-maker in a centralized system is able to play both with local public goods and spillovers, a mechanism that is not available under a decentralized system. When compared to the traditional exogenous spillovers assumption, this improves the case for centralization under the standard benevolent planner approach. However, the same is not necessarily true in the non-cooperative legislature, as in this case the interests of the legislator do not need to be aligned with those of the society. Finally, we extend the traditional political economy analysis by considering a legislature in which decisions are undertaken by different committees (separation of powers), and show that it performs better than the original non-cooperative legislature, greatly improving the case for centralization.

Is it redistribution or centralization? On the determinants of government investment in infrastructure

The dilemma efficiency versus equity, together with political partisan interests, has received increasing attention to explain the territorial allocation of investments. However, centralization intended to introduce or reinforce hierarchization in the political system has not been object as of now of empirical analysis. Our main contribution to the literature is providing evidence that meta-political objectives related to the ordering of political power and administration influence regional investment. In this way, we find evidence that network mode’s (roads and railways) investment programs are influenced by the centralization strategy of investing near to the political capital, while investment effort in no-network modes (airports and ports) appears to be positively related to distance. Since investment in surface transportation infrastructures is much higher than that in airports and ports, and taken into account that regions surrounding the political capital are poorer than the average, we suggest that centralization rather than redistribution has been the driver for the concentration of public investment on these regions.

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.

The advantages and disadvantages of logistics centralization and decentralization from employee’s perspective

Tämän tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on havainnoida keskittämisen ja hajauttamisen hyötyjä ja haittoja logistiikassa, ja selventää mitä tekijöidä tulee huomioida näiden kahden rakenteen väliltä valitessa. Tutkimus kokoaa molempien rakenteiden hyödyt ja haitat hyödyntämällä sekä haastateltujen työntekijöiden osaamista ja mielipiteitä että aiheeseen liittyvää kirjallisuutta. Päätavoitteena on lisätä ymmärrystä siitä, miten organisaatiorakenne vaikuttaa logistiseen toimintaan.

Centralization versus Delegation in an Experimental Capital Budgeting Setting

In an experiment, we model two stylized facts about capital budgeting practice, budgetary slack creation and delegation of decision-making authority. In our setting, under centralization, headquarters announces a budget, the division manager gives a cost report, and headquarters decides on the project. Under delegation, headquarters allocates a budget to the manager, and the manager is authorized to make the investment decision. We argue that the ability of headquarters to commit to a budget moderates the effect of delegation, and we find evidence in favor of our argument as there is an interaction effect of delegation and commitment to budgets. The effects of delegation are particularly strong when budgets are non-binding as delegation serves as a substitute for commitment in this case. This leads to smaller expenditures and to a higher headquarters’ payoff under delegation than under centralization. In contrast, when headquarters can commit to the budget, the descriptive data are consistent with our conjectures about the effects of honesty preferences, but the effects are too small to be significant.

Federal centralization; a study and criticism of the expanding scope of congressional legislation,

Mode of access: Internet.

Federal centralization; a study and criticism of the expanding scope of congressional legislation,

Mode of access: Internet.

"Centralization of power supply";

Mode of access: Internet.