Institutional designs to face the dark side of total allowable catches

Setting total allowable catches (TACs) is an endogenous process in which different agents and institutions, often with conflicting interests and opportunistic behaviour, try to influence policy-makers. Such policy-makers, far from being the benevolent social planners many would wish them to be, may also pursue self-interest when making final decisions. Although restricted knowledge of stock abundance and population dynamics, and weakness in enforcement, have effects, these other factors may explain the reason why TAC management has failed to guarantee sustainable exploitation of fish resources. Rejecting the exogeneity of the TAC and taking advantage of fruitful debate on economic policy (i.e. the rules vs. discretion debate, and that surrounding the independence of central banks), two institutional developments are analysed as potential mechanisms to face up to misconceptions about TACs: long-term harvest control rules, and a central bank of fish.

What happens after the central bank of Brazil increases the target interbank rate by 1%?

I start presenting an explicit solution to Taylorís (2001) model, in order to illustrate the link between the target interest rate and the overnight interest rate prevailing in the economy. Next, I use Vector Auto Regressions to shed some light on the evolution of key macroeconomic variables after the Central Bank of Brazil increases the target interest rate by 1%. Point estimates show a four-year accumulated output loss ranging from 0:04% (whole sample, 1980 : 1-2004 : 2; quarterly data) to 0:25% (Post-Real data only) with a Örst-year peak output response between 0:04% and 1:0%; respectively. Prices decline between 2% and 4% in a 4-year horizon. The accumulated output response is found to be between 3:5 and 6 times higher after the Real Plan than when the whole sample is considered. The 95% confidence bands obtained using bias-corrected bootstrap always include the null output response when the whole sample is used, but not when the data is restricted to the Post-Real period. Innovations to interest rates explain between 4:9% (whole sample) and 9:2% (post-Real sample) of the forecast error of GDP.

What happens after the Central Bank of Brazil increases the target interbank rate by 1%?

In this paper I use Taylor's (2001) model and Vector Auto Regressions to shed some light on the evolution of some key macroeconomic variables after the Central Bank of Brazil, through the COPOM, increases the target interest rate by 1%. From a quantitative perspective, the best estimate from the empírical analysis, obtained with a 1994 : 2 - 2004 : 2 subsample of the data, is that GDP goes through an accumulated decline, over the next four years, around 0.08%. Innovations to interest rates explain around 9.2% of the forecast erro r of GDP.

On the Benefits of Including Age-structure in Harvest Control Rules

This paper explores the benefits of including age-structure in the control rule (HCR) when decision makers regard their (age-structured) models as approximations. We find that introducing age structure into the HCR reduces both the volatility of the spawning biomass and the yield. Although at a fairly imprecise level the benefits are lower, there are still major advantages for actual assessment precision of the case study. Moreover, we find that when age-structure is included in the HCR the relative ranking of different policies in terms of variance in biomass and yield does not differ. These results are shown both theoretically and numerically by applying the model to the Southern Hake fishery.

Harvest control rule vs optimal harvesting of an age-structured population: The case of the Ibero-Atlantic Sardine Fishery

Research Masters

Chile's macroeconomic policies in the 1990s as seen from the vantage point of the Central Bank

Includes bibliography

The Central Bank and Chilean macroeconomic policy in the 1990s

Includes bibliography

Bank of the United States.

"Read and laid upon the table."

Age composition and distribution of red drum (Sciaenops ocellatus) in offshore waters of the north central Gulf of Mexico: an evaluation of a stock under a federal harvest moratorium

Because of a lack of fishery-dependent data, assessment of the recovery of fish stocks that undergo the most aggressive form of management, namely harvest moratoriums, remains a challenge. Large schools of red drum (Sciaenops ocellatus) were common along the northern Gulf of Mexico until the late 1980s when increased fishing effort quickly depleted the stock. After 24 years of harvest moratorium on red drum in federal waters, the stock is in need of reassessment; however, fisherydependent data are not available in federal waters and fishery-independent data are limited. We document the distribution, age composition, growth, and condition of red drum in coastal waters of the north central Gulf of Mexico, using data collected from a nearshore, randomized, bottom longline survey. Age composition of the fishery-independent catch indicates low mortality of fish age 6 and above and confirms the effectiveness of the federal fishing moratorium. Bottom longline surveys may be a cost-effective method for developing fishery-independent indices for red drum provided additional effort can be added to nearshore waters (<20 m depth). As with most stocks under harvest bans, effective monitoring of the recovery of red drum will require the development of fishery-independent indices. With limited economic incentive to evaluate non-exploited stocks, the most cost-effective approach to developing such monitoring is expansion of existing fishery independent surveys. We examine this possibility for red drum in the Gulf of Mexico and recommend the bottom longline survey conducted by the National Marine Fisheries Service expand effort in nearshore areas to allow for the development of long-term abundance indices for red drum.

Modeling the monetary policy reaction function of the colombian central bank

This paper proposes a simple Ordered Probit model to analyse the monetary policy reaction function of the Colombian Central Bank. There is evidence that the reaction function is asymmetric, in the sense that the Bank increases the Bank rate when the gap between observed inflation and the inflation target (lagged once) is positive, but it does not reduce the Bank rate when the gap is negative. This behaviour suggests that the Bank is more interested in fulfilling the announced inflation target rather than in reducing inflation excessively. The forecasting performance of the model, both within and beyond the estimation period, appears to be particularly good.

Ending uncertainty: recapitalisation under European Central Bank supervision. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/18, 17 December 2013

Estimates of the recapitalisation needs of the euro-area banking system vary between €50 and €600 billion. The range shows the considerable uncertainty about the quality of banks’ balance sheets and about the parameters of the forthcoming European Central Bank stress tests, including the treatment of sovereign debt and systemic risk. Uncertainty also prevails about the rules and discretion that will applyto bank recapitalisation, bank restructuring and bank resolution in 2014 and beyond. The ECB should communicate the relevant parameters of its exercise early and in detail to give time to the private sector to find solutions. The ECB should establish itself as a tough supervisor and force non-viable banks into restructuring. This could lead to short-term financial volatility, but it should be weighed against the cost of a durably weak banking system and the credibility risk to the ECB. The ECB may need to provide large amounts of liquidity to the financial system. Governments should support the ECB, accept cross-border bank mergers and substantial creditor involvement under clear bail-in rules and should be prepared to recapitalise banks. Governments should agree on the eventual creation of a single resolution mechanism with efficient and fast decision-making procedures, and which can exercise discretion where necessary. A resolution fund, even when fully built-up, needs to have a common fiscal backstop to be credible.

Innovations of the European Central Bank in the Context of Financial and Monetary Integration: A Chinese Assessment. ZEI Discussion Paper C229, 2015

In the 15 years since the introduction of the Euro, the integration process within the European Economic and Monetary Union has seen rapid development in terms of both breadth and depth. Exclusively responsible for the monetary policy of the Eurozone, the European Central Bank has continued to adjust to meet the challenges brought about by these changes. The paper explores financial and monetary integration in the Eurozone and reviews the reasons, specific performance and impact of changes in the European Central Bank’s decision-making mechanisms. The purpose of which is to deepen and expand understanding in academic circles of the European economy and the European Economic and Monetary Union, as well as their development trends.