The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights has begun to refer to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in order to support its reasoning for interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights in a particular way. But the EU Charter does not yet have any special status in that regard, being treated by the Court as on a par with numerous other documents of international law. The Court’s use of the Charter began in connection with arts 8 and 12 of the Convention (the right to a family life and the right to marry) but in subsequent years it has been extended to many other Articles of the Convention. It is in relation to art.6 (the right to a fair trial) that the Charter’s influence has been most noticeable so far, the Court having changed its position on two important aspects of Article 6 partly because of the wording of the EU Charter. But the influence on art.3 (in relation to the rights of asylum seekers), art.7 (in relation to retroactive penal laws), art.9 (in relation to the right to conscientious objection) and art.11 (in relation to rights of trades unions) has also been significant. The potential for the Charter to have greater influence on the Court’s jurisprudence in years to come remains considerable.

The Case Law of the ECJ concerning the Free Provision of Services : 2000 - 2005. Research Papers in Law, 2/2006

Introduction. The present overview covers the period starting from 2000 until the end of 2005.1 This is the follow-up to our overview covering the 1995-1999 period.2 The first striking feature of the present contribution is that it has to deal with almost 3,5 times as many cases as the previous one. Hence, the ECJ has gone from deciding 40 cases in the five year period between 1995- 1999 to deciding over 140 cases based on Art 49 between 2000-2005. This confirms, beyond any doubt, the tendency already observed in our previous overview, that a “third generation” case law on services is being developed at a very rapid pace by the ECJ. This third generation case law is based on the idea that Article 49 EC is not limited to striking down discriminatory measures but extends to the elimination of all hindrances to the free provision of services. This idea was first expressed in the Tourist Guide cases, the Greek and Dutch TV cases and most importantly in the Säger case.3 It has been confirmed ever since. As was to be expected, this broad brush approach of the Court’s has led to an ever-increasing amount of litigation reaching Luxemburg. It is clear that, if indicators were used to weight the importance of the Court’s case law during the relevant period, services would score much higher than goods, both from a quantitative and from a qualitative perspective.4 Hence, contrary to the previous overview, this one cannot deal in detail with any of the judgments delivered during the reference period. The aim of the present contribution is restricted to presenting the basic trends of the Court’s case law in the field of services Therefore, the analysis follows a fundamentally horizontal approach, fleetingly considering the facts of individual cases, with a view to identifying the conceptual premises of the Court’s approach to the free movement of services. Nonetheless, the substantial solutions adopted by the Court in some key topics, such as concession contracts, healthcare services, posted workers and gambling, are also presented as case studies. In this regard, the analysis is organized in four sections. First we explore the (ever expanding) scope of the freedom to provide services (Section 2), then we go on to identify the nature of the violations and of justifications thereto (Section 3), before carrying out some case studies to concretely illustrate the above (Section 4). Then, for the sake of completeness, we try to deduce the general principles running through the totality of the relevant case law (Section 5). Inevitably, some concluding remarks follow (Section 6).5

Rwanda Crisis and Genocide in Case Law of Rwanda Tribunal

After the Second World War the public was shocked to learn about the horrors perpetrated. As a response to the Holocaust, the newly established United Nations adopted the Genocide Convention of 1948 to prevent future genocides and to punish the perpetrators. The Convention remained, however, almost dead letter until the present day. In 1994, the long-lasted tension between the major groups of Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda erupted in mass scale violence towards the Tutsi ethnic group. The purpose was to eradicate the Tutsi population of Rwanda. The international community did not halt the genocide. It stood by idle, failing to follow the swearing-in of the past. The United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the ICTR) to bring to justice persons responsible for the genocide. Ever since its creation the ICTR has delivered a wealth of judgements elucidating the legal ingredients of the crime of genocide. The case law on determining the membership of national, ethnic, racial or religious groups has gradually shifted from the objective to subjective position. The membership of a group is seen as a subjective rather than objective concept. However, a totally subjective approach is not accepted. Therefore, it is necessary to determine some objective existence of a group. The provision on the underlying offences is not so difficult to interpret compared to the corresponding one on the protected groups and the mental element of genocide. The case law examined, e.g., whether there is any difference between the words killing and meurtre, the nature of mental harm caused by the perpetrator and sexual violence in the conflict. The mental element of genocide or dolus specialis of genocide is not thoroughly examined in the case law of the ICTR. In this regard, reference in made, in addition, to the case law of the other ad hoc Tribunal. The ICTR has made a significant contribution to the law of genocide and international criminal justice in general. The corpus of procedural and substantive law constitutes a basis for subsequent trials in international and hybrid tribunals. For national jurisdictions the jurisprudence on substantive law is useful while prosecuting international crimes.

The Right to Water in the Case-Law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

The human right to water is nowadays more broadly recognised, mainly due to the essential societal function that this resource plays; likewise, because of the present water scarcity is generating conflicts between its different uses. Thus, this right aims at protecting human beings by guaranteeing access to clean water that is essential to satisfy vital human needs. Similarly, access to clean water is an important element to guarantee other rights including the right to life and health. The recognition of the right to water is mainly achieved in two ways: as a new and independent right and as a subordinate or derivative right. Concerning the latter, the right to water can emanate from civil and political rights, such as the right to life; or can be derived from economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to housing. This contribution explores the position of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights regarding the right to water, and analyses whether the Court has recognised the right to water and, if so, in which manner.

The importance of International Developments in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of the EC legal order. Research Papers in Law, 1/2009

From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.

Gender Equality in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2009

The principle of gender equality forms a part of the EU’s social policy and serves equally men and women. So far, fourteen directives concerning gender equality have been adopted in the EU, with the New Equal Treatment Directive as the latest one. The EU has developed different models to promote gender equality: equal treatment, positive action and most recently gender mainstreaming. The equal treatment model is primarily concerned with formal equality and it unfortunately prevails in the ECJ’s rulings. Indeed, this paper argues that so far, the ECJ has not managed to develop a firm and consistent case law on gender equality, nor to stretch it coherently to positive action and gender mainstreaming. It seems that in spite of some progress in promoting the position of women, the ECJ’s case law has recently taken a step backwards with its conservative judgments in e.g. the Cadman case. Overall, this paper aims at summing up and evaluating the most important cases of the ECJ on gender equality.

Udział stowarzyszeń zwykłych w postępowaniu sądowoadministracyjnym w sprawach z zakresu ochrony środowiska – analiza rozbieżności w orzecznictwie

Participation of unincorporated associations in court and administrative proceedings is a tool of public participation which is a part of basic principles of performance of a democratic country and a civil society. By means of abiding by those principles administrative bodies and courts respect the rule of law and it becomes a standard. The rule of public participation can be as well treated as a part of the basic civil rights stipulated in the Constitution. By respecting the right of unincorporated associations to participate in court and administrative proceedings in environmental protection-related cases the goals and functions of environmental protection law can be accomplished.

The analytical approach of the European Court of Human Rights in surveillance cases—the implications, justifications, and future of the Court’s reasoning, with a focus on the legislative impact in Ireland

A notable feature of the surveillance case law of the European Court of Human Rights has been the tendency of the Court to focus on the “in accordance with the law” aspect of the Article 8 ECHR inquiry. This focus has been the subject of some criticism, but the impact of this approach on the manner in which domestic surveillance legislation has been formulated in the Party States has received little scholarly attention. This thesis addresses that gap in the literature through its consideration of the Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages (Regulation) Act, 1993 and the Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act, 2009. While both Acts provide several of the safeguards endorsed by the European Court of Human Rights, this thesis finds that they suffer from a number of crucial weaknesses that undermine the protection of privacy. This thesis demonstrates how the focus of the European Court of Human Rights on the “in accordance with the law” test has resulted in some positive legislative change. Notwithstanding this fact, it is maintained that the legality approach has gained prominence at the expense of a full consideration of the “necessary in a democratic society” inquiry. This has resulted in superficial legislative responses at the domestic level, including from the Irish government. Notably, through the examination of a number of more recent cases, this project discerns a significant alteration in the interpretive approach adopted by the European Court of Human Rights regarding the application of the necessity test. The implications of this development are considered and the outlook for Irish surveillance legislation is assessed.

The Extra-territorial Obligations of European States regarding Human Rights in the Context of Terrorism

This chapter focuses on the growing tendency of international human rights law to require states to protect the rights of non-nationals who are in the state unlawfully and of nationals and non-nationals who are outside the state, especially when any of these people are involved in terrorist or counter-terrorist activity. It reviews these additional obligations within a European context, focusing on EU law and the law of the European Convention on Human Rights and drawing on the case law of UK courts. Part 1 considers when a European state must grant asylum to alleged terrorists on the basis that otherwise they would suffer human rights abuses in the state from which they are fleeing. Part 2 examines whether, outside of asylum claims, a European state must not deport or extradite an alleged terrorist because he or she might suffer an abuse of human rights in the receiving state. Part 3 looks at whether a European state whose security forces are engaged in counter-terrorism activities abroad is obliged to protect the human rights of the individuals serving in those forces and/or the human rights of the alleged terrorists they are confronting. While welcoming the extension of state responsibility, the chapter notes that it is occurring in a way which introduces three aspects of relativity into the protection of human rights. First, European law protects only some human rights extra-territorially. Second, it protects those rights only when there is ‘a real risk’ of their being violated. Third, sometimes it protects those rights only when there is a real risk of their being violated ‘flagrantly’.