Risks of Carbon Fraud

Carbon credit markets are in the early stages of development and media headlines such as these illustrate emerging levels of concern and foreboding over the potential for fraudulent crime within these markets. Australian companies are continuing to venture into the largely unregulated voluntary carbon credit market to offset their emissions and / or give their customers the opportunity to be ‘carbon neutral’. Accordingly, the voluntary market has seen a proliferation of carbon brokers that offer tailored offset carbon products according to need and taste. With the instigation of the Australian compliance market and with pressure increasing for political responses to combat climate change, we would expect Australian companies to experience greater exposure to carbon products in both compliance and voluntary markets. This paper examines the risks of carbon fraud in these markets by reviewing cases of actual fraud and analysing and identifying contexts where risks of carbon fraud are most likely.

CARBON CREDITS AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY

International carbon credit markets are based in differences between developing and developed countries greenhouse gases emissions mitigation costs and technological limits faced by developed countries. Potential of energy efficiency measures to reduce fossil fuel usage in Brazilian industrial segments is assessed, and analysis of such potentials singles out those segments and regions more apt to generate carbon credits through Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. Though there are currently few Brazilian CDM projects, their number may be significantly increased, which is a positive outcome. For this purpose, it is crucial that energy conservation programs estimate how CDM may improve their economic competitiveness.

Information asymmetry and competition in credit markets: the pricing of overdraft loans in Brazil

This paper evaluates how information asymmetry affects the strength of competition in credit markets. A theory is presented in which adverse selection softens competition by decreasing the incentives creditors have for competing in the interest rate dimension. In equilibirum, although creditors compete, the outcome is similar to collusion. Three empirical implications arise. First, interest rate should respond asymmetrically to changes in the cost of funds: increases in cost of funds should, on average, have a larger effect on interest rates than decreases. Second, aggressiveness in pricing should be associated with a worseing in the bank level default rates. Third, bank level default rates should be endogenous. We then verify the validity of these three empirical implications using Brazilian data on consumer overdraft loans. The results in this paper rationalize seemingly abnormallly high interest rates in unsecured loans.

Climate change and reduction of CO2 emissions: the role of developing countries in carbon trade markets

Includes bibliography

Income inequality and credit markets

Includes bibliography

Confusion and uncertainty in credit markets

Includes bibliography

Endogenous Growth in the Presence of Informal Credit Markets: A Comparative Analysis Between Credit Rationing and Self-Revelation Regimes

This paper examines whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces the cost of credit rationing in terms of growth. In a dynamic general equilibrium framework, we assume that firms are heterogenous with different degrees of risk and households invest in human capital development. With the help of Indian household level data we show that the informal market reduces the cost of rationing by increasing the growth rate by 0.7 percent. This higher growth rate, in the presence of an informal sector, is due to the ability of the informal market to separate the high risk from the low risk firms thanks to better information. But even after such improvement we do not get the optimum outcome. The findings, based on our second question, suggest that the revelation of firms' type, based on incentive compatible pricing, can lead to almost 2 percent higher growth rate as compared to the credit rationing regime with informal sector.

Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking Europe's credit markets? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/07, 24 July 2014

The European market for asset-backed securities (ABS) has all but closed for business since the start of the economic and financial crisis. ABS (see Box 1) were in fact the first financial assets hit at the onset of the crisis in 2008. The subprime mortgage meltdown caused a deterioration in the quality of collateral in the ABS market in the United States, which in turn dried up overall liquidity because ABS AAA notes were popular collateral for inter-bank lending. The lack of demand for these products, together with the Great Recession in 2009, had a considerable negative impact on the European ABS market. The post-crisis regulatory environment has further undermined the market. The practice of slicing and dicing of loans into ABS packages was blamed for starting and spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Regulation in the post-crisis context has thus been relatively unfavourable to these types of instruments, with heightened capital requirements now necessary for the issuance of new ABS products. And yet policymakers have recently underlined the need to revitalise the ABS market as a tool to improve credit market conditions in the euro area and to enhance transmission of monetary policy. In particular, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have jointly emphasised that: “a market for prudently designed ABS has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and to allow for better risk sharing... by transforming relatively illiquid assets into more liquid securities. These can then be sold to investors thereby allowing originators to obtain funding and, potentially, transfer part of the underlying risk, while investors in such securities can diversify their portfolios... . This can lead to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution of risk” (ECB and Bank of England, 2014a). In addition, consideration has started to be given to the extent to which ABS products could become the target of explicit monetary policy operations, a line of action proposed by Claeys et al (2014). The ECB has officially announced the start of preparatory work related to possible outright purchases of selected ABS1. In this paper we discuss how a revamped market for corporate loans securitised via ABS products, and how use of ABS as a monetary policy instrument, can indeed play a role in revitalising Europe’s credit market. However, before using this instrument a number of issues should be addressed: First, the European ABS market has significantly contracted since the crisis. Hence it needs to be revamped through appropriate regulation if securitisation is to play a role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Second, even assuming that this market can expand again, the European ABS market is heterogeneous: lending criteria are different in different countries and banking institutions and the rating methodologies to assess the quality of the borrowers have to take these differences into account. One further element of differentiation is default law, which is specific to national jurisdictions in the euro area. Therefore, the pool of loans will not only be different in terms of the macro risks related to each country of origination (which is a ‘positive’ idiosyncratic risk, because it enables a portfolio manager to differentiate), but also in terms of the normative side, in case of default. The latter introduces uncertainties and inefficiencies in the ABS market that could create arbitrage opportunities. It is also unclear to what extent a direct purchase of these securities by the ECB might have an impact on the credit market. This will depend on, for example, the type of securities targeted in terms of the underlying assets that would be considered as eligible for inclusion (such as loans to small and medium-sized companies, car loans, leases, residential and commercial mortgages). The timing of a possible move by the ECB is also an issue; immediate action would take place in the context of relatively limited market volumes, while if the ECB waits, it might have access to a larger market, provided steps are taken in the next few months to revamp the market. We start by discussing the first of these issues – the size of the EU ABS market. We estimate how much this market could be worth if some specific measures are implemented. We then discuss the different options available to the ECB should they decide to intervene in the EU ABS market. We include a preliminary list of regulatory steps that could be taken to homogenise asset-backed securities in the euro area. We conclude with our recommended course of action.

Carbon credit trading in Brazil: an overview of a new business sector

This article discusses the Carbon Credit Trading Market in Brazil and opportunities for technological development and innovation related. The international trade in carbon credits becomes a source of opportunities for developing countries because of the Clean Development Mechanism. Committed to reduce polluting levels from 2008 to 2012, and ahead, industrialized countries started to seek ecological solutions internally or compensatory actions such as buying carbon credits from low-emission countries. This strategy brought up a brand-new industrial sector that still requires productive structures and a solid international commercialization system. This is a qualitative study, based on documentary research, referring to the Brazilian territory. The data obtained point out a set of efforts such as researching and developing products and processes environment friendly. Other findings indicate opportunities to expand Green Economy Sector through supporting a set of newborn firms such as waste management and recycling, in addition to other actions that reinforce sustainable development opportunities to the country and, at the end, to the world.

The economics of credit markets: theory and evidence.

Doutoramento em Economia.

Fraud risk and the visibility of carbon

In recent years, carbon has been increasingly rendered ‘visible’ both discursively and through political processes that have imbued it with economic value. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been constructed as social and environmental costs and their reduction or avoidance as social and economic gain. The ‘marketisation’ of carbon, which has been facilitated through various compliance schemes such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the Kyoto Protocol, the proposed Australian Emissions Reduction Scheme and through the voluntary carbon credit market, have attempted to bring carbon into the ‘foreground’ as an economic liability and/or opportunity. Accompanying the increasing economic visibility of carbon are reports of frauds and scams – the ‘gaming of carbon markets’(Chan 2010). As Lohmann (2010: 21) points out, ‘what are conventionally classed as scams or frauds are an inevitable feature of carbon offset markets, not something that could be eliminated by regulation targeting the specific businesses or state agencies involved’. This paper critiques the disparate discourses of fraud risk in carbon markets and examines cases of fraud within emerging landscapes of green criminology.