Capital requirements and loan market conditions insight into the Portuguese banking system (2004-2011)

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Managing marginal capital requirements in solvency II: Analysis of a real insurance portfolio

This thesis provides a complete analysis of the Standard Capital Requirements given by Solvency II for a real insurance portfolio. We analyze the investment portfolio of BPI Vida e Pensões, an insurance company affiliated with a Portuguese bank BPI, both at security, sub-portfolio and asset class levels. By using the Standard Formula from EIOPA, Total SCR amounts to 239M€. This value is mostly explained by Market and Default Risk whereas the former is driven by Spread and Concentration Risks. Following the methodology of Leblanc (2011), we examine the Marginal Contribution of an asset to the SCR which allows for the evaluation of the risks of each security given its characteristics and interactions in the portfolio. The top contributors to the SCR are Corporate Bonds and Term Deposits. By exploring further the composition of the portfolio, our results show that slight changes in allocation of Term and Cash Deposits have severe impacts on the total Concentration and Default Risks, respectively. Also, diversification effects are very relevant by representing savings of 122M€. Finally, Solvency II represents an opportunity for the portfolio optimization. By constructing efficient frontiers, we find that as the target expected return increases, a shift from Term Deposits/ Commercial Papers to Eurozone/Peripheral and finally Equities occurs.

Basel III new capital requirements, impacts and bank behavior

For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant ownership movements that cause the crowding-out.

Capital requirements and loan market conditions insight into Portuguese Banking system (2004-2011)

Capital Requirements have been gaining importance in the current macroeconomic and financial environment and Portugal is no exception. Nonetheless, despite the several media articles on this subject, the associations with Loan Market Conditions, namely availability and pricing are still unstudied. Thus, this project adds to the existing literature a characterization of Portuguese four biggest banks on capital reporting and requirements fulfillment. It is concluded that banks under analysis need to increase capital and that there is an association between the variables under study: Share Capital is negatively correlated with Credit Volume, and it is positively correlated with Net Commercial Income.

Basel III: The impact of new capital requirements on profitability of Portuguese Banks

This empirical study aims to explore the impact of increased capital ratio requirements, on the ROE of the Portuguese banking sector. The paper employs both a quantitative- and qualitative approach, with the qualitative approach as the main method of research. The method adopted to conduct the qualitative research was semi structured elite interviews with banking executives. Higher capital requirements decrease the ROE of banks in Portugal, but huge impairments charges, macroeconomic factors and increased costs of deposits are clearly the dominant reasons for the reduced levels of ROE the past years. Among the measures taken to increase capital ratios, reduction of RWAs and non-core assets have been the main focus, but the issuance of CoCos is regarded as the most expensive measure due to high interest payments. However, the CoCos will not have any effect on the ROE in the long term. It is difficult to draw any conclusions on the impact of more equity in the balance sheet on the ROE of Portuguese banks, as many banks currently don’t generate enough money to pay back on shareholders´ investments.

The effect of default risk on trading book capital requirements for public equities : an irc application for the Brazilian market

Esse é um dos primeiros trabalhos a endereçar o problema de avaliar o efeito do default para fins de alocação de capital no trading book em ações listadas. E, mais especificamente, para o mercado brasileiro. Esse problema surgiu em crises mais recentes e que acabaram fazendo com que os reguladores impusessem uma alocação de capital adicional para essas operações. Por essa razão o comitê de Basiléia introduziu uma nova métrica de risco, conhecida como Incremental Risk Charge. Essa medida de risco é basicamente um VaR de um ano com um intervalo de confiança de 99.9%. O IRC visa medir o efeito do default e das migrações de rating, para instrumentos do trading book. Nessa dissertação, o IRC está focado em ações e como consequência, não leva em consideração o efeito da mudança de rating. Além disso, o modelo utilizado para avaliar o risco de crédito para os emissores de ação foi o Moody’s KMV, que é baseado no modelo de Merton. O modelo foi utilizado para calcular a PD dos casos usados como exemplo nessa dissertação. Após calcular a PD, simulei os retornos por Monte Carlo após utilizar um PCA. Essa abordagem permitiu obter os retornos correlacionados para fazer a simulação de perdas do portfolio. Nesse caso, como estamos lidando com ações, o LGD foi mantido constante e o valor utilizado foi baseado nas especificações de basiléia. Os resultados obtidos para o IRC adaptado foram comparados com um VaR de 252 dias e com um intervalo de confiança de 99.9%. Isso permitiu concluir que o IRC é uma métrica de risco relevante e da mesma escala de uma VaR de 252 dias. Adicionalmente, o IRC adaptado foi capaz de antecipar os eventos de default. Todos os resultados foram baseados em portfolios compostos por ações do índice Bovespa.

Expansion of the electricity sector in Latin America and its capital requirements

Includes bibliography

Capital requirements for expansion of the electric utility industry in Latin America

Includes bibliography

The Optimal Capital Structure of Banks: Balancing Deposit Insurance, Capital Requirements and Tax-Advantaged Debt

The capital structure and regulation of financial intermediaries is an important topic for practitioners, regulators and academic researchers. In general, theory predicts that firms choose their capital structures by balancing the benefits of debt (e.g., tax and agency benefits) against its costs (e.g., bankruptcy costs). However, when traditional corporate finance models have been applied to insured financial institutions, the results have generally predicted corner solutions (all equity or all debt) to the capital structure problem. This paper studies the impact and interaction of deposit insurance, capital requirements and tax benefits on a bankÇs choice of optimal capital structure. Using a contingent claims model to value the firm and its associated claims, we find that there exists an interior optimal capital ratio in the presence of deposit insurance, taxes and a minimum fixed capital standard. Banks voluntarily choose to maintain capital in excess of the minimum required in order to balance the risks of insolvency (especially the loss of future tax benefits) against the benefits of additional debt. Because we derive a closed- form solution, our model provides useful insights on several current policy debates including revisions to the regulatory framework for GSEs, tax policy in general and the tax exemption for credit unions.

Macroeconomic Dynamics of Market Risk Capital Requirements and Credit Supply Interdependence

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Optimal Capital Requirements in Financial Networks with Fire Sales

I explore and analyze a problem of finding the socially optimal capital requirements for financial institutions considering two distinct channels of contagion: direct exposures among the institutions, as represented by a network and fire sales externalities, which reflect the negative price impact of massive liquidation of assets.These two channels amplify shocks from individual financial institutions to the financial system as a whole and thus increase the risk of joint defaults amongst the interconnected financial institutions; this is often referred to as systemic risk. In the model, there is a trade-off between reducing systemic risk and raising the capital requirements of the financial institutions. The policymaker considers this trade-off and determines the optimal capital requirements for individual financial institutions. I provide a method for finding and analyzing the optimal capital requirements that can be applied to arbitrary network structures and arbitrary distributions of investment returns.

In particular, I first consider a network model consisting only of direct exposures and show that the optimal capital requirements can be found by solving a stochastic linear programming problem. I then extend the analysis to financial networks with default costs and show the optimal capital requirements can be found by solving a stochastic mixed integer programming problem. The computational complexity of this problem poses a challenge, and I develop an iterative algorithm that can be efficiently executed. I show that the iterative algorithm leads to solutions that are nearly optimal by comparing it with lower bounds based on a dual approach. I also show that the iterative algorithm converges to the optimal solution.

Finally, I incorporate fire sales externalities into the model. In particular, I am able to extend the analysis of systemic risk and the optimal capital requirements with a single illiquid asset to a model with multiple illiquid assets. The model with multiple illiquid assets incorporates liquidation rules used by the banks. I provide an optimization formulation whose solution provides the equilibrium payments for a given liquidation rule.

I further show that the socially optimal capital problem using the ``socially optimal liquidation" and prioritized liquidation rules can be formulated as a convex and convex mixed integer problem, respectively. Finally, I illustrate the results of the methodology on numerical examples and

discuss some implications for capital regulation policy and stress testing.

An extreme value theory approach to calculating minimum capital risk requirements

This paper investigates the frequency of extreme events for three LIFFE futures contracts for the calculation of minimum capital risk requirements (MCRRs). We propose a semiparametric approach where the tails are modelled by the Generalized Pareto Distribution and smaller risks are captured by the empirical distribution function. We compare the capital requirements form this approach with those calculated from the unconditional density and from a conditional density - a GARCH(1,1) model. Our primary finding is that both in-sample and for a hold-out sample, our extreme value approach yields superior results than either of the other two models which do not explicitly model the tails of the return distribution. Since the use of these internal models will be permitted under the EC-CAD II, they could be widely adopted in the near future for determining capital adequacies. Hence, close scrutiny of competing models is required to avoid a potentially costly misallocation capital resources while at the same time ensuring the safety of the financial system.

A word of caution on calculating market-based minimum capital risk requirements

This paper demonstrates that the use of GARCH-type models for the calculation of minimum capital risk requirements (MCRRs) may lead to the production of inaccurate and therefore inefficient capital requirements. We show that this inaccuracy stems from the fact that GARCH models typically overstate the degree of persistence in return volatility. A simple modification to the model is found to improve the accuracy of MCRR estimates in both back- and out-of-sample tests. Given that internal risk management models are currently in widespread usage in some parts of the world (most notably the USA), and will soon be permitted for EC banks and investment firms, we believe that our paper should serve as a valuable caution to risk management practitioners who are using, or intend to use this popular class of models.

Tools for testing the Solvency Capital Requirement for life insurance

Longevity risk is one of the major risks that an insurance company or a pension fund has to deal with and it is expected that its importance will grow in the near future. In agreement with these considerations, in Solvency II regulation the Standard formula furnished for calculating the Solvency Capital Requirement explicitly considers this kind of risk. According to the new European rules in our paper we suggest a multiperiod approach to evaluate the SCR for longevity risk. We propose a backtesting framework for measuring the consistency of SCR calculations for life insurance policies.

O impacto da implementação do Basel III no capital dos bancos portugueses

Este trabalho é uma análise dos efeitos da implementação das últimas recomendações do Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) também conhecidas como o Basel III de 2010 que deverão ser faseadamente implementadas desde 1 de Janeiro de 2013 até 1 de Janeiro de 2019, no capital próprio dos bancos Portugueses. Neste trabalho assume-se que os ativos pesados pelo risco de 2012 mantêm-se constantes e o capital terá de ser aumentado segundo as recomendações ano após ano até ao fim de 2018. Com esta análise, pretende-se entender o nível de robustez do capital próprio dos bancos Portugueses e se os mesmos têm capital e reservas suficientes para satisfazer as recomendações de capital mínimo sugeridas pelo BCBS ou caso contrário, se necessitarão de novas injeções de capital ou terão de reduzir a sua atividade económica. O Basel III ainda não foi implementado em Portugal, pois a União Europeia está no processo de desenvolvimento e implementação do Credit Requirement Directive IV (CRD IV) que é uma recomendação que todos os bancos centrais dos países da zona Euro deverão impor aos respetivos bancos. Esta diretiva da União Europeia é baseada totalmente nas recomendações do Basel III e deverá ser implementada em 2014 ou nos anos seguintes. Até agora, os bancos Portugueses seguem um sistema com base no aviso 6/2010 do Banco de Portugal que recomenda o cálculo dos rácios core tier 1, tier 1 e tier 2 usando o método notações internas (IRB) de avaliação da exposição do banco aos riscos de crédito, operacional, etc. e onde os ativos ponderados pelo risco são calculados como 12,5 vezes o valor dos requisitos totais de fundos calculados pelo banco. Este método é baseado nas recomendações do Basel II que serão substituídas pelo Basel III. Dado que um dos principais motivos para a crise económica e financeira que assolou o mundo em 2007 foi a acumulação de alavancagem excessiva e gradual erosão da qualidade da base do capital próprio dos bancos, é importante analisar a posição dos bancos Portugueses, que embora não sejam muito grandes a nível global, controlam a economia do país. Espera-se que com a implementação das recomendações do Basel III não haja no futuro uma repetição dos choques sistémicos de 2007. Os resultados deste estudo usando o método padrão recomendado pelo BCBS mostram que de catorze bancos Portugueses incluídos neste estudo, apenas seis (BES, Montepio, Finantia, BIG, Invest e BIC) conseguem enquadrar nas recomendações mínimas do Basel III até 1-1- 2019 e alguns outros estão marginalmente abaixo dos rácios mínimos (CGD, Itaú e Crédito Agrícola).