Genetic and environmental influences on human responses to odors

Olfaction, the sense of smell, has many important functions in humans. Human responses to odors show substantial individual variation. Olfactory receptor genes have been identified and other genes may also influence olfaction. However, the proportion of phenotypic variation in odor response due to genetic variation remains largely unknown. Little is also known about which genes modify specific responses to odors. This study aimed to elucidate genetic and environmental influences on human responses to odors. Individuals from Finnish families (n=146) and Australian (n=413), British (n=163), Danish (n=336), and Finnish (n=399) twins rated intensity and pleasantness of a set of 12 (families) or 6 (twins) odors and tried to identify the odors. In addition, the participants rated their own sense of smell and annoyance experienced with different environmental odors. The odor stimuli of a commercial smell test (The Brief Smell Identification Test; banana, chocolate, cinnamon, gasoline, lemon, onion, paint thinner, pineapple, rose, smoke, soap, and turpentine) were presented in the family study. Based on the results of the family study and a literature survey, a new set of odor stimuli (androstenone, chocolate, cinnamon, isovaleric acid, lemon, and turpentine) was designed for the twin studies. In the family sample, heritabilities of the traits were estimated and underlying genomic regions were searched using a genome-wide linkage scan. In the pooled twin sample, variation in the measured traits was decomposed into genetic and environmental components using quantitative genetic modeling. In addition, associations between nongenetic factors (e.g., sex, age, and smoking) and olfactory-related traits were explored. Suggestive evidence for a genetic linkage for pleasantness of cinnamon at a locus on chromosome 4q32.3 emerged from the family sample. High heritability for the pleasantness of cinnamon was found in the family but not the twin study. Heritability of perceived intensity of androstenone odor was determined to be ~30% in the twin sample. A strong genetic correlation between perceived intensity and pleasantness of androstenone, in the absence of any environmental correlation, indicated that only the genetic correlation explained the phenotypic correlation between the traits (r=-0.27) and that the traits were influenced by an overlapping set of genes. Self-rated olfactory function appeared to reflect the odor annoyance experienced rather than actual olfactory acuity or genetic involvement. Results from nongenetic analyses supported the speculated superiority of females' olfactory abilities, the age-related diminishing of olfactory acuity, and the influences of experience-dependent factors on odor responses. This was the first study to estimate heritabilities and perform linkage screens for individual odors. A genetic effect was detected for only a few responses to specific odors, suggesting the predominance of environmental effects in odor perceptions.

Liikennepolttoaineeksi tarkoitettu ohraetanoli, Suomen ohramarkkinat ja ilmastonmuutos

The aim of the thesis was to analyze the use of barley as an input for bioethanol production and the impacts the use has on the Finnish barley markets. Two main research questions were formulated. First, privately and socially optimal bioethanol production levels were examined. In the social optimum, the climate benefits of bioethanol production were considered. It was calculated that the production and use of bioethanol created smaller CO2 -emissions when compared with the production and use of gasoline. Second, the impacts of bioethanol production on farmland allocation and agricultural production were analyzed. In more detail, the second aim was to analyze the farmland allocation between wheat and barley cultivation and green set aside in the private and social optimum. An analytical model was produced to analyze the barley markets in Finland. To provide an empirical counterpart to this model, existing research data on bioethanol production and barley cultivation was used. The aim of the model was to analyze the supply and the demand as well as market equilibrium of barley. Furthermore, the model provided a framework for analyzing the differences between the private optimum and social optimum of bioethanol production in Finland. The demand for barley consists of animal feed demand and bioethanol demand. On the supply side, a heterogeneous model of farmland quality was used. With this framework, it is possible to analyze farmland allocation between barley and wheat cultivation and green set aside and how the climate benefits of bioethanol production affects the allocation. Moreover, the relative changes in barley price between the private and social optimum were analyzed. Based on the empirical analysis, the private optimum for barley based bioethanol production is 58 691 metric tons. However, the social optimum for barley based bioethanol production is 72 736 metric tons. The portion of farmland that is allocated to barley cultivation is increased if the climate benefits of bioethanol production are considered. In the private optimum, 1/19 of the total farmland is allocated to barley cultivation whereas in social optimum the share increases to 7/19. Furthermore, the increase in barley price between private and social optimum is rather modest. Total increase in price is only about 1,8 percent.

Hintakartelli toistettuna pelinä: teoriasta pääkaupunkiseudun bensiinin vähittäismyyntimarkkinoille

Tutkielman tarkoituksena oli soveltaa toistetun pelin teoria- ja empiriapohjaa suomalaiseen tutkimusaineistoon. Kartellin toimintadynamiikka on mallinnettu peliteorian osa-alueen, toistetun pelin kentäksi. Toistetussa pelissä samaa, kerran pelattua peliä pelataan useita kierroksia. Äärettömästi toistetusta pelistä muodostuu toistetun pelin yleinen teoria (The Folk Theorem), jossa jokaisella pelaajalla on yksilöllisesti rationaalinen käytössykli. Toisen pelaajan kanssa tehty yhteistyö kasvattaa pelaajan käytössykliltä kertyvää kokonaishyötyä. Kartellitutkimuksessa ei voi ohittaa oikeustieteellistä näkökulmaa, joten sekin on tiivistetysti mukana esityksessä. Äänettömässä tai implisiittisessä kartellissa ( tacit collusion ) ei avoimen kartellin tavoin ole osapuolten välistä kommunikointia, mutta sen lopputulos on sama. Tästä syystä äänetön kartelli on yhdenmukaistettuna käytöksenä kielletty. Koska myös tunnusmerkit ovat osin samat, kartellitutkimus on saanut arvokasta mittausaineistoa paljastuneiden kartellien käytöksestä. Pelkkään hintatiedostoonkin perustuvalla tutkimuksella on vankka teoreettinen ja empiirinen pohja. Oikeuskirjallisuudessa ja käytännössä hintayhteneväisyyden on yhdessä muiden tunnusmerkkien kanssa katsottu olevan indisio kartellista. Bensiinin vähittäismyyntimarkkinat ovat rakenteellisesti otollinen kenttä toistetulle pelille. Tutkielman empiirisessä osuudessa kohteena olivat pääkaupunkiseudun bensiinin vähittäismyyntimarkkinat ja tiedosto sisälsi otoksia hinta-aikasarjoista ajalta 1.8.2004 - 30.6.2005 kaikkiaan 116:ltä jakeluasemalta Espoosta, Helsingistä ja Vantaalta. Tutkimusmenetelmänä oli toistettujen mittausten varianssianalyysi post hoc-vertailuin. Tilastollisesti merkitsevä hinnoitteluyhtenevyys lähellä sijaitsevien asemien kesken löytyi 47 asemalta, ja näin ollen näillä asemilla on yksi kartellin tunnusmerkeistä. Hinnoitteluyhtenevyyden omaavat asemat muodostivat liikenneyhteyksien mukaan jaetuilla kilpailualueillaan ryhmittymiä ja kaikkiaan tällaisia yhtenevästi hinnoittelevia ryhmittymiä oli 21. Näistä ryhmittymistä 9 oli ns. sekapareja eli osapuolina olivat kylmäasema ja liikenneasema. Useimmissa tapauksissa oli kyseessä alueensa kalleimmin hinnoitteleva kylmäasema. Tutkielman tärkeimmät lähteet: Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. – Froeb, Luke M. – Geweke, John F. – Taylor, Cristopher T. (2005): A Variance screen for collusion. Working paper no. 275, Bureau of economics, Federal Trade Commission, Washington DC 20580. Dutta, Prajit K. (1999): Strategies and Games, Theory and Practice. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England. Harrington, Joseph E. (2004): Detecting cartels. Working paper. John Hopkins University. Ivaldi, Marc – Jullien, Bruno – Rey, Patric – Seabright, Paul – Tirole, Jean (2003): The Economics of Tacit Collusion. EU:n komission kilpailun pääosaston julkaisu. Phlips, Louis (1996): On the detection of collusion and predation. European Economic Review 40 (1996), 495–510.