Bargaining efficiency and screening: An experimental investigation

This paper investigates whether information about fairness types canbe useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency.An experiment was conducted in which subjects were first screened usinga dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participantsinto two types. Mutually anonymous pairs of subjects then bargained, witha dispute cost structure imposed. Sorting with identification reducesdispute costs; there are also significant differences in bargainingefficiency across pairing types. Information about types is crucial forthese differences and also strongly affects the relative bargainingsuccess of the two types and the hypothetical optimal bargaining strategy.

Bargaining on networks: An experiment

While markets are often decentralized, in many other cases agents in one role can only negotiate with a proper subset of the agents in the complementary role. There may be proximity issues or restricted communication flows. For example, information may be transmitted only through word-of-mouth, as is often the case for job openings, business opportunities, and confidential transactions. Bargaining can be considered to occur over a network that summarizes the structure of linkages among people. We conduct an alternating-offer bargaining experiment using separate simple networks, which are then joined during the session by an additional link. The results diverge sharply depending on how this connection is made. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link. We use a graph-theoretic analysis to show that any two-sided network can be decomposed into simple networks of three types, so that our result can be generalized to more complex bargaining environments. Participants appear to grasp the essential characteristics of the networks and we observe a rather consistently high level of bargaining efficiency.

Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.

The Efficiency of Collective Bargaining in Public Schools.

This paper develops a bargaining model of wage and employment determination for the public sector. the solution to the model generates structural wage and employment equations that are estimated using data from New York State teacher-school district collective bargaining agreements.

An ultimatum bargaining experiment on trade union efficiency

We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency.

Equity considerations in health care: An axiomatic bargaining approach

The general issues of equity and efficiency are placed at the center of the analysis of resource allocation problems in health care. We examine them using axiomatic bargaining theory. We study different solutions that have been proposed and relate them to previous literature on health care allocation. In particular, we focus on the solutions based on axiomatic bargaining with claims and suggest that they may be particularly appealing as distributive criteria in health policy. Finally, we present the results of a survey that tries to elicit moral intuitions of people about resource allocation problems and their different solutions.

Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Intermittent Fasting Induces Hypothalamic Modifications Resulting In Low Feeding Efficiency, Low Body Mass And Overeating.

Intermittent fasting (IF) is an often-used intervention to decrease body mass. In male Sprague-Dawley rats, 24 hour cycles of IF result in light caloric restriction, reduced body mass gain, and significant decreases in the efficiency of energy conversion. Here, we study the metabolic effects of IF in order to uncover mechanisms involved in this lower energy conversion efficiency. After 3 weeks, IF animals displayed overeating during fed periods and lower body mass, accompanied by alterations in energy-related tissue mass. The lower efficiency of energy use was not due to uncoupling of muscle mitochondria. Enhanced lipid oxidation was observed during fasting days, whereas fed days were accompanied by higher metabolic rates. Furthermore, an increased expression of orexigenic neurotransmitters AGRP and NPY in the hypothalamus of IF animals was found, even on feeding days, which could explain the overeating pattern. Together, these effects provide a mechanistic explanation for the lower efficiency of energy conversion observed. Overall, we find that IF promotes changes in hypothalamic function that explain differences in body mass and caloric intake.

Obesogenic Environment By Excess Of Dietary Fats In Different Phases Of Development Reduces Spermatic Efficiency Of Wistar Rats At Adulthood: Correlations With Metabolic Status.

This study compares the impact of obesogenic environment (OE) in six different periods of development on sperm parameters and the testicular structure of adult rats and their correlations with sex steroid and metabolic scenario. Wistar rats were exposed to OE during gestation (O1), during gestation/lactation (O2), from weaning to adulthood (O3), from lactation to adulthood (O4), from gestation to sexual maturity (O5), and after sexual maturation (O6). OE was induced by a 20% fat diet, and control groups were fed a balanced diet (4% fat). Serum leptin levels and adiposity index indicate that all groups were obese, except for O1. Three progressive levels of impaired metabolic status were observed: O1 presented insulin resistance, O2 were insulin resistant and obese, and groups O3, O4, and O5 were insulin resistant, obese, and diabetic. These three levels of metabolic damage were proportional to the increase of leptin and decreased circulating testosterone. The impairment in the daily sperm production (DSP) paralleled these three levels of metabolic and hormonal damage being marginal in O1, increasing in O2, and being higher in groups O3, O4, O5, and O6. None of the OE periods affected the sperm transit time in the epididymis, and the lower sperm reserves were caused mainly by impaired DSP. In conclusion, OE during sexual maturation markedly reduces the DSP at adulthood in the rat. A severe reduction in the DSP also occurs in OE exposure during gestation/lactation but not in gestation, indicating that breast-feeding is a critical period for spermatogenic impairment under obesogenic conditions.

Semi-determinate Growth Habit Adjusts The Vegetative-to-reproductive Balance And Increases Productivity And Water-use Efficiency In Tomato (solanum Lycopersicum).

Tomato (Solanum lycopersicum) shows three growth habits: determinate, indeterminate and semi-determinate. These are controlled mainly by allelic variation in the SELF-PRUNING (SP) gene family, which also includes the florigen gene SINGLE FLOWER TRUSS (SFT). Determinate cultivars have synchronized flower and fruit production, which allows mechanical harvesting in the tomato processing industry, whereas indeterminate ones have more vegetative growth with continuous flower and fruit formation, being thus preferred for fresh market tomato production. The semi-determinate growth habit is poorly understood, although there are indications that it combines advantages of determinate and indeterminate growth. Here, we used near-isogenic lines (NILs) in the cultivar Micro-Tom (MT) with different growth habit to characterize semi-determinate growth and to determine its impact on developmental and productivity traits. We show that semi-determinate genotypes are equivalent to determinate ones with extended vegetative growth, which in turn impacts shoot height, number of leaves and either stem diameter or internode length. Semi-determinate plants also tend to increase the highly relevant agronomic parameter Brix×ripe yield (BRY). Water-use efficiency (WUE), evaluated either directly as dry mass produced per amount of water transpired or indirectly through C isotope discrimination, was higher in semi-determinate genotypes. We also provide evidence that the increases in BRY in semi-determinate genotypes are a consequence of an improved balance between vegetative and reproductive growth, a mechanism analogous to the conversion of the overly vegetative tall cereal varieties into well-balanced semi-dwarf ones used in the Green Revolution.

G-quadruplex Formation Enhances Splicing Efficiency Of Pax9 Intron 1.

G-quadruplexes are secondary structures present in DNA and RNA molecules, which are formed by stacking of G-quartets (i.e., interaction of four guanines (G-tracts) bounded by Hoogsteen hydrogen bonding). Human PAX9 intron 1 has a putative G-quadruplex-forming region located near exon 1, which is present in all known sequenced placental mammals. Using circular dichroism (CD) analysis and CD melting, we showed that these sequences are able to form highly stable quadruplex structures. Due to the proximity of the quadruplex structure to exon-intron boundary, we used a validated double-reporter splicing assay and qPCR to analyze its role on splicing efficiency. The human quadruplex was shown to have a key role on splicing efficiency of PAX9 intron 1, as a mutation that abolished quadruplex formation decreased dramatically the splicing efficiency of human PAX9 intron 1. The less stable, rat quadruplex had a less efficient splicing when compared to human sequences. Additionally, the treatment with 360A, a strong ligand that stabilizes quadruplex structures, further increased splicing efficiency of human PAX9 intron 1. Altogether, these results provide evidences that G-quadruplex structures are involved in splicing efficiency of PAX9 intron 1.

Leaf Manganese Accumulation And Phosphorus-acquisition Efficiency.

Plants that deploy a phosphorus (P)-mobilising strategy based on the release of carboxylates tend to have high leaf manganese concentrations ([Mn]). This occurs because the carboxylates mobilise not only soil inorganic and organic P, but also a range of micronutrients, including Mn. Concentrations of most other micronutrients increase to a small extent, but Mn accumulates to significant levels, even when plants grow in soil with low concentrations of exchangeable Mn availability. Here, we propose that leaf [Mn] can be used to select for genotypes that are more efficient at acquiring P when soil P availability is low. Likewise, leaf [Mn] can be used to screen for belowground functional traits related to nutrient-acquisition strategies among species in low-P habitats.

The effect of using mixed initiator systems on the efficiency of photopolymerization of dental resins

A study was performed in order to determine the efficiency of the simultaneous use of the photoinitiators phenylpropanedione (PPD) and camphorquinone (CQ) in the polymerization of acrylic polymers and evaluate possible mechanisms leading to synergism or antagonism. It was found that efficiencies of both initiators taken individually are higher than that of their mixture, indicating that when both dyes are used simultaneously there will be an energy transfer from the more efficient initiator (CQ) to the less efficient one (PPD). Also, there was no proof of any reaction between the amine present in the CQ formulation and the PPD excited state.