Factores determinantes do nível de divulgação sobre instrumentos derivados de acordo com as recomendações do Basel Committee on Banking Supervision e da Organisation of Securities Commissions - evidência empírica no sector bancário português

Este estudo analisa o nível de divulgação sobre instrumentos derivados e seus factores determinantes nas entidades bancárias portuguesas. Para o efeito, foi utilizado um índice de divulgação, baseado nas recomendações emitidas pelo Basel Committee on Banking Supervision e pela Organisation of Securities Commissions, e analisados os Relatórios & Contas anuais, individuais, relativos a 2009. Conclui-se que o número de empresas que apresenta informação sobre a utilização de instrumentos derivados é bastante elevado, mas o valor médio de divulgação apresentado é bastante reduzido. Identificam-se, como factores determinantes do nível de divulgação, o tamanho da empresa, a qualidade do auditor externo e o facto de a empresa ter procedido a um aumento de capital durante o exercício económico em análise.

Grau de cumprimento com as recomendações do Basel Committee on Banking Supervision e da Organisation of Securities Commissions, sobre divulgação de informação relacionada com instrumentos derivados - evidência empírica no sector bancário português

This study analyzes the level of disclosure on derivatives, in accordance with the recommendations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Organization of Securities Commission, by Portuguese banks. We have analyzed individual annual reports related to 2009, using a disclosure index based on those recommendations. We concluded that the number of companies that provides information about derivative instruments is quite high, but the average value of disclosure is very low. The information disclosed more frequently is that related to general aspects, followed by information related to accounting and valuation methods.

Estudo do grau de cumprimento com as recomendações do Basel Committee on Banking Supervision e da Organisation of Securities Commissions, sobre divulgação de informação relacionada com instrumentos derivados, pelas entidades portuguesas pertencentes ao sector bancário

Este estudo analisa o nível de divulgação sobre instrumentos derivados, de acordo com as recomendações emitidas pelo Basel Committee on Banking Supervision e pela Organisation of Securities Commissions, pelas entidades bancárias portuguesas. Para o efeito, foi utilizado um índice de divulgação e analisados os Relatórios & Contas anuais, individuais, relativos a 2009. Conclui-se que o número de empresas que apresenta informação sobre a utilização de instrumentos derivados é bastante elevado, mas o valor médio de divulgação apresentado é bastante reduzido. A informação mais divulgada é a relativa a informações gerais, seguida da informação relacionada com contabilidade e métodos de avaliação.

Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility forbanking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated bythe Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macroand microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems areclassified according to the regulatory regime in place. We find that theinflation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries wherethe Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides,although banks seem to be more profitable when Central banks supervise them,they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to moresophisticated liabilities as a funding source.The data are not definitively in favor of functional separation. However, we argue that the evolution of financial intermediaries, moral hazard problems and especially cost accountability seem to suggest that separation would be a better solution for industrialized countries.We also critically discuss the current arrangement of financial regulationand supervision in the EMU: our proposal is to establish an independentEuropean System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) structured similarly to theESCB.

Monetary policy and banking supervision: coordination instead of separation. CEPS Policy Brief No. 286, 12 December 2012

Introduction. Following the June 2012 European Council decision to place the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM) within the European Central Bank, the general presumption in the policy discussions has been that there should be ‘Chinese walls’ between the supervisory and monetary policy arms of the ECB. The current legislative proposal, in fact, is explicit on this account. On the contrary, however, this paper finds that there is no need to impose a strict separation between these two functions. The authors argue, in fact, that a strict separation of supervision and monetary policy is not even desirable during a financial crisis when the systemic stability of the financial system represents the biggest threat to a monetary policy that aims at price stability. In their view, the key problem hampering the ECB today is that it lacks detailed information on the state of health of the banking system, which is often highly confidential. Chinese walls would not solve this problem. Moreover, in light of the fact that the new, proposed Supervisory Board will be composed to a large extent of representatives of the same institutions that also dominate the Governing Council, the paper finds that it does not make sense to have Chinese walls between two boards with largely overlapping memberships. In addition, it recommends that some members of the Supervisory Boards should be “independents” in order to reduce the tendency of supervisors to unduly delay the recognition of losses.

The banking supervision agenda in Latin America

Includes bibliography

ECB Banking Supervision and beyond. CEPS Task Force Report, December 2014

With publication of the results of its Comprehensive Assessment at the end of October 2014, the European Central Bank has set the standard for its new mandate as supervisor. But this was only the beginning. The heavy work started in early November, with the day-to-day supervision of the 120 most significant banks in the eurozone under the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The centralisation of the supervision in the eurozone will pose a number of challenges for the ECB in the coming months and years ahead. This report analyses these challenges in detail, drawing on the discussions and presentations in the CEPS Task Force on ECB Banking Supervision, and reinforced by extensive research undertaken by the rapporteur. José María Roldán, Presidente, Asociación Española de Banca, served as Chairman of the Task Force.

Changing Banking Supervision in the Eurozone: the ECB as a Policy Entrepreneur. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 38, December 2014

In 2012, the European Union adopted a transformational change to its banking policy for the Eurozone. It dropped the model of decentralized supervision and regulatory competition between countries, and replaced it with a single supervisor and harmonization. Transferring banking supervision to the ECB also alters the existing constitutional order. The policy process leading to this transformational change was rapid and highly political, which was different compared to earlier incremental changes to banking policy. Kingdon's model, whereby policy entrepreneurs seize opportunities at times when the independent streams of solutions, problems and politics converge, partly explains this transformation. The study of EU banking policy suggests, however, that the multiple streams framework should pay more attention to the way in which entrepreneurs engineer fluctuations within the streams and thereby contribute to creating opportunities for change. This paper identifies the ECB as an effective entrepreneur which also played an active role in political bargaining.

The real effects of banking supervision:evidence from enforcement actions

We present a novel way to examine macro-financial linkages by focusing on the real effects of bank supervisors’ enforcement actions. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in supervisory monitoring intensity, we show that enforcement actions in single-market banks trigger temporarily large adverse effects for the macroeconomy by reducing personal income growth, the number of establishments, and increasing unemployment. These effects are related to contractions in bank lending and liquidity creation, and are more pronounced when we consider enforcement actions on both single-market and multi-market banks, and in counties with fewer banks and greater external financial dependence.

The application of Basel III in Portugal: previsions based on 2012 and 2013 banking balance-sheets

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced new regulations for banking supervision in December 2010, better known as Basel III recommendations that aimed at guaranteeing the solidity of banks worldwide and the mitigation of new banking crises risks. The European Union transposed these directives through the Credit Review Directives IV (CRD IV). Portugal adopted CRD IV by a new decree-law no. 157/2014, on 24 th October 2014, enforced from 24 th November 2014. While individual banks have been given the option of using the internal ratings based method, this study analyses the compliance levels of all Portuguese banking institutions using the standard method, also prescribed by BCBS. Our results show that out of thirteen banks on 31-12-2013 only five banks were in a comfortable position and the remaining eight could not reach the minimum requirements set up by BCBS for 1-1-2014.

An overall perspective on banking regulation

We survey the theory of banking regulation from the general perspectiveof regulatory theory. Starting by considering the different justificationsof financial intermediation, we proceed to identify the market failuresthat make banking regulation necessary. We then succinctly compare how theanalysis of regulation compares in the domains of banking and industrialorganization. Finally we analyse why a safety net for banks could be partof banking regulation and how it can be structured in an efficient way.

Effects of bank supervision and regulation on bank risk

In the last few decades, banking has strongly internationalized and become more complex. Hence, bank supervision and regulation has taken global perspective, too. The most important international regulation are the Basel frameworks by the Basel committee on banking supervision. This study examines the effects of bank supervision and regulation, especially the Basel II, on bank risk and risk-taking. In order to separate and recognize the efficiency of these effects, the co-effects of many supervisory and regulatory tools together with other relevant factors must be taken into account. The focus of the study is on the effects of asymmetric information and banking procyclicality on the efficiency of the Basel II. This study tries to find an answer, if the Basel II, implemented in 2008, has decreased bank risk in banks of European Union member states. This study examines empirically, if the volatility on bank stock returns have changed after the implementation of the Basel II. Panel data consists of 62 bank stock returns, bank-specific variables, economic variables and variables concerning regulatory environment between 2003 and 2011. Fixed effects regression is used for panel data analysis. Results indicate that volatility on bank stock returns has increased after 2008 and the implementation of the Basel II. Result is statistically very significant and robustness has been verified in different model specifications. The result of this study contradicts with the goal of the Basel II about banking system stability. Banking procyclicality and wrong incentives for regulatory arbitrage under asymmetric information explained in theoretical part may explain this result. On the other hand, simultaneously with the implementation of the Basel II, the global financial crisis emerged and caused severe losses in banks and increased stock volatility. However, it is clear that supervision and regulation was unable to prevent the global financial crisis. After the financial crisis, supervision and regulation have been reformed globally. The main problems of the Basel II, examined in the theoretical part, have been recognized in order to prevent problems of procyclicality and wrong incentives in the future.

An incomplete step toward a banking union. CEPS Commentary, 5 July 2012

In this Commentary, Daniel Gros applauds the decision taken by Europe’s leaders at the eurozone summit at the end of June to transfer responsibility for banking supervision in the eurozone to the European Central Bank. It represents explicit recognition of the important fact that problems might originate at the national level, but, owing to monetary union, they can quickly threaten the stability of the entire eurozone banking system. In his view, the next small, incremental step, although one not yet officially acknowledged, will necessarily be the creation of a common bank rescue fund.

FATORES DETERMINANTES DA DIVULGAÇÃO DE INFORMAÇÃO SOBRE RISCO DE LIQUIDEZ: EVIDÊNCIA EMPÍRICA NO SISTEMA FINANCEIRO PORTUGUÊS

The objectives of this empirical study are, on the one hand, to evaluate the level of disclosure, about liquidity risk, practiced by fourteen banking institutions that operate in Portuguese financial system, and, on the other hand, to assess the determinants of that disclosure. To this end, we have used content analysis, as data collection technique, and have examined the information disclosed in the annual reports of the fourteen banks, for the period between 2007 and 2011. For this purpose we have constructed a disclosure index, based on the recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and have defined a set of potentially explanatory variables related to the level of disclosure. The results demonstrated that size and financial year were the variables that showed up as statistically significant in explaining the level of disclosure.