891 resultados para banking regulation, financial stability
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Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal
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The importance of the banks and financial markets relies on the fact that they promote economic efficiency by allocating savings efficiently to profitable investment opportunities.An efficient banking system is a key determinant for the financial stability.The theory of market failure forms the basis for understanding financial regulation.Following the detrimental economic and financial consequences in theaftermath of the crisis, academics and policymakers started to focus their attention on the construction of an appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework of the banking sector. This dissertation aims at understanding the impact of regulations and supervision on banks’ performance focusing on two emerging market economies, Turkey and Russia. It aims at examining the way in which regulations matter for financial stability and banking performance from a law & economics perspective. A review of the theory of banking regulation, particularly as applied to emerging economies, shows that the efficiency of certain solutions regarding banking regulation is open to debate. Therefore, in the context of emerging countries, whether a certain approach is efficient or not will be presented as an empirical question to which this dissertation will try to find an answer.
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In recent years much attention has been given to systemic risk and maintaining financial stability. Much of the focus, rightly, has been on market failures and the role of regulation in addressing them. This article looks at the role of domestic policies and government actions as sources of global instability. The global financial system is built upon global markets controlled by national financial and macroeconomic policies. In this context, regulatory asymmetries, diverging policy preferences, and government failures add a further dimension to global systemic risk not present at the national level.
Systemic risk is a result of the interplay between two independent variables: an underlying trigger event, in this analysis a domestic policy measure, and a transmission channel. The solution to systemic risk requires tackling one of these variables. In a domestic setting, the centralization of regulatory power into one single authority makes it easier to balance the delicate equilibrium between enhancing efficiency and reducing instability. However, in a global financial system in which national financial policies serve to maximize economic welfare, regulators will be confronted with difficult policy and legal tradeoffs.
We investigate the role that financial regulation plays in addressing domestic policy failures and in controlling the danger of global financial interdependence. To do so we analyse global financial interconnectedness, and explain its role in transmitting instability; we investigate the political economy dynamics at the origin of regulatory asymmetries and government failures; and we discuss the limits of regulation.
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This paper addresses the effects of bank competition on the risk-taking behaviors of banks in 10 Latin American countries between 2003 and 2008. We conduct our empirical approach in two steps. First, we estimate the Boone indicator, which is a measure of competition. We then regress this measure and other explanatory variables on the banking "stability inefficiency" derived simultaneously from the estimation of a stability stochastic frontier. Unlike previous findings, this paper concludes that competition affects risk-taking behavior in a non-linear way as both high and low competition levels enhance financial stability, while we find the opposite effect for average competition. In addition, bank size and capitalization are essential factors in explaining this relationship. On the one hand, the larger a bank is, the more it benefits from competition. On the other hand, a greater capital ratio is advantageous for banks that operate in collusive markets, while capitalization only enhances the stability of larger banks under high and average competition. These results are of extreme importance when considering bank regulations, especially in light of the recent turmoil in the global financial markets. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Excessive leverage and risk-taking by large international banks were the main causes of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the ensuing sharp drop in economic activity and employment. World leaders and central bankers promised that it would not happen again and, to this end, undertook to overhaul banking regulation, first and foremost by rectifying Basel prudential rules. This study argues that the new Basel III Accord and the ensuing EU Capital Requirements Directive IV fail to correct the two main shortcomings of international prudential rules: 1) reliance on banks’ risk management models for the calculation of capital requirements and 2) the lack of accountability by supervisors. Accordingly, the authors propose the calculation of capital requirements without risk adjustment and creation of a system of mandated action by supervisors modelled on the US framework of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA). They also recommend that banks should be required to issue large amounts of debentures that are convertible into equity in order to strengthen market discipline on management and shareholders.
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Ultra-loose monetary policies, such as very low or even negative interest rates, large-scale asset purchases, long-maturity lending to banks and forward guidance in central bank communication, aim to increase inflation and output, to the benefit of financial stability. But at the same time, these measures pose various risks and might create challenges for financial institutions. • By assessing the theoretical literature and developments in the United States, United Kingdom and Japan, where very expansionary monetary policies were adopted during the past six years, and by examining the euro-area situation, we conclude that the risks to financial stability of ultra-loose monetary policy in the euro area could be low. However, vigilance is needed. • While monetary policy should focus on its primary mandate of area-wide price stability, other policies should be deployed whenever the financial cycle deviates from the economic cycle or when heterogeneous financial developments in the euro area require financial tightening in some but not all countries. These policies include micro-prudential supervision, macro-prudential oversight, fiscal policy and regulation of sectors that pose risks to financial stability, such as construction.
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The present study was prepared within the framework of cooperation between the Competitiveness Research Centre, operating within the Institute of Business Economics of Corvinus University of Budapest, and the National Association of Entrepreneurs, based on a commission from the latter. Th e goal of the study was to survey the self-financing capabilities and borrowing opportunities of majority Hungarian-owned small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and to identify potential problems. The results of the research revealed that the high proportion of owner’s equity in the financing structure is not due to difficulties with borrowing, but because enterprises that cover their fi nancing primarily from their own resources have other financing opportunities at their disposal. Although general satisfaction with banks shows a diminishing tendency, it can still be interpreted favourably. The majority of companies have not encountered serious borrowing difficulties. With regard to the system of competitive tenders, company managers have sensed some improvement, but general satisfaction is still lacking. Although the research results suggest that the primary obstacle to growth in 2013 was not the lack of credit or external funding, it is important to emphasize that start-ups, young enterprises and micro-enterprises, which struggle the most with financing worries, were not represented in the analysed database.
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We propose and estimate a financial distress model that explicitly accounts for the interactions or spill-over effects between financial institutions, through the use of a spatial continuity matrix that is build from financial network data of inter bank transactions. Such setup of the financial distress model allows for the empirical validation of the importance of network externalities in determining financial distress, in addition to institution specific and macroeconomic covariates. The relevance of such specification is that it incorporates simultaneously micro-prudential factors (Basel 2) as well as macro-prudential and systemic factors (Basel 3) as determinants of financial distress. Results indicate network externalities are an important determinant of financial health of a financial institutions. The parameter that measures the effect of network externalities is both economically and statistical significant and its inclusion as a risk factor reduces the importance of the firm specific variables such as the size or degree of leverage of the financial institution. In addition we analyze the policy implications of the network factor model for capital requirements and deposit insurance pricing.
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The euro crisis has forced member states and the EU institutions to create a series of new instruments to safeguard macro-financial stability of the Union. This study describes the status of existing instruments, the role of the European Parliament and how the use of the instruments impinges on the EU budget also through their effects on national budgets. In addition, it presents a survey of other possible instruments that have been proposed in recent years (e.g. E-bonds and eurobonds), in order to provide an assessment of how EU macro-financial stability assistance could evolve in the future and what could be its impact on EU public finances.
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The purpose of this paper is to use Kane's notion of the regulatory dialectic to analyse the changing nature of bank regulation in Australia. Throughout Australia's economic history, economic regulation of the Australian banking system has not been static but has responded to changes in technology, market forces, and the behaviour of regulated institutions. From this analysis, some inferences about general banking principles and policy can be made.