Essays in the political economy of voting and reforms

This thesis presents four essays in the political economy of elections and reforms. The first study exploits discontinuities around school entry cut-off dates to show that early childhood conditions can impact the probability to become a top-flight politician. The second study provides empirical estimates of the effect of sequential voting on turnout and bandwagon voting outside the laboratory. The third work describes a novel nonparametric strategy to identify tactical voting patterns directly from balloting results using British election data. Finally, a study is put forward that examines the political feasibility of reforms.

Rauhan atomi, sodan koodi : Suomalaisen atomivoimaratkaisun teknopolitiikka 1955-1970

This dissertation investigates the atomic power solution in Finland between 1955 - 1970. During these years a national arrangement for atomic energy technology evolved. The foundations of the Finnish atomic energy policy; the creation of basic legislation and the first governmental bodies, were laid between 1955 - 1965. In the late 1960's, the necessary technological and political decisions were made in order to purchase the first commercial nuclear reactor. A historical narration of this process is seen in the international context of "atoms for peace" policies and Cold War history in general. The geopolitical position of Finland made it necessary to become involved in the balanced participation in international scientific-technical exchange and assistive nuclear programs. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 categorically denied Finland acquisition of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, from the "Geneva year" of 1955, the emphasis was placed on peaceful purposes for atomic energy as well as on the education of national professionals in Finland. An initiative for the governmental atomic energy commission came from academia but the ultimate motive behind it was an anticipated structural change in the supply of national energy. Economically exploitable hydro power resources were expected to be built within ten years and atomic power was seen as a promising and complementing new energy technology. While importing fuels like coal was out of the question, because of scarce foreign currency, domestic uranium mineral deposits were considered as a potential source of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, even then nuclear energy was regarded as just one of the possible future energy options. In the mid-1960 s a bandwagon effect of light water reactor orders was witnessed in the United States and soon elsewhere in the world. In Finland, two separate invitations for bids for nuclear reactors were initiated. This study explores at length both their preceding grounds and later phases. An explanation is given that the parallel, independent and nearly identical tenders reflected a post-war ideological rivalry between the state-owned utility Imatran Voima and private energy utilities. A private sector nuclear power association Voimayhdistys Ydin represented energy intensive paper and pulp industries and wanted to have free choice instead of being associated themselves with "the state monopoly" in energy pricing. As a background to this, a decisive change had started to happen within Finnish energy policy: private and municipal big thermal power plants became incorporated into the national hydro power production system. A characteristic phenomenon in the later history is the Soviet Union s effort to bid for the tender of Imatran Voima. A nuclear superpower was willing to take part in competition but not on a turnkey basis as Imatran Voima had presumed. As a result of many political turns and four years of negotiations the first Finnish commercial light water reactor was ordered from the East. Soon after this the private nuclear power group ordered its reactors from Sweden. This work interprets this as a reasonable geopolitical balance in choosing politically sensitive technology. Conceptually, social and political dimensions of new technology are emphasised. Negotiations on the Finnish atomic energy program are viewed as a cooperation and a struggle, where state-oriented and private-oriented regimes pose their own macro level views and goals (technopolitical imaginaries) and defend and advance their plans and practical modes of action (schemata). Here, not only technologists but even political actors are seen to contribute to technopolitical realisations.

What’s so Special About Cyberspace ? Reflections on Elkin-Koren And Salzberger

Un résumé en français est également disponible.

What’s so Special About Cyberspace Reflections on Elkin-Koren And Salzberger

Dans cet article, l’auteur Ejan Mackaay présente les caractéristiques fondamentales du cyberespace et analyse les relations économiques et juridiques entre les acteurs du marché virtuel de l’Internet. Cette analyse s'inscrit en marge des travaux de Niva Elkin-Koren et Eli Salzberger, dont elle suit le plan. D'une part, il y est précisé que le marché virtuel de l’Internet remet en question l’analyse classique des interactions entre les acteurs économiques. La nouvelle analyse néo-institutionnel présente un cadre analytique qui relève plus adéquatement les relations complexes entre les acteurs économiques du marché virtuel que les théories économiques classiques. Cette nouvelle approche se fonde sur le concept que les acteurs économiques utilisent les ressources afin d’être intégrés au sein des institutions les plus actives et efficaces. D'autre part, il est fait mention que le cyberespace présente plusieurs caractéristiques d’un marché économique. Toutefois, étant virtuel, le cyberespace ne présente pas les mêmes limites qu’un marché physique. En effet, dans ce dernier, certaines limites physiques imposent diverses règles de comportement. Le législateur doit donc prendre conscience de l’absence de telles limites et des normes qu’elles imposaient afin de légiférer adéquatement sur les échanges dans le cyberespace. Ensuite, afin d’illustrer les divergences entre les marchés physiques et virtuels, une analyse est faite au regard des principaux échecs de marchés, soit l’établissement d’un monopole, l’accès aux biens publics, les informations imparfaites et les externalités négatives. Un monopole est un échec de marché qui restreint considérablement la compétition, peut être accrut par l’effet boule de neige et, s’il n’est pas contrôlé, peut mener à un effet de blocage ou d’exclusion de certains acteurs. Le second échec analysé est l’accès aux biens publics. Dans le cyberespace, le principal bien public est l’information qui peut être échangée entre les utilisateurs. Toutefois, certaines règles de droits d’auteur et de propriété intellectuelle peuvent considérablement limiter l’accès à ce bien. L’information incomplète des acteurs économiques constitue un autre échec de marché, mais le cyberespace offre plusieurs moyens d’accéder à l’information pertinente aux transactions éclairées. Enfin, les externalités négatives peuvent généralement être considérées comme des effets secondaires des échanges commerciaux. Toutefois il est souligné que ces dernières ont un effet très limité dans le cyberespace, étant donné le plus grand nombre d’options de retrait et la facilité accrue de l’exercer. Enfin, il est rappelé que le commerce électronique et le cyberespace remettent en questions toutes les théories économiques et politiques traditionnelles et offrent une perspective nouvelle sur le phénomène de la formation des normes.

The allocation of development aid assistance : do new donors have old motives?

The aid allocation literature explores the motives behind development aid  assistance. This literature is enormous, yet surprisingly, the extant empirical  studies have in the main only focused on the motives of established donors. Consequently, relatively little is known of the motives of new donors. This paper explores the aid allocation motives of three relatively new DAC donors: Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Both OLS and Tobit two-way effects estimators are used to model their aid allocation process. The results indicate that humanitarian concerns are not an important factor for these three donors. Greece contributes aid predominately to its neighbors and to transitional East European nations. Portugal is motivated by commercial interests and former colony status. The bandwagon effect exists in reverse for Portugal. Commercial interests operate also for Luxembourg. Additionally, Luxembourg appears to donate to smaller more developed countries and is less inclined to donate to East European nations.

Exit polls, turnout, and bandwagon voting : evidence from a natural experiment

We exploit a voting reform in France to estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon voting. Before the change in legislation, individuals in some French overseas territories voted after the election result had already been made public via exit poll information from mainland France. We estimate that knowing the exit poll information decreases voter turnout by about 12 percentage points. Our study is the first clean empirical design outside of the laboratory to demonstrate the effect of such knowledge on voter turnout. Furthermore, we find that exit poll information significantly increases bandwagon voting; that is, voters who choose to turn out are more likely to vote for the expected winner.

Exit polls, turnout, and bandwagon voting: Evidence from a natural experiment

We exploit a voting reform in France to estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon voting. Before the change in legislation, individuals in some French overseas territories voted after the election result had already been made public via exit poll information from mainland France. We estimate that knowing the exit poll information decreases voter turnout by about 11 percentage points. Our study is the first clean empirical design outside of the laboratory to demonstrate the effect of such knowledge on voter turnout. Furthermore, we find that exit poll information significantly increases bandwagon voting; that is, voters who choose to turn out are more likely to vote for the expected winner.