Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts. CES Papers - Open Forum #8, 2012

How much leeway did governments have in designing bank bailouts and deciding on the height of intervention during the 2007-2009 financial crisis? This paper analyzes comparatively what explains government responses to banking crises. Why does the type of intervention during financial crises vary to such a great extent across countries? By analyzing the variety of bailouts in Europe and North America, we will show that the strategies governments use to cope with the instability of financial markets does not depend on economic conditions alone. Rather, they take root in the institutional and political setting of each country and vary in particular according to the different types of business-government relations banks were able to entertain with public decision-makers. Still, “crony capitalism” accounts overstate the role of bank lobbying. With four case studies of the Irish, Danish, British and French bank bailout, we show that countries with close one-on-one relationships between policy-makers and bank management tended to develop unbalanced bailout packages, while countries where banks have strong interbank ties and collective negotiation capacity were able to develop solutions with a greater burden sharing from private institutions.

European Union Bailouts and Credibility. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 15 No. 4, October 2015

Since the Great Recession started, there have been eight bailouts to EU Member States, which approximate cost to the EU has been of around 380 billion euros. The aim of this paper is to analyze the legal-constitutional issues that this major bailing out operation has brought about. The conclusion is that the EU was not only ill-prepared from an economic perspective to make bailouts; it was also ill-prepared from a constitutional perspective as well, above all if one understands law, as this paper does, as a credibility device. Absent further reforms and clarifications, the current EU system of bailout governance may be prone to generate important credibility problems in the future.

A human capital framework : designed for convergence

The 21" century business environment is dominated by unprecedented change across a broad spectrum of social, economic, technological and cultural factors (Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons 2001). Among these, two broad trends -economic globalisation and rising knowledge intensity (Hart 2006)have come to distinguish organisational life. Under the weight of these transformational influences, the developed world, it seems, has arrived at a transformational moment. The far-reaching effects of the global financial crisis and its shadowy twin: the threat of a double dip recession, continue to exert an unsteadying influence on global and corporate finances. Growth in developed economies has slumped, share prices have declined, the market value of corporations has slipped and unemployment rates, in the vast majority of developed economies, have risen. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth has retreated from the strong growth experienced in the late 1990s to negative growth in 2009 and a sluggish and unsteady recovery in 2010. In response, the reach of Government in terms of its participation in markets has been extended, bringing with it the need to transition to new governance and regulatory arrangements. Ongoing concerns regarding the pace and sustainability of the recovery remains a front-of-mind concern with bailouts, buybacks, borrowings and BP dominating news services: 'We are witnessing the reweaving of the social, political and economic fabric that binds our planet, with long-term consequences that are as or more profound than those of the industrial era' (Tapscott & Williams 2006, p. 59).

Credit Unions in Great Britain: Recent Trends and Current Prospects

Against the current backdrop of deteriorating economic and financial conditions we consider recent trends and current prospects for credit unions in Great Britain. We note that although credit unions have experienced solid membership and asset growth there are clouds on the horizon. Bad debts and loan arrears are on the rise and may be linked to recent legislative amendments and the increasing use by Government of credit unions as a mechanism to achieve its financial inclusion goals. Whatever the reason, the deterioration in the loan book needs to be quickly addressed, or it will ultimately result in either more government bailouts or a stream of failing credit unions.

Banking in Crisis: The Rise and Fall of British Banking Stability, 1800 to the Present

Can the lessons of the past help us to prevent another banking collapse in the future? This is the first book to tell the story of the rise and fall of British banking stability in the past two centuries, and it sheds new light on why banking systems crash and the factors underpinning banking stability. John Turner shows that there were only two major banking crises in Britain during this time: the crisis of 1825–6 and the Great Crash of 2007–8. Although there were episodic bouts of instability in the interim, the banking system was crisis-free. Why was the British banking system stable for such a long time and why did the British banking system implode in 2008? In answering these questions, the book explores the long-run evolution of bank regulation, the role of the Bank of England, bank rescues and the need to hold shareholders to account.

Financial Taxes and the Sand in the Wheels of Financialization:Legal Challenges for the EU Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax

One of the many results of the Global Financial Crisis was the insight that the financial sector is under-taxed compared to other industries. In light of the huge bailouts and continued subsidies for financial institutions that are characterized as too-big-to-fail demands came on the agenda to make finance pay for the mega-crisis it caused. The most prominent examples of such taxes are a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) and a Financial Activities Tax (FAT). Possible effects of such taxes on the economic constitution and increasingly in particular on the European Single Market have been discussed controversially over the last decades already. Especially with the decision of eleven EU member states to adapt an FTT using the enhanced cooperation procedure a number of additional legal challenges for implementing such a tax have emerged. This paper analyzes how tax measures of indirectly regulating the financial industry differ, what legal challenges they pose, and what their overall contribution would be in making the financial system more stable and resilient. It also analyzes the legal arguments against enhanced cooperation in this area and the legal issues related to the British lawsuit against the Commission’s Directive proposal in the European Court of Justice on grounds of the extra-territoriality application of tax. The paper concludes that the feasibility of an FTT is legally sound and given the FTT’s advantages over a FAT the EU Directive should be implemented as a first step for a European-wide FTT. However, significant uncertainties about its implementation remain at this stage.

The effect of ownership concentration on management behavior in Belgian banks: A case study

Double Degree. A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master’s Degree in Finance from NOVA – School of Business and Economics and a Masters Degree in Management from Louvain School of Management

Banks and sovereigns: An econometric analysis of an entangled relationship

In this discussion OLS regressions are used to study the factors that influence sovereign yield spreads and domestic bank indeces for a set of euro area countries. The results show that common factors explain changes in bank indeces better than in the yields. Moreover, although there is some country differentiation, a common pattern among all is visible. A contemporary spillover effect between banks and sovereigns emerged after bank bailouts and became stronger with the burst of the sovereign debt crisis. The vicious cycle between the two has contributed to the escalation of spreads and to painful austerity measures.

Loan sales under asymmetric information

Loans are illiquid assets that can be sold in a secondary market even that buyers have no certainty about their quality. I study a model in which a lender has access to new investment opportunities when all her assets are illiquid. To raise funds, the lender may either borrow using her assets as collateral, or she can sell them in a secondary market. Given asymmetric information about assets quality, the lender cannot recover the total value of her assets. There is then a role for the government to correct the information problem using fiscal tools.

Political intervention in economic activity

This paper proposes a political economy explanation of bailouts to declining industries. A model of probabilistic voting is developed, in which two candidates compete for the vote of two groups of the society through tactical redistribution. We allow politicians to have core support groups they understand better, this implies politicians are more or less effective to deliver favors to some groups. This setting is suited to reproduce pork barrels or machine politics and patronage. We use this model to illustrate the case of an economy with both an efficient industry and a declining one, in which workers elect their government. We present the conditions under which the political process ends up with the lagged-behind industry being allowed to survive.

Biased selection within the social health insurance market in Colombia

Las regulaciones como primaje comunitario, paquetes estandarizados y afiliación abierta, orientadas a reducir el impacto de las fallas en los mercados de seguros, tienen un efecto limitado puesto que abren espacio a la selección sesgada. A partir de 1993, el sistema de seguridad social en salud en Colombia fue reformado hacia un enfoque de mercado con la expectativa de mejorar el desempeño de los monopolios preexistentes exponiéndolos a la competencia de nuevos entrantes. La hipótesis que se maneja en el trabajo es que las fallas de mercado pueden llevar a selección sesgada favoreciendo a los nuevos entrantes. Se analizaron dos encuestas de hogares utilizando el estado de salud auto reportado y la presencia de enfermedad crónica como indicadores prospectivos del riesgo de los afiliados. Se encuentra que hay selección sesgada, llevando a selección adversa entre los aseguradores preexistentes, y a selección favorable entre los nuevos entrantes. Este patrón se observa en 1997 y se incrementa en el 2003. Aunque las entidades preexistentes son entidades públicas, y su tamaño disminuyó sustancialmente entre estos años, se analizan sus implicaciones fiscales en términos de financiación adicional por parte del gobierno.

Developing “Best Practices” for bankers’ pay in line with Basel III

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.

On The Timing of Default Losses: When and Why?

At the light of what happened in 2010 and 2011, a lot of European countries founded themselves in a difficult position where all the credit rating agencies were downgrading debt states. Problem of solvency and guarantees on the states' bond were perceived as too risky for a Monetary Union as Europe is. Fear of a contagion from Greece as well was threatening the other countries as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland; while Germany and France asked for a division between risky and riskless bond in order to feel more safe. Our paper gets inspiration by Roch and Uhlig (2011), it refers to the Argentinian case examined by Arellano (2008) and examine possible interventions as monetization or bailout as proposed by Cole and Kehoe (2000). We propose a model in which a state defaults and cannot repay a fraction of the old bond; but contrary to Roch and Uhlig that where considering a one-time cost of default we consider default as an accumulation of losses, perceived as unpaid fractions of the old debts. Our contributions to literature is that default immediately imply that economy faces a bad period and, accumulating losses, government will be worse-off. We studied a function for this accumulation of debt period by period, in order to get an idea of the magnitude of this waste of resources that economy will face when experiences a default. Our thesis is that bailouts just postpone the day of reckoning (Roch, Uhlig); so it's better to default before accumulate a lot of debts. What Europe need now is the introduction of new reforms in a controlled default where the Eurozone will be saved in its whole integrity and a state could fail with the future promise of a resurrection. As experience show us, governments are not interested into reducing debts since there are ECB interventions. That clearly create a distortion between countries in the same monetary union, giving to the states just an illusion about their future debtor position.

Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in European Banking

This dissertation investigates corporate governance and dividend policy in banking. This topic has recently attracted the attention of numerous scholars all over the world and currently remains one of the most discussed topics in Banking. The core of the dissertation is constituted by three papers. The first paper generalizes the main achievements in the field of relevant study using the approach of meta-analysis. The second paper provides an empirical analysis of the effect of banking corporate governance on dividend payout. Finally, the third paper investigates empirically the effect of government bailout during 2007-2010 on corporate governance and dividend policy of banks. The dissertation uses a new hand-collected data set with information on corporate governance, ownership structure and compensation structure for a sample of listed banks from 15 European countries for the period 2005-2010. The empirical papers employ such econometric approaches as Within-Group model, difference-in-difference technique, and propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching estimator. The main empirical results may be summarized as follows. First, we provide evidence that CEO power and connection to government are associated with lower dividend payout ratios. This result supports the view that banking regulators are prevalently concerned about the safety of the bank, and powerful bank CEOs can afford to distribute low payout ratios, at the expense of minority shareholders. Next, we find that government bailout during 2007-2010 changes the banks’ ownership structure and helps to keep lending by bailed bank at the pre-crisis level. Finally, we provide robust evidence for increased control over the banks that receive government money. These findings show the important role of government when overcoming the consequences of the banking crisis, and high quality of governance of public bailouts in European countries.

The emblematic statement of the Nobel Peace Prize. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 1, January 2013

From the Introduction. On October 12th the Nobel Committee announced that the annual Nobel Peace Prize would be awarded to the European Union for, “promoting peace, democracy and human rights over six decades”.1 This was a bit of good news for the EU who had produced nothing but bad press with the Euro Crisis, the bailouts of struggling countries like Greece, and protests in the southern member states of Spain, Portugal, and Italy. At such a momentous occasion the EU’s next challenge was to figure out who would be the rightful head of the EU to accept the award. The EU has made their decision by opting to send its top three officials Jose Manuel Barroso the President of the European Commission, Herman Van Rompuy the President of the European Council, and Martin Schulz the President of the European Parliament2 as a sign that the EU is not headed by one person but instead is an supranational economic and political bloc that seeks to unify the European continent. Their symbolic acceptance of the award is in response to what Geir Lundestad, the Secretary of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, called, “an accumulated record.”3 This record has ushered the EU into the international spotlight as a beacon for countries in the EU’s periphery to want to join the bloc.