General zoology, or Systematic natural history, by George Shaw ... with plates from the first authorities and most selected specimens, engraved principally by Mr. Heath.

v.6:pt.1 (1806)

General zoology, or Systematic natural history, by George Shaw ... with plates from the first authorities and most selected specimens, engraved principally by Mr. Heath.

v.6:pt.2 (1806)

Efficiency and quality in local government management: the case of Spanish local authorities

This study analyses efficiency levels in Spanish local governments and their determining factors through the application of DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) methodology. It aims to find out to what extent inefficiency arises from external factors beyond the control of the entity, or on the other hand, how much it is due to inadequate management of productive resources. The results show that on the whole, there is still a wide margin within which managers could increase local government efficiency levels, although it is revealed that a great deal of inefficiency is due to exogenous factors. It is specifically found that the size of the entity, per capita tax revenue, the per capita grants or the amount of commercial activity are some of the factors determining local government inefficiency.

Hortus Jamaicensis, or A botanical description (according to the Linnean system) and an account of the virtues, &c., of its indigenous plants hitherto known, as also of the most useful exotics. Compiled from the best authorities, and alphabetically arranged.

1

Hortus Jamaicensis, or A botanical description (according to the Linnean system) and an account of the virtues, &c., of its indigenous plants hitherto known, as also of the most useful exotics. Compiled from the best authorities, and alphabetically arranged.

2

Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?

In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.

Would Fiscal Authorities in the EMU prefer to coordinate?

This article studies whether fiscal authorities would prefer to operate like in the current EMU or to coordinate according to the theoretical literature. The EMU approach will lead to higher volatility of interest rates, output, inflation and average budget deficits, but the SGP deficit target will be breached less often. Keywords: fiscal policy coordination, monetary union, Stability and Growth Pact. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0

The Healthier Communities Shared Priority Project: Learning from the pathfinder authorities

This report presents the findings of an evaluation of how the 12 pathfinder local authorities in the LGA/DH sponsored Shared Priority Project began engaging with new requirements to promote healthier communities and narrow health inequalities. The purpose of the report is to capture the learning from the pathfinder authorities' experience of this initial planning phase and share it more widely now that all local authorities have to focus on the shared priorities.

How to set and monitor goals for prevalence of child obesity: guidance for Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and local authorities

This guidance follows on from the publication of the Government's obesity strategy Healthy Weight, Healthy Lives: A Cross-Government strategy for England. The guidance provides advice to PCTs and local authorities on how to set child obesity goals as part of the Vital Signs and the National Indicator Set. This will be followed shortly with full guidance on developing local plans.

Beyond the Transatlantic Divide: The Multiple Authorities of Standards in the Global Political Economy of Services

This paper explores the plurality of institutional environments in which standards for the service sector are expected to support the rise of a global knowledge-based economy. Despite the careful wording of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a whole range of international bodies still have the capacity to define technical specifications affecting how services are expected to be traded on worldwide basis. The analysis relies on global political economy approaches to extend to the area of service standards the assumption that the process of globalization is not opposing states and markets, but a joint expression of both of them including new patterns and agents of structural change through formal and informal power and regulatory practices. It analyses on a cross-institutional basis patterns of authority in the institutional setting of service standards in the context of the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), the European Union, and the United States. In contrast to conventional views opposing the American system to the ISO/European framework, the paper questions the robustness of this opposition by showing that institutional developments of service standards are likely to face trade-offs and compromises across those systems and between two opposing models of standardisation.

The Same, but Different: Central Banks, Regulatory Agencies, and the Politics of Delegation to Independent Authorities

Independent regulatory agencies are the institutional foundations of the regulatory state that, during the past 15 years, has gained prominence throughout Europe. This article studies the rise of independent authorities in European countries by comparing regulatory agencies and central banks. Delegation to independent central banks and to independent regulatory agencies is similar in many respects. In both cases, agents are deliberately made independent from political principals through a specific institutional design. Moreover, it has been argued that delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies is linked to the need for policy-makers to improve the credibility of policy commitments, to the wish of incumbent politicians to tie the hands of future majorities, and to the extent to which the institutional contexts safeguard policy stability. Through an analysis of the formal independence of central banks and regulatory agencies in Western Europe, this article identifies an empirical puzzle that casts doubts on the accuracy of current explanations. Veto players and the uncertainty of incumbent policy-makers in respect to their re-election prospects matter for delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies, but in opposite ways. Making sense of these anomalies is necessary to achieve a better understanding of delegation to independent authorities.

Self-rule Index for Local Authorities (Release 1.0)

Local autonomy is a highly valued feature of good governance. The continuous attempts of many European countries to strengthen the autonomy of local government show the importance given to decentralisation and far-reaching competences at the lowest units of a state. Measuring and comparing local autonomy, however, has proven to be a difficult task. Not only are there diverging ideas about the core elements of local autonomy, there are also considerable difficulties to apply specific concepts to different countries. This project suggests a comprehensive methodology to measure local autonomy. It analyses 39 European countries and reports changes between 1990 and 2014. A network of experts on local government assessed the autonomy of local government of their respective countries on the basis of a common code book. The eleven variables measured are located on seven imensions and can be combined to a "Local Autonomy Index" (LAI). The data show an increase of local autonomy between 1990 and 2005, especially in the new Central and Eastern European countries. Countries with a particularly high degree of local autonomy are Switzerland, the Nordic countries, Germany and Poland.