Audit pricing and product differentiation in small private firms : evidence from Thailand

Purpose – There is limited evidence on how differences in economic environments affect the demand for and supply of auditing. Research on audit pricing has mainly focused on large client markets in developed economies; in contrast, the purpose of this paper is to focus on the small client segment in the emerging economy of Thailand which offers a choice between auditors of two different qualities. Design/methodology/approach – This paper is based on a random stratified sample of small clients in Thailand qualifying for audit exemption. The final sample consists of 1,950 firm-year observations for 2002-2006. Findings – The authors find evidence of product differentiation in the small client market, suggesting that small firms view certified public accountants as superior and pay a premium for their services. The authors also find that audit fees have a positive significant association with leverage, metropolitan location and client size. Audit risk and audit opinion are not, however, significantly associated with audit fees. Furthermore, the authors find no evidence that clients whose financial year ends in the auditors’ busy period pay significantly higher audit fees, and auditors engage in low-balling on initial engagements to attract audit clients. Research limitations/implications – The research shows the importance of exploring actual decisions regarding audit practice and audit pricing in different institutional and organizational settings. Originality/value – The paper extends the literature from developed economies and large/listed market setting to the emerging economy and small client market setting. As far as the authors are aware, this is the first paper to examine audit pricing in the small client market in an emerging economy.

Jurisdictional differences in contracting out GBE audits : the impact on audit pricing

This paper examines audit costs for government business enterprises in various Australian jurisdictions, focusing on whether contracting private-sector suppliers induces competitive pricing and hence lower-priced audits. One jurisdiction (New South Wales) is shown to have low levels of contracting-out. It is argued that this lowers price competition and therefore, we predict, audit costs in NSW will be higher than elsewhere in Australia. An empirical comparison shows that, controlling for other factors, NSW is statistically significantly more expensive than other Australian jurisdictions. Alternative explanations relating to variation in audit quality, jurisdiction differences and relative cost are also discussed.

City-level auditor industry specialization, economies of scale, and audit pricing

We examine the effects of city-level auditor industry specialization and scale economies on audit pricing in the United States. Using a sample of Big N clients for the 2000-2007 period, and a scale measure based on percentile rankings of the number of audit clients at the city-industry level, we document significant specialization premiums and scale discounts in both the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) periods. However, the effects of industry specialization and scale economies on audit pricing are highly interactive. The negative effect of city-industry scale on audit fees obtains only for clients of specialist auditors. By contrast, clients of non-specialist auditors obtain scale discounts only when they enjoy strong bargaining power, suggesting that auditors are "forced" to pass on scale economies to clients with greater bargaining power.

Do political connections affect the role of independent audit committees and CEO Duality? Some evidence from Malaysian audit pricing

This study examines whether political connection to firms affects the association between audit committee independence and demand for higher quality audits. In line with Carcello et al. (2002), our findings show that there is a positive association between audit committee independence and audit fees thus supporting the hypothesis that more independent audit committees demand higher audit quality. However, we find that this relationship is weaker for politically connected (PCON) firms suggesting that the independence of audit committees in Malaysian PCON firms may be compromised. Additionally, we provide evidence that PCON firms that have CEO duality are perceived by audit firms as being of higher risk than CEO duality firms without political connection.

Executive equity risk-taking incentives and audit pricing

Using a large sample of U.S. firms spanning the period 2000-2010, we document a strong positive association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio to stock return volatility (vega) and audit fees. We also show that the positive association between vega and audit fees is weaker in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period. In supplementary tests, we show that the relation between vega and audit fees is stronger for firms with older CEOs and in firms where the CEO is also chairman of the board. Collectively, our results suggest that audit firms incorporate executive risktaking incentives in the fees they charge for their services.

The cost of sin:the effect of social norms on audit pricing

In this paper we provide evidence for the effects of social norms on audit pricing by studying companies belonging to the alcohol, firearms, gambling, military, nuclear power, and tobacco industries,which are often described as “sin” companies. We hypothesize that the disparities between “sin” firms operations and prevailing social norms create an adverse context which heightens the client's business risk assessment by auditors and is, thereby, reflected in the pricing decisions for audit and consulting services. Having controlled for the impact of variables relating to client attributes, auditor attributes and engagement attributes, we demonstrate that audit firms charge significantly higher audit and consulting fees to companies that deviate from prevailing social norms. Additionally,we show that audit pricing levels within the “sin” group depend both on prevailing political views and on the level of “vice” exhibited by “sin” companies.

An empirical investigation of audit pricing in the public sector:the case of Greek LGOs

This paper investigates the associations between audit pricing and multidimensional characteristics of local governments by using a sample of Greek municipalities. The Greek institutional setting is interesting because it is politically pluralistic. Moreover, independent auditors appointed through a bid process exclusively perform the audits. Our results suggest a considerable variation on audit fees which is mainly driven by politically related factors indicating the importance of relevant theoretical anticipations in audit pricing in the public sector. Agency costs appear strong enough to explain audit pricing. We also confirm prior findings on the significance of audit complexity and size. Results also suggest that audit fees are reduced when an internal team dedicated to accrual accounting is appointed. Therefore, our conclusions offer practical implications for policy setters and regulators in the public sector in relation to audit quality.

Audit pricing, reporting quality, and auditor switches in the post -SOX period

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act represents an important watershed event in the history and regulation of the accounting profession. In this dissertation, I develop arguments as to why we can expect differences in auditor behavior before and after SOX and empirically test if indeed there were differences in auditor behavior before and after SOX. My dissertation consists of three essays. For the three essays, I investigate issues related to auditor independence, audit pricing, the impact of auditor changes in the post-SOX period. The motivation for the first part of my research comes from the SEC's assertions that there are differences between types of non-audit services in terms of their potential to adversely impact auditor independence. The first part of my dissertation empirically validates the SEC's assertions that auditors would be more conservative in those instances where the tax and other non-audit services fee ratios are high but not when the audit-related fee ratio is high. The second part of my study examines if auditors are less likely to "low ball" their audit fees in the period after SOX than in the period preceding SOX. Legislators, regulators, and the media have expressed concerns that auditors "low ball" the fees for initial year audits and that such low-balling can lead to reduced audit quality. I find that there is significant initial year audit fee discount in pre-SOX period and but the fee discount does not hold in post-SOX periods. The third part of my dissertation examines the association between auditor switches and auditor conservatism. I find that a large portion of Big 4 clients switch to non-Big 4 auditors and there is no significant evidence indicating that successor auditors are more conservative in the post-SOX period.