Turnbull : generating undue expectations of the corporate governance role of audit committees

Following an initial consultation draft (Turnbull 1999a), the Internal control Working Party of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, chaired by Nigel Turnbull, executive director of Rank Group plc. has published Internal Control: Guidance for Directors of Listed companies Incorporated in the UK (Turnbull, 1999b). The guidance is commonly referred to as the Turnbull Report. This paper outlines the key recommendations of the report and discusses some of its implications, particularly in the context of the increasing emphasis on a broader corporate governance role for audit committees. The paper suggests that the increasing role envisaged of audit committees for example lately in the UK by Turnbull, may generate undue expectations are premised on an unsubstantiated notion of the contribution of audit committees.

Public policy on corporate audit committees : case study evidence of current practice

Corporate failures and malpractices have led to an increasing emphasis on the governance role of audit committees. The Smith report Audit Committee Combined Code Guidance and the Higgs Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (now incorporated in a Revised Combined Code) represent further attempts to strengthen corporate accountability in the UK. Although the regulatory focus on audit committees indicates confidence in their role as part of the solution to governance failures, questions remain about their efficacy in practice. Against the background of the publication of the Smith report and the wider reliance on audit committees in several countries to help improve corporate accountability, this paper provides research evidence, drawn from an ACCA-sponsored project, on the processes and effects of the audit committees in three UK companies. This study complements other research on audit committees by adopting a case study approach, in order to reflect the importance of investigating audit committee operations from within the organisation and to develop a closer understanding of audit committee impact than is available from generally observable data. The empirical evidence for the case studies was obtained from semi-structured interviews with personnel involved in the audit committee process, internal documents made available by the companies, and publicly available information, including annual reports.

The corporate governance effects of audit committees

Arguments associated with the promotion of audit committees in many countries are premised on their potential for alleviating weaknesses in corporate governance. This paper provides a synthesis and evaluation of empirical research on the governance effects associated with audit committees. Given recent policy recommendations in several countries aimed at strengthening these committees, it is important to establish what research evidence demonstrates about their existing governance contribution. A framework for analyzing the impact of audit committees is described, identifying potential perceived effects which may have led to their adoption and documented effects on aspects of the audit function, on financial reporting quality and on corporate performance. It is argued that there is only limited and mixed evidence of effects to support claims and perceptions about the value of audit committees for these elements of governance. It is also shown that most of the existing research has focused on factors associated with audit committee existence, characteristics and measures of activity and there is very little evidence on the processes associated with the operation of audit committees and the manner in which they influence organizational behaviour. It is clear that there is no automatic relationship between the adoption of audit committee structures or characteristics and the achievement of particular governance effects, and caution may be needed over expectations that greater codification around factors such as audit committee members’ independence and expertise as the means of ‘‘correcting’’ past weaknesses in the arrangements for audit committees. The most fundamental question concerning what difference audit committees make in practice continues to be an important area for research development. For future research we suggest: (i) greater consideration of the organizational and institutional contexts in which audit committees operate; (ii) explicit theorization of the processes associated with audit committee operation; (iii) complementing extant research methods with field studie, and; (iv) investigation of unintended (behavioural) as well as expected consequences of audit committees.

A study of the informal interactions between audit committees and internal auditors in Australia

This paper finds evidence for the growing importance of informal interactions between the internal audit function and the audit committee (AC) in Australia – a relatively unexplored topic in the literature – using a survey of Chief Audit Executives (CAEs). It also describes the nature of these informal interactions. The most innovative elements of this paper are the findings that certain personal characteristics of CAEs, the specific knowledge and expertise of the AC chair, as well as some of the AC chair’s personal characteristics are associated with the existence (and increase) of informal interactions.

Informal interactions between audit committees and internal audit functions : exploratory evidence and directions for future research

Purpose – This paper aims to recognise the importance of informal processes within corporate governance and complement existing research in this area by investigating factors associated with the existence of informal interactions between audit committees and internal audit functions and in providing directions for future research. Design/methodology/approach – To examine the existence and drivers of informal interactions between audit committees and internal audit functions, this paper relies on a questionnaire survey of chief audit executives (CAEs) in the UK from listed and non-listed, as well as financial and non-financial, companies. While prior qualitative research suggests that informal interactions do take place, most of the evidence is based on particular organisational setting or on a very small range of interviews. The use of a questionnaire enabled the examination of the existence of internal interactions across a relatively larger number of entities. Findings – The paper finds evidence of audit committees and internal audit functions engaging in informal interactions in addition to formal pre-scheduled regular meetings. Informal interactions complement formal meetings with the audit committee and as such represent additional opportunities for the audit committees to monitor internal audit functions. Audit committees’ informal interactions are significantly and positively associated with audit committee independence, audit chair’s knowledge and experience, and internal audit quality. Originality/value – The results demonstrate the importance of the background of the audit committee chair for the effectiveness of the governance process. This is possibly the first paper to examine the relationship between audit committee quality and internal audit, on the existence and driver of informal interactions. Policy makers should recognize that in addition to formal mechanisms, informal processes, such as communication outside of formal pre-scheduled meetings, play a significant role in corporate governance.

The importance of audit committees in initial public offerings

This paper follows Balvers, McDonald and Miller (1988), and Beatty (1989), who find lower underpricing in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) when prestigious auditors are used to attest to the IPO's financial statements. Australian IPOs are not obliged to nominate audit firms in the prospectus, but often identify that they will have audit committees so as to assist in more appropriate corporate governance. This paper analyzes if IPOs identifying the existence of audit committees in the prospectus have a lower underpricing return. While our findings are consistent with previous studies concluding that both the size of the new issue and the use of an underwriter are important ingredients in the level of underpricing return, the inclusion of an audit committee in the prospectuses has actually increased underpricing returns. The capital market may view the audit committee identification with some skepticism.

Do political connections affect the role of independent audit committees and CEO Duality? Some evidence from Malaysian audit pricing

This study examines whether political connection to firms affects the association between audit committee independence and demand for higher quality audits. In line with Carcello et al. (2002), our findings show that there is a positive association between audit committee independence and audit fees thus supporting the hypothesis that more independent audit committees demand higher audit quality. However, we find that this relationship is weaker for politically connected (PCON) firms suggesting that the independence of audit committees in Malaysian PCON firms may be compromised. Additionally, we provide evidence that PCON firms that have CEO duality are perceived by audit firms as being of higher risk than CEO duality firms without political connection.

Audit committees in Scottish local authorities 1998-2005

During the last 15 years corporate governance has become increasingly prominent in the public sector. The Audit Commission's 1993 report on probity in local government recommended the establishment of audit committees. However, progress on this was slow, as demonstrated by a survey of Scottish local authorities by the authors in 1998. Recent major changes in government in Scotland at both a local and national level have prompted councils to improve the accountability, openness and integrity of their operations. One major aspect of this exercise was the formation of scrutiny committees to provide objective scrutiny of the process and audit committees were the most common vehicle for this. This article explores recent developments in Scottish local government and their impact on audit committees. The article also reports the results of a 2005 survey of Scottish local authorities and compares these with the 1998 survey. This indicates a significant growth in the number of audit committees in Scottish councils and although the level of their perceived effectiveness is patchy, they are a more important feature of local government than they were in 1998.

Associations between SOX 404 opinions and auditors, audit committees, and executives

This dissertation examined three issues associated with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) that are of current interest to regulators and the accounting profession. For the first essay, I examined auditor changes from 2003 to 2005 for 2,454 non-financial firms that filed their initial SOX 404 opinions prior to July 1, 2005. My results showed that there is a significant association between the receipt of an adverse SOX 404 opinion and auditor resignations - both before and after the issuance of the SOX 404 opinion. The data related to auditor dismissals show that clients are not successful in opinion shopping, since clients dismissing the auditor before the SOX 404 report also are more likely to receive an adverse SOX 404 opinion than clients not changing auditors. My second essay examined the relation between audit committee characteristics and changes in material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting under the new SOX regime. My results showed that improvements in internal control in the second year of SOX are associated with: (1) the number of audit committee members and (2) financial expertise of audit committee members. My third essay examined the relation between the appointment of the new executives and the subsequent receipt of initial section 404 of SOX opinions. My results showed that adverse SOX 404 reports will be more likely at firms that recently hired a new chief financial officer (CFO).