Factors Affecting Audit Quality in the 2007 UK Regulatory Environment: Perceptions of Chief Financial Officers, Audit Committee Chairs and Audit Engagement Partners

In line with global changes, the UK regulatory regime for audit and corporate governance has changed significantly since the Enron scandal, with an increased role for audit committees and independent inspection of audit firms. UK listed company chief financial officers (CFOs), audit committee chairs (ACCs) and audit partners (APs) were surveyed in 2007 to obtain views on the impact of 36 economic and regulatory factors on audit quality. 498 usable responses were received, representing a response rate of 36%. All groups rated various audit committee interactions with auditors among the factors most enhancing audit quality. Exploratory factor analysis reduces the 36 factors to nine uncorrelated dimensions. In order of extraction, these are: economic risk; audit committee activities; risk of regulatory action; audit firm ethics; economic independence of auditor; audit partner rotation; risk of client loss; audit firm size; and, lastly, International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and audit inspection. In addition to the activities of the audit committee, risk factors for the auditor (both economic and certain regulatory risks) are believed to most enhance audit quality. However, ISAs and the audit inspection regime, aspects of the ‘standards-surveillance compliance’ regulatory system, are viewed as less effective. Respondents commented that aspects of the changed regime are largely process and compliance driven, with high costs for limited benefits, supporting psychological bias regulation theory that claims there is overconfidence that a useful regulatory intervention exists.

The Board Committee as a Legal Transplant: a Comparative Analysis illustrated by the example of the Audit Committee

Bilanzskandale und Missmanagement haben in den vergangenen Jahren den Ruf nach besseren Kontrollmechanismen in der Unternehmensführung laut werden lassen. Audit Committees sind ein wichtiges Werkzeug um eine solche Kontrolle sicherzustellen und sind inzwischen weltweit zum integralen Bestandteil einer guten "Corporate Governance" geworden. Die Audit Committees haben sich in unterschiedlichen kulturellen und rechtlichen Umgebungen etabliert. Wie der Beitrag zeigt, hat die weltweite Zunahme der Bedeutung der "Corporate Governance" das Audit Committee zum Vorzeigebeispiel eines "legal transplant" gemacht.

Audit committee director turnover

Actions by both private sector organizations and legislators in recent years have highlighted the importance of the audit committee of the board of directors of corporations in the financial reporting process. For example, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 has multiple sections that deal with the composition and functioning of audit committees. My dissertation examines multiple issues related to the composition of audit committees. In the first two parts of my dissertation, I examine the stock market reactions to disclosures of audit committee appointments and departures in the 8-Ks filed with the SEC during 2008 and 2009. I find that there is a positive stock market reaction to the appointment of audit committee directors who are financial experts. The second essay investigates the cumulative abnormal return to departure of audit committee directors. I find that when an accounting expert leaves the audit committee, the market reaction is significantly negative. These results are consistent with regulators’ concerns related to having directors with audit, accounting and other financial expertise on corporate audit committees. The third essay of my dissertation examines the changes in audit committee composition in the last decade. I find that while the increase in audit committee size is relatively modest, there has been a significant increase in the number of audit committee experts and the frequency of audit committee meetings over the past decade; interestingly, such increase in the number of meetings has persisted even after the media focus on the auditing profession, in the immediate aftermath of the Enron and Andersen failures, have waned. My results show that audit committee composition and its role continues to evolve with regulatory and other corporate governance related changes.

Effective corporate governance : experimental evidence on international auditors'judgments and the contribution of financial accounting education

1 Summary This dissertation deals with two major aspects of corporate governance that grew in importance during the last years: the internal audit function and financial accounting education. In three essays, I contribute to research on these topics which are embedded in the broader corporate governance literature. The first two essays consist of experimental investigations of internal auditors' judgments. They deal with two research issues for which accounting research lacks evidence: The effectiveness of internal controls and the potentially conflicting role of the internal audit function between management and the audit committee. The findings of the first two essays contribute to the literature on internal auditors' judgment and the role of the internal audit function as a major cornerstone of corporate governance. The third essay theoretically examines a broader issue but also relates to the overall research question of this dissertation: What contributes to effective corporate governance? This last essay takes the perspective that the root for quality corporate governance is appropriate financial accounting education. r develop a public interest approach to accounting education that contributes to the literature on adequate accounting education with respect to corporate governance and accounting harmonization. The increasing importance of both the internal audit function and accounting education for corporate governance can be explained by the same recent fundamental changes that still affect accounting research and practice. First, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX, 2002) and the 8th EU Directive (EU, 2006) have led to a bigger role for the internal audit function in corporate governance. Their implications regarding the implementation of audit committees and their oversight over internal controls are extensive. As a consequence, the internal audit function has become increasingly important for corporate governance and serves a new master (i.e. the audit committee) within the company in addition to management. Second, the SOX (2002) and the 8th EU Directive introduced additional internal control mechanisms that are expected to contribute to the reliability of financial information. As a consequence, the internal audit function is expected to contribute to a greater extent to the reliability of financial statements. Therefore, effective internal control mechanisms that strengthen objective judgments and independence become important. This is especially true when external- auditors rely on the work of internal auditors in the context of the International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 610 and the equivalent US Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 65 (see IFAC, 2009 and AICPA, 1990). Third, the harmonization of international reporting standards is increasingly promoted by means of a principles-based approach. It is the leading approach since a study of the SEC (2003) that was required by the SOX (2002) in section 108(d) was in favor of this approach. As a result, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) commit themselves to the development of compatible accounting standards based on a principles-based approach. Moreover, since the Norwalk Agreement of 2002, the two standard setters have developed exposure drafts for a common conceptual framework that will be the basis for accounting harmonization. The new .framework will be in favor of fair value measurement and accounting for real-world economic phenomena. These changes in terms of standard setting lead to a trend towards more professional judgment in the accounting process. They affect internal and external auditors, accountants, and managers in general. As a consequence, a new competency set for preparers and users of financial statements is required. The basil for this new competency set is adequate accounting education (Schipper, 2003). These three issues which affect corporate governance are the initial point of this dissertation and constitute its motivation. Two broad questions motivated a scientific examination in three essays: 1) What are major aspects to be examined regarding the new role of the internal audit function? 2) How should major changes in standard setting affect financial accounting education? The first question became apparent due to two published literature reviews by Gramling et al. (2004) and Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright (2004). These studies raise various questions for future research that are still relevant and which motivate the first two essays of my dissertation. In the first essay, I focus on the role of the internal audit function as one cornerstone of corporate governance and its potentially conflicting role of serving both management and the audit committee (IIA, 2003). In an experimental study, I provide evidence on the challenges for internal auditors in their role as servant for two masters -the audit committee and management -and how this influences internal auditors' judgment (Gramling et al. 2004; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2004). I ask if there is an expectation gap between what internal auditors should provide for corporate governance in theory compared to what internal auditors are able to provide in practice. In particular, I focus on the effect of serving two masters on the internal auditor's independence. I argue that independence is hardly achievable if the internal audit function serves two masters with conflicting priorities. The second essay provides evidence on the effectiveness of accountability as an internal control mechanism. In general, internal control mechanisms based on accountability were enforced by the SOX (2002) and the 8th EU Directive. Subsequently, many companies introduced sub-certification processes that should contribute to an objective judgment process. Thus, these mechanisms are important to strengthen the reliability of financial statements. Based on a need for evidence on the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms (Brennan & Solomon, 2008; Gramling et al. 2004; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2004; Solomon & Trotman, 2003), I designed an experiment to examine the joint effect of accountability and obedience pressure in an internal audit setting. I argue that obedience pressure potentially can lead to a negative influence on accountants' objectivity (e.g. DeZoort & Lord, 1997) whereas accountability can mitigate this negative effect. My second main research question - How should major changes in standard setting affect financial accounting education? - is investigated in the third essay. It is motivated by the observation during my PhD that many conferences deal with the topic of accounting education but very little is published about what needs to be done. Moreover, the Endings in the first two essays of this thesis and their literature review suggest that financial accounting education can contribute significantly to quality corporate governance as argued elsewhere (Schipper, 2003; Boyce, 2004; Ghoshal, 2005). In the third essay of this thesis, I therefore focus on approaches to financial accounting education that account for the changes in standard setting and also contribute to corporate governance and accounting harmonization. I argue that the competency set that is required in practice changes due to major changes in standard setting. As the major contribution of the third article, I develop a public interest approach for financial accounting education. The major findings of this dissertation can be summarized as follows. The first essay provides evidence to an important research question raised by Gramling et al. (2004, p. 240): "If the audit committee and management have different visions for the corporate governance role of the IAF, which vision will dominate?" According to the results of the first essay, internal auditors do follow the priorities of either management or the audit committee based on the guidance provided by the Chief Audit executive. The study's results question whether the independence of the internal audit function is actually achievable. My findings contribute to research on internal auditors' judgment and the internal audit function's independence in the broader frame of corporate governance. The results are also important for practice because independence is a major justification for a positive contribution of the internal audit function to corporate governance. The major findings of the second essay indicate that the duty to sign work results - a means of holding people accountable -mitigates the negative effect of obedience pressure on reliability. Hence, I found evidence that control .mechanisms relying on certifications may enhance the reliability of financial information. These findings contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms. They are also important in the light of sub-certification processes that resulted from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 8th EU Directive. The third essay contributes to the literature by developing a measurement framework that accounts for the consequences of major trends in standard setting. Moreovér, it shows how these trends affect the required .competency set of people dealing with accounting issues. Based on this work, my main contribution is the development of a public interest approach for the design of adequate financial accounting curricula. 2 Serving two masters: Experimental evidence on the independence of internal auditors Abstract Twenty nine internal auditors participated in a study that examines the independence of internal auditors in their potentially competing roles of serving two masters: the audit committee and management. Our main hypothesis suggests that internal auditors' independence is not achievable in an institutional setting in which internal auditors are accountable to two different parties with potentially differing priorities. We test our hypothesis in an experiment in which the treatment consisted of two different instructions of the Chief audit executive; one stressing the priority of management (cost reduction) and one stressing the priority of the audit committee (effectiveness). Internal auditors had to evaluate internal controls and their inherent costs of different processes which varied in their degree of task complexity. Our main results indicate that internal auditors' evaluation of the processes is significantly different when task complexity is high. Our findings suggest that internal auditors do follow the priorities of either management or the audit committee depending on the instructions of a superior internal auditor. The study's results question whether the independence of the internal audit function is actually achievable. With our findings, we contribute to research on internal auditors' judgment and the internal audit function's independence in the frame of corporate governance.

A versenyképesség és a társaságok belső ellenőrzése (Competitiveness and corporate internal audit)

A cikk a belső ellenőrzésnek a hatékony társaságirányításhoz való hozzájárulását és ennek a versenyképességre gyakorolt hatását vizsgálja. A belső ellenőrzés és a társaságirányítás kölcsönös összefüggésben áll egymással. Nemcsak a belső ellenőrzés hat a társaságirányításra, hanem a releváns társaságirányítási struktúrák, emberi kapcsolatok és magatartásformák jelentős hatást gyakorolnak a belső ellenőrzés színvonalára és hatékonyságára. A cikk ezért különös figyelmet szentel a belső ellenőröknek az igazgatósággal, az auditbizottsággal/felügyelőbizottsággal, a menedzsmenttel és a könyvvizsgálóval való kapcsolatainak vizsgálatára. Rávilágít a belső ellenőrzés legfőbb funkciójára, amely objektív bizonyosságot nyújt az igazgatóság és a felső vezetők számára a kockázatok azonosítására, kezelésére és elfogadható szintre történő csökkentésére szolgáló kontrollfolyamatok megfelelőségéről és hatékonyságáról. A bemutatott belső ellenőrzési modell azt a szemléletet közvetíti, hogy a belső ellenőrzés által nyújtott objektív bizonyosság megszerzése nemcsak a jogszabályoknak vagy az ajánlásoknak való megfelelés, hanem a társaságok versenyképessége szempontjából is kiemelkedő jelentőségű. _________ The purpose of this paper is to consider the contribution of internal audit to the sound corporate governance and the impact of that on the competitiveness of the companies. There is a mutual dependency between internal audit and corporate governance. Not only the internal audit has impact on the corporate governance but the relevant governance structures, relationships and behaviour influence the level and effectiveness of the internal audit. Therefore the present paper is highly concerned with the internal auditors` relationships with the board, audit committee/supervisory board, senior management and the external auditor. It highlights the internal audit function, that provides objective assurance to the board and senior management about the adequacy and effectiveness of the processes by which risks are identified, managed, controlled and mitigated to acceptable levels. The internal audit model demonstrated represents an approach, according to that getting objective assurance provided by internal audit is important not only to be in line with laws and recommendations but to facilitate the corporate competitiveness.

Agency cost of government ownership: a study of voluntary audit comitte formation in China

In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.

Federal cognizant agency audit organization guidelines /

"October 1985."

Associations between SOX 404 opinions and auditors, audit committees, and executives

This dissertation examined three issues associated with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) that are of current interest to regulators and the accounting profession. For the first essay, I examined auditor changes from 2003 to 2005 for 2,454 non-financial firms that filed their initial SOX 404 opinions prior to July 1, 2005. My results showed that there is a significant association between the receipt of an adverse SOX 404 opinion and auditor resignations - both before and after the issuance of the SOX 404 opinion. The data related to auditor dismissals show that clients are not successful in opinion shopping, since clients dismissing the auditor before the SOX 404 report also are more likely to receive an adverse SOX 404 opinion than clients not changing auditors. My second essay examined the relation between audit committee characteristics and changes in material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting under the new SOX regime. My results showed that improvements in internal control in the second year of SOX are associated with: (1) the number of audit committee members and (2) financial expertise of audit committee members. My third essay examined the relation between the appointment of the new executives and the subsequent receipt of initial section 404 of SOX opinions. My results showed that adverse SOX 404 reports will be more likely at firms that recently hired a new chief financial officer (CFO).

Gender differences in audit committees

Issues related to the composition of audit committees have attracted significant interest from legislators and regulators in recent years. In my dissertation, I examine one overlooked component of audit committee composition – namely, the presence of female directors on the audit committee. I empirically test to see if there are any differences in the functioning of audit committee when there is at least one female director on the audit committee. My dissertation examines three issues: audit committee diligence, audit pricing and earnings management. ^ The absence of females on corporate boards has become the focus of legislators in some countries. Prior research, in a variety of contexts, suggests that women are in general more conservative in their judgments and decisions. The first part of my dissertation empirically shows that the presence of at least one female director on the audit committee makes the audit committee have more meetings. The second essay empirically examines if there is a positive association between audit fees and the presence of female directors in the audit committee. I posit that having a female director on the audit committee will result in higher audit fees. I find no significant evidence to show that audit fees are higher when there is a female director on the audit committee. The third part of my dissertation empirically examines if there an association between the presence of a female director on the audit committee and earnings management. I find no significant evidence to show that the presence of female directors on the audit committee constrains earnings management. Overall, the results suggest that having a female on the audit committee changes the form – if not the substance – of audit committee functioning. ^

Shareholder ratification of the auditor and audit market competition

In my dissertation, I examine factors associated with firms’ submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification and test if shareholder ratification of auditor selection is associated with the extent of price competition in the audit market (as measured by audit fees) and audit quality (as measured by clients’ earnings management). The dissertation is motivated from the recent recommendation of the U.S. Treasury’s Advisory Committee on Auditing Profession (ACAP) regarding the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification votes. The ACAP suggests that this practice may improve the competition in the audit market; yet, there is no empirical evidence supporting the ACAP’s recommendation. My dissertation attempts to fill the gap in the literature on an issue of current interest to the auditing profession. I find that firm size, CEO-Chair duality, insider ownership and institutional ownership are associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. However, I do not find an association between audit committee variables and the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The second essay investigates the association between auditor ratification and audit fees. Audit fees are higher in firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification. The finding is not consistent with the increased price competition predicted by the ACAP. The third essay of my dissertation examine whether the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification is associated with earnings management. I find that firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification are more likely to have lower level of earnings management. Overall, the results suggest that the same factors that are associated with higher quality monitoring also may be associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The results call into question the one-size-fits-all approach recommended by the ACAP.

Three essays on corporate governance and meeting-beating or missing analyst forecasts

The beginning of the 21st century was plagued with unprecedented instances of corporate fraud. In an attempt to address apparent non-existent or “broken” corporate governance policies, sweeping measures of financial reporting reform ensued, having specific requirements relating to the composition of audit committees, the interaction between audit committees and external auditors, and procedures concerning auditors’ assessment of client risk. The purpose of my dissertation is to advance knowledge about “good” corporate governance by examining the association between meeting-or-beating analyst forecasts and audit fees, audit committee compensation, and audit committee tenure and “busyness”. Using regression analysis, I found the following: (1) the frequency of meeting-or-just beating (just missing) analyst forecasts is negatively (positively) associated with audit fees, (2) the extent by which a firm exceeds analysts’ forecasts is positively (negatively) associated with audit committee compensation that is predominately equity-based (cash-based), and (3) the likelihood of repeatedly meeting-or-just beating analyst forecasts is positively associated with audit committee tenure and “busyness”. These results suggest that auditors consider clients who frequently meet-or-just beat forecasts as being less “risky”, and clients that frequently just miss as being more “risky”. The results also imply that cash-based director compensation is more successful in preserving the effectiveness of the audit committee’s financial reporting oversight role, that equity-based compensation motivates independent audit committee directors to focus on short-term performance thereby aligning their interests with management, and that audit committee director tenure and the degree of director “busyness” can affect an audit committee member’s effectiveness in providing financial reporting oversight. Collectively, my dissertation provides additional insights regarding corporate governance practices and informs policy-makers for future relevant decisions.^