Les décisions rendues par les arbitres de griefs dans les cas de sanctions visant des policiers ayant eu des démêlés judiciaires

L’objet de cette étude porte sur la détermination de la sanction à imposer aux policiers ayant été reconnus coupables d’infractions criminelles, sur l’influence de l’article 18.2 de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne dans cette détermination et sur les méthodes utilisées dans la jurisprudence arbitrale. Deux méthodes de détermination des sanctions s’opposent sur ce sujet, soit la méthode « large et libérale » et la méthode « stricte et littérale ». La méthode de détermination des sanctions « large et libérale » prévoit, entre autres, l’application de l’article 18.2 de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne. Cette loi est de niveau quasi constitutionnel et prévoit, notamment, l’analyse objective du lien existant entre l’emploi de policier et l’infraction criminelle commise. Quant à la méthode de détermination des sanctions « stricte et littérale », elle résulte de l’application de la Loi sur la police qui est une loi ordinaire prévoyant un régime particulier pour les policiers reconnus coupables d’infractions criminelles. En effet, l’article 119 de la Loi sur la police implique, depuis son remaniement en 2000, la destitution automatique des policiers reconnus coupables d’une infraction criminelle poursuivable uniquement par voie de mise en accusation et la destitution des policiers reconnus coupables d’une infraction criminelle poursuivable soit sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire, soit par voie de mise en accusation à moins que le policier ne puisse démontrer que des circonstances particulières ne justifient une mesure différente que la destitution. L’analyse réalisée dans le cadre de cette recherche vise la détermination des sanctions guidant les décisions des arbitres de griefs quant à la situation des policiers accusés et/ou reconnus coupables d’infractions criminelles en cours d’emploi. À cet effet, 25 décisions arbitrales et leurs révisions judiciaires ont été étudiées selon l’analyse de contenu à l’aide d’une grille d’analyse. L’analyse des données obtenues a par la suite été réalisée par l’entremise de l’analyse qualitative.

The European Court of Human Rights and Domestic Violence: Valiuliene v Lithuania

This article analyses the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the issue of domestic violence, with a particular focus on Valiuliene v Lithuania. It seems that to date the Court’s jurisprudence on this issue is somewhat inconsistent, and with Valiuliene v Lithuania the Court was given an opportunity to clarify its approach in this area. There are certainly a number of positive aspects to the Court’s judgment, however there are also difficulties with the approach of the Court in this case. Overall it is to be hoped that the judgment in Valiuliene v Lithuania will mark the beginning of a more coherent jurisprudence as regards domestic violence.

To Be or Not to Be a Normative Power: The EU’s Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy in Russia. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers 2/2013

The ‘Normative Power Europe’ debate has been a leitmotif in the academic discourse for over a decade. Far from being obsolete, the topic is as relevant as when the term was first coined by Ian Manners in 2002.1 ‘To be or not to be a normative power’ is certainly one of the existential dilemmas in the foreign policy of the European Union. This paper, however, intends to move beyond the black-and-white debate on whether the European Union is a normative power and to make it more nuanced by examining the factors that make it such. Contrary to the conventional perception that the European Union is a necessarily ‘benign’ force in the world, it assumes that it has aspirations to be a viable international actor. Consequently, it pursues different types of foreign policy behaviour with a varying degree of normativity in them. The paper addresses the question of under what conditions the European Union is a ‘normative power’. The findings of the study demonstrate that the ‘normative power’ of the European Union is conditioned upon internal and external elements, engaged in a complex interaction with a decisive role played by the often neglected external elements.

The European Court of Human Rights and Domestic Violence

Domestic violence is an issue that affects vast numbers of women throughout the world. It seems to constitute a clear violation of at least three articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, however it has only been recognised as being a human rights issue relatively recently. Indeed, until 2007 domestic violence had not been directly addressed by the European Court of Human Rights. However, the Court has now addressed the issue in a series of recent cases. This paper discusses what positive obligations states parties to the Convention now have in relation to the issue of domestic violence. It proceeds to discuss the gaps in the Court’s jurisprudence in this area at present and how the case law of the Court may develop in the future.

Realising political equality: the European Court of Human Rights and positive obligations in a democracy'

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) speaks of the importance of an “effective political democracy” in its Preamble, though it is only in Article 3 of Protocol 1 (P1-3) that we find a right to free elections. This paper discusses the role of “positive obligations” under P1-3. This paper outlines the positive obligations in P1-3 focusing on obligations where the state is required to do more than just change the law. This may mean providing resources or facilities, adopting regulatory frameworks or creating new institutions. The paper highlights specific positive obligations that need to be further developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Sometimes these can be developed by analogy with positive obligations recognised in other areas of ECtHR jurisprudence. However, beyond these cases, states should ensure that members of vulnerable and disadvantaged minorities are able to participate in the electoral process and should ensure that dominant political groups cannot abuse their political power to exclude other parties unfairly. This is necessary to realise equal political rights. The second section of this paper sketches some preliminary points about the Strasbourg institutions’ approach to P1-3. After that, the third section identifies circumstances where the ECtHR should apply a more intense scrutiny in P1-3 cases. The fourth, fifth and sixth sections look at positive obligations relating to the right to vote, the right to run for election and the regulation of political parties.