A synchronous multimedia annotation system for secure collaboratories

In this paper, we describe the Vannotea system - an application designed to enable collaborating groups to discuss and annotate collections of high quality images, video, audio or 3D objects. The system has been designed specifically to capture and share scholarly discourse and annotations about multimedia research data by teams of trusted colleagues within a research or academic environment. As such, it provides: authenticated access to a web browser search interface for discovering and retrieving media objects; a media replay window that can incorporate a variety of embedded plug-ins to render different scientific media formats; an annotation authoring, editing, searching and browsing tool; and session logging and replay capabilities. Annotations are personal remarks, interpretations, questions or references that can be attached to whole files, segments or regions. Vannotea enables annotations to be attached either synchronously (using jabber message passing and audio/video conferencing) or asynchronously and stand-alone. The annotations are stored on an Annotea server, extended for multimedia content. Their access, retrieval and re-use is controlled via Shibboleth identity management and XACML access policies.

A security architecture for a semantic Grid registry

Existing registry technologies such as UDDI can be enhanced to support capabilities for semantic reasoning and inquiry, which subsequently increases its usability range. The Grimoires registry was developed to provide such support through the use of metadata attachments to registry entities. The use of such attachments provides a way for allowing service operators to specify security assertions pertaining to registry entities owned by them. These assertions may however have to be reconciled with existing registry policies. A security architecture based on the XACML standard and deployed in the OMII framework is outlined to demonstrate how this goal is achieved in the registry.

EXAM-S: an Analysis tool for Multi-Domain Policy Sets

As distributed collaborative applications and architectures are adopting policy based management for tasks such as access control, network security and data privacy, the management and consolidation of a large number of policies is becoming a crucial component of such policy based systems. In large-scale distributed collaborative applications like web services, there is the need of analyzing policy interactions and integrating policies. In this thesis, we propose and implement EXAM-S, a comprehensive environment for policy analysis and management, which can be used to perform a variety of functions such as policy property analyses, policy similarity analysis, policy integration etc. As part of this environment, we have proposed and implemented new techniques for the analysis of policies that rely on a deep study of state of the art techniques. Moreover, we propose an approach for solving heterogeneity problems that usually arise when considering the analysis of policies belonging to different domains. Our work focuses on analysis of access control policies written in the dialect of XACML (Extensible Access Control Markup Language). We consider XACML policies because XACML is a rich language which can represent many policies of interest to real world applications and is gaining widespread adoption in the industry.

A Provenance-Aware Policy Language (cProvl) and a Data Traceability Model (cProv) for the Cloud

Provenance plays a pivotal in tracing the origin of something and determining how and why something had occurred. With the emergence of the cloud and the benefits it encompasses, there has been a rapid proliferation of services being adopted by commercial and government sectors. However, trust and security concerns for such services are on an unprecedented scale. Currently, these services expose very little internal working to their customers; this can cause accountability and compliance issues especially in the event of a fault or error, customers and providers are left to point finger at each other. Provenance-based traceability provides a mean to address part of this problem by being able to capture and query events occurred in the past to understand how and why it took place. However, due to the complexity of the cloud infrastructure, the current provenance models lack the expressibility required to describe the inner-working of a cloud service. For a complete solution, a provenance-aware policy language is also required for operators and users to define policies for compliance purpose. The current policy standards do not cater for such requirement. To address these issues, in this paper we propose a provenance (traceability) model cProv, and a provenance-aware policy language (cProvl) to capture traceability data, and express policies for validating against the model. For implementation, we have extended the XACML3.0 architecture to support provenance, and provided a translator that converts cProvl policy and request into XACML type.