The Winnipeg principles, WTO and sustainable development: Proposed policies for reconciling trade and the environment

There is, a widespread belief that the WTO has made virtually no concessions to environmentalists about their concerns arising from free trade and the process of globalization. There are concerns that these processes may undermine prospects for sustainable development. Following, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the International Institute for Sustainable Development was established to advocate policies to support sustainable development within Canada and globally. In 1994, it proposed the Winnipeg Principles as. a means for reconciling international trade and development so as to: achieve sustainable development (ISD, 1994a,b). These seven principles are outlined in this article and assessed:. Although the International Institute for Sustainable Development had hoped: through these principles to influence the work programme of the Environment and Trade Committee of WTO, it seems to have little effect. Probably if these principles had been seriously considered by WTO, the serious social conflicts which emerged globally at the beginning of this century would have been avoided, and we would be in a better position to understand the complex links between trade, environment and sustainable development and adopt relevant policies. Copyright (C) 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

Globalisation and sustainability: environmental Kuznets curve and the WTO

Economic globalisation is seen by many as a driving force for global economic growth. Yet opinion is divided about the benefits of this process, as highlighted by the WTO meeting in Seattle in late 1999. Proponents of economic globalisation view it as a positive force for environmental improvement and as a major factor increasing the likelihood of sustainable development through its likely boost to global investment. These proponents mostly appeal to analysis based on the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) to support their views about environmental improvement. But EKC-analysis has significant deficiencies. Furthermore, it is impossible to be confident that the process of economic globalisation will result in sustainable development, if 'weak conditions' only are satisfied. 'Strong conditions' probably need to be satisfied to achieve sustainable development, and given current global institutional arrangements, these are likely to be violated by the economic globalisation process. Global political action seems to be needed-to avert a deterioration in the global environment and to prevent unsustainability of development. This exposition demonstrates the limitations of EKC-analysis, identifies positive and negative effects of economic globalisation on pollution levels, and highlights connections between globalisation and the debate about whether strong or weak conditions are required for sustainable development. The article concludes with a short discussion of the position of WTO in relation to trade and the environment and the seemingly de facto endorsement of WTO of weak conditions for sustainable development. It suggests that WTO's relative neglect of environmental concerns is no longer politically tenable and needs to be reassessed in the light of recent developments in economic analysis. The skew of economic growth, e.g. in favour of developing countries, is shown to be extremely important from a global environmental perspective. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

China's proposing behavior in Global Governance: the cases of the WTO Doha Round negotiation and G-20 process

This article examines China's proposals on the reform of global governance, and discusses the main features of China's proposing behavior in the cases of the WTO Doha Round negotiation and G-20 Process. The main findings are: (1) in the critical junctures of global governance reform, China engaged the reform of the global governance institutions proactively, and put forward a series of reform proposals; (2) in proposing behavior, China argued the global governance institutions should be properly adjusted without intention to change the basic principles, refrained from playing a leadership role while proposing jointly with other countries, and upheld the principled idea of pro-development.

How Much “Safety” Is Available under the U.S. Proposal to the WTO?, November 2005

Critics of the U.S. proposal to the World Trade Organization (WTO) made in October 2005 are correct when they argue that adoption of the proposal would significantly reduce available support under the current farm program structure. Using historical prices and yields from 1980 to 2004, we estimate that loan rates would have to drop by 9 percent and target prices would have to drop by 10 percent in order to meet the proposed aggregate Amber Box and Blue Box limits. While this finding should cheer those who think that reform of U.S. farm programs is long overdue, it alarms those who want to maintain a strong safety net for U.S. agriculture. The dilemma of needing to reform farm programs while maintaining a strong safety net could be resolved by redesigning programs so that they target revenue rather than price. Building on a base of 70 percent Green Box income insurance, a program that provides a crop-specific revenue guarantee equal to 98 percent of the product of the current effective target price and expected county yield would fit into the proposed aggregate Amber and Blue Box limits. Payments would be triggered whenever the product of the season-average price and county average yield fell below this 98 percent revenue guarantee. Adding the proposed crop-specific constraints lowers the coverage level to 95 percent. Moving from programs that target price to ones that target revenue would eliminate the rationale for ad hoc disaster payments. Program payments would automatically arrive whenever significant crop losses or economic losses caused by low prices occurred. Also, much of the need for the complicated mechanism (the Standard Reinsurance Agreement) that transfers most risk of the U.S. crop insurance to the federal government would be eliminated because the federal government would directly assume the risk through farm programs. Changing the focus of federal farm programs from price targeting to revenue targeting would not be easy. Farmers have long relied on price supports and the knowledge that crop losses are often adequately covered by heavily subsidized crop insurance or by ad hoc disaster payments. Farmers and their leaders would only be willing to support a change to revenue targeting if they see that the current system is untenable in an era of tight federal budgets and WTO limits.