Fannie E. Pettibone Wright

On verso: Christmas 1900

A boundary preserving numerical algorithm for the Wright-Fisher model with mutation

The Wright-Fisher model is an Itô stochastic differential equation that was originally introduced to model genetic drift within finite populations and has recently been used as an approximation to ion channel dynamics within cardiac and neuronal cells. While analytic solutions to this equation remain within the interval [0,1], current numerical methods are unable to preserve such boundaries in the approximation. We present a new numerical method that guarantees approximations to a form of Wright-Fisher model, which includes mutation, remain within [0,1] for all time with probability one. Strong convergence of the method is proved and numerical experiments suggest that this new scheme converges with strong order 1/2. Extending this method to a multidimensional case, numerical tests suggest that the algorithm still converges strongly with order 1/2. Finally, numerical solutions obtained using this new method are compared to those obtained using the Euler-Maruyama method where the Wiener increment is resampled to ensure solutions remain within [0,1].

Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

G. Ernest Wright Papers, 1957-1972

This collection primarily contains correspondence from Wright’s years as president of ASOR. Material dates as far back as 1957, and proceed into the early 1970’s. Some of Wright’s more notable correspondents include William F. Albright, A. Henry Detweiler, Paul W. Lapp, William Reed, and Dean Seiler. Subject-specific correspondence includes records of expenditures, budget planning, corporate memberships, and the Jerusalem School.