Boulevard to broken dreams, Part 1: the Polonoroeste road project in the Brazilian Amazon, and the World Bank's environmental and indigenous peoples' norms

ABSTRACT Before the mid 1980s the World Bank conceived "nature" as something to be "conquered" and "environment" as a source of resources for "development". By the late 1980s the Bank incorporated norms of environmental sustainability and indigenous peoples' protection into its mandate, and other development-oriented IOs followed. This two-part paper describes how a fight over the Polonoroeste road project in the Brazilian Amazon - inside the Bank, between the Bank and NGOs supported by the US Congress, and between the Bank and the government of Brazil -helped to generate the far-reaching change of policy norms. The first part describes how the project was designed as an innovation in sustainable development in rainforests; and how it provoked a firestorm inside the Bank as it moved towards project approval.

Do IMF and World Bank programs induce government crises? an empirical analysis

We examine whether and under what circumstances World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs affect the likelihood of major government crises. We find that crises are, on average, more likely as a consequence of World Bank programs. We also find that governments face an increasing risk of entering a crisis when they remain under an IMF or World Bank arrangement once the economy's performance improves. The international financial institution's (IFI) scapegoat function thus seems to lose its value when the need for financial support is less urgent. While the probability of a crisis increases when a government turns to the IFIs, programs inherited by preceding governments do not affect the probability of a crisis. This is in line with two interpretations. First, the conclusion of IFI programs can signal the government's incompetence, and second, governments that inherit programs might be less likely to implement program conditions agreed to by their predecessors.

Criticisms and suggestions on the cross-conditionality of the IMF and the World Bank

Includes bibliography