Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 636 - "The Relation between Philosophy and Sociology in the Work of Wilhelm Dilthey" und "Autoritärer Staat" (p. IX 12.1-7-IX 13.1-7)

"The Relation between Psychology and Sociology in the Work of Wilhelm Dilthey" (GS 4, S. 352-370), veröffentlicht in Studies in Philosophy and Social Science VIII, 1939/40, S. 430-443, Vortragstext englische Fassung, Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 18 Blatt, deutsche Fassung, Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 20 Blatt; Vorlage zur Eröffnung der Vortragsveranstaltung, Typoskript, 1 Blatt; Über das Verhältnis Diltheys zu Max Weber; über die Widersprüche bei Dilthey; zur Logik geisteswissenschaftlichen Verstehens (= Vorarbeiten zum Vortrag? Vorbereitungen zu Diskussionsbeiträgen?), a) englische Fassung, Typoskript, 5 Blatt, b) deutsche Fassung, Typoskript, 6 Blatt; N.N.: handschriftliche Notiz für die Diskussion, 1 Blatt; Exzerpte zum Werk Wilhelm Diltheys, Typoskripte, 12 Blatt; Zitate aus Schriften Wilhelm Diltheys, Typoskripte, 12 Blatt; Deutsche Übersetzung des Aufsatzes von Kurt Jürgen Huch und Alfred Schmidt, mit dem Titel: "Der Zusammenhang zwischen Psychologie und Soziologie im Werk Wilhelm Diltheys", veröffentlicht in: Max Horkheimer, "Kritische Theorie", Bd. II, 1968, S.273-291, Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 29 Blatt; "Autoritärer Staat" (GS 5, S. 293-319), Aufsatz, datiert: Frühjahr 1940, veröffentlicht als vervielfältigtes Typoskript in "Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis", herausgegeben vom Institut für Sozialforschung, Los Angeles 1942, S. 123-161;

Curso: La edad hermenéutica de la razón -Dilthey, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Betti, Apel, Vattimo-

Coordina: Dr. Pedro Enrique García Ruiz

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).

Wilhelm Diltheys gesammelte Schriften.

Editions vary.

Sapientia, 1946, Vol. I, nº 2 (número completo)

Contenido: El significado histórico de Godofredo G. Leibniz (1646-1946) / La Dirección – La “comprehensión” del estado en Wilhelm Dilthey / Arturo Enrique Sampay – La subalternación de la ética a la psicología / Julio Meinvielle – Mundo del accidente / G. K. E. – Notas -- Bibliografía

Visión y versión de la historia.

Se exponen las diferentes formas de interpretar el mundo históricamente, o las distintas corrientes filosóficas que tratan el tema. El positivismo de Comte y su estudio naturista del ser humano, el existencialismo de Heidegger, la doctrina espiritualista y psicologista de Maine de Biran, el idealismo de Georg Hegel, Immanuel Kant o George Berkeley, el materialismo en el que lo material precede al pensamiento, como en Karl Marx y Friederich Engels, inciado por Feuerbach, el realismo político de Maquiavelo y Guicciardini, el moralismo de Tomás Moro y el espiritualismo de Savonarola, se comparan con los ideales de Wilhelm Dilthey y su ordenamiento del mundo histórico en antropología, ontología y gnoseología, lanzando una crítica de la razón histórica.

La pedagogia com a comprensió hermenèutica en Eduard Spranger.

Resumen tomado de la publicación

Kulturowa interpretacja filozofii moralności Davida Hume’a

Wydział Nauk Społecznych: Instytut Filozofii

What public experience may be - on publicity, communication and the expression of lived experiences

The idea of public experience is often invoked in different social and academic contexts. However, it seldom deserved a reflection that specifically sought to deepen its meaning from the point of view of social life. In this article we contribute to the understanding of the uniqueness of the public form of experience. We believe that one of the best ways through which we can observe the public experience is by the objectification, performance and dramatization of the culture, i.e., the “expression of lived experiences”. There is, in publicity, the possibility of simultaneous allocation of individual and collective experiences, and it is in this sense that we can see how culture influences the shaping of experience itself. Public experience is characterized by the weaving and intertwining of singular experiences that are pluralized and plural lived experiences that are singularized, in a process where individual and society interpenetrate. The relationship between experience and publicity arises from this symbolic communion contained in the systems of thought and action of societies. The decisive role of the principle of publicity to experience consists, according with the hypothesis we wish to put forward, in making available and communicating the social world of symbolic (cultural) activity. Public experience is, then, envisaged as the experience of a common world where both singular and plural definitions of the individual (taken as society) converge through lived experiences and, particularly, through their expression, which can take different symbolic forms.

What public experience may be - on publicity, communication and the expression of lived experiences

The idea of public experience is often invoked in different social and academic contexts. However, it seldom deserved a reflection that specifically sought to deepen its meaning from the point of view of social life. In this article we contribute to the understanding of the uniqueness of the public form of experience. We believe that one of the best ways through which we can observe the public experience is by the objectification, performance and dramatization of the culture, i.e., the “expression of lived experiences”. There is, in publicity, the possibility of simultaneous allocation of individual and collective experiences, and it is in this sense that we can see how culture influences the shaping of experience itself. Public experience is characterized by the weaving and intertwining of singular experiences that are pluralized and plural lived experiences that are singularized, in a process where individual and society interpenetrate. The relationship between experience and publicity arises from this symbolic communion contained in the systems of thought and action of societies. The decisive role of the principle of publicity to experience consists, according with the hypothesis we wish to put forward, in making available and communicating the social world of symbolic (cultural) activity. Public experience is, then, envisaged as the experience of a common world where both singular and plural definitions of the individual (taken as society) converge through lived experiences and, particularly, through their expression, which can take different symbolic forms.

Gadamer's transformation of hermeneutics : from Dilthey to Heidegger

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to show how Gadamer's hermeneutics synthesizes the insights of both Heidegger and Dilthey in order to introduce a new hermeneutics. Gadamer's hermeneutics is based not only on the priority of ontology, as Heidegger insists, and neither is it only a product of life which can be objectively understood through study and rigorous method, as Dilthey suggests. For Gadamer, hermeneutics is the bringing together of ontology in terms of history. By this synthesis Gadamer not only places himself within the context of a Lebensphilosophie, but also shows that it is within language that Being can be disclosed according to a lived context. Throughout this paper the philosophies ofDilthey and Heidegger are explicated within a historical context as to bring out how, and why, Gadamer sees the need to surpass these philosophies. Through Gadamer's philosophy of play and the game, language, the dialogical model, application, and the fusion of horizons we can see how Gadamer's critique and questioning of these two philosophy leads to his new hermeneutics. Special attention is paid to the role in which these two contrasting philosophies were used to complement each other in the product of Gadamer' s philosophical hermeneutics as it is presented in his major work Truth andMethod. For Gadamer, the task of understanding is never complete. Therefore, his hermeneutics remains a dynamic structure with which we can always question the past and our traditions. This paper seeks to show his philosophical movements within these questions

Francisco Romero. Tres lecciones sobre Guillermo Dilthey en su Centenario

Fil: Torchia Estrada, Juan Carlos.