Demokratie, good governance und Entwicklung: Eine quantitative Analyse für 191 Staaten im Zeitraum 1996 bis 2005

Das Jahr 1989 markiert nicht nur den Beginn entscheidender geopolitischer Veränderungen, sondern gleichzeitig den Ursprung eines bedeutsamen Wandels in der internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Mit der viel beachteten Studie ‚Sub-Saharan Africa – From Crisis to Sustainable Growth’ initiierte die Weltbank eine Debatte über die Relevanz institutioneller Faktoren für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, die in den folgenden Jahren unter dem Titel ‚Good Governance’ erhebliche Bedeutung erlangte. Nahezu alle zentralen Akteure begannen, entsprechende Aspekte in ihrer praktischen Arbeit zu berücksichtigen, und entwickelten eigene Konzepte zu dieser Thematik. Wenn auch mit der Konzentration auf Institutionen als Entwicklungsdeterminanten eine grundlegende Gemeinsamkeit der Ansätze festzustellen ist, unterscheiden sie sich jedoch erheblich im Hinblick auf die Einbeziehung politischer Faktoren, so dass von einem einheitlichen Verständnis von ‚Good Governance’ nicht gesprochen werden kann. Während die meisten bilateralen Akteure sowie DAC und UNDP Demokratie und Menschenrechte explizit als zentrale Bestandteile betrachten, identifiziert die Weltbank einen Kern von Good Governance, der unabhängig von der Herrschaftsform, also sowohl in Demokratien wie auch in Autokratien, verwirklicht werden kann. Die Implikationen dieser Feststellung sind weit reichend. Zunächst erlaubt erst diese Sichtweise der Bank überhaupt, entsprechende Aspekte aufzugreifen, da ihr eine Berücksichtigung politischer Faktoren durch ihre Statuten verboten ist. Bedeutsamer ist allerdings, dass die Behauptung der Trennbarkeit von Good Governance und der Form politischer Herrschaft die Möglichkeit eröffnet, Entwicklung zu erreichen ohne eine demokratische Ordnung zu etablieren, da folglich autokratische Systeme in gleicher Weise wie Demokratien in der Lage sind, die institutionellen Voraussetzungen zu verwirklichen, welche als zentrale Determinanten für wirtschaftlichen Fortschritt identifiziert wurden. Damit entfällt nicht nur ein bedeutsamer Rechtfertigungsgrund für demokratische Herrschaft als solche, sondern rekurrierend auf bestimmte, dieser zu attestierende, entwicklungshemmende Charakteristika können Autokratien nun möglicherweise als überlegene Herrschaftsform verstanden werden, da sie durch jene nicht gekennzeichnet sind. Die Schlussfolgerungen der Weltbank unterstützen somit auch die vor allem im Zusammenhang mit der Erfolgsgeschichte der ostasiatischen Tigerstaaten vertretene Idee der Entwicklungsdiktatur, die heute mit dem Aufstieg der Volksrepublik China eine Renaissance erlebt. Der wirtschaftliche Erfolg dieser Staaten ist danach auf die überlegene Handlungsfähigkeit autokratischer Systeme zurückzuführen, während Demokratien aufgrund der Verantwortlichkeitsbeziehungen zwischen Regierenden und Regierten nicht in der Lage sind, die notwendigen Entscheidungen zu treffen und durchzusetzen. Die dargestellte Sichtweise der Weltbank ist allerdings von verschiedenen Autoren in Zweifel gezogen worden, die auch für ein im Wesentlichen auf technische Elemente beschränktes Good Governance-Konzept einen Zusammenhang mit der Form politischer Herrschaft erkennen. So wird beispielsweise vertreten, das Konzept der Bank bewege sich ausdrücklich nicht in einem systemneutralen Vakuum, sondern propagiere zumindest implizit die Etablierung demokratischer Regierungsformen. Im Übrigen steht die aus den Annahmen der Weltbank neuerlich abgeleitete Idee der Entwicklungsdiktatur in einem erheblichen Widerspruch zu der von multilateralen wie bilateralen Akteuren verstärkt verfolgten Förderung demokratischer Herrschaft als Mittel für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung sowie der fortschreitenden Verbreitung der Demokratie. Besteht nun doch ein Einfluss der Herrschaftsform auf die Verwirklichung von Good Governance als zentraler Entwicklungsdeterminante und kann zudem davon ausgegangen werden, dass Demokratien diesbezüglich Vorteile besitzen, dann ist eine Entwicklungsdiktatur keine denkbare Möglichkeit, sondern im Gegenteil demokratische Herrschaft der gebotene Weg zu wirtschaftlichem Wachstum bzw. einer Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse. Aufgrund der mit den Schlussfolgerungen der Weltbank verbundenen bedeutsamen Implikationen und der bisher weitestgehend fehlenden ausführlichen Thematisierung dieses Gegenstands in der Literatur ist eine detaillierte theoretische Betrachtung der Zusammenhänge zwischen den zentralen Elementen von Good Governance und demokratischer Herrschaft notwendig. Darüber hinaus sollen die angesprochenen Beziehungen auch einer empirischen Analyse unterzogen werden. Gegenstand dieser Arbeit ist deshalb die Fragestellung, ob Good Governance eine von demokratischer Herrschaft theoretisch und empirisch unabhängige Entwicklungsstrategie darstellt.

Impeding good governance implementation in Indonesian regional government : the effect of a bureaucratic generation gap

The implementation of ‘good governance’ in Indonesia’s regional government sector became a central tenet in governance research following the introduction of the national code for governance in 2006. The code was originally drafted in 1999 as a response to the Asian financial crises and many cases of unearthed corruption, collusion, and nepotism. It was reviewed in 2001 and again in 2006 to incorporate relevant political, economical, and social developments. Even though the national code exists along with many regional government decrees on good governance, the extent of implementation of the tenets of good governance in Indonesia’s regional government is still questioned. Previous research on good governance implementation in Indonesian regional government (Mardiasmo, Barnes and Sakurai, 2008) identified differences in the nature and depth of implementation between various Indonesian regional governments. This paper analyses and extends this recent work and explores key factors that may impede the implementation and sustained application of governance practices across regional settings. The bureaucratic culture of Indonesian regional government is one that has been shaped for over approximately 30 years, in particular during that of the Soeharto regime. Previous research on this regime suggests a bureaucratic culture with a mix of positive and negative aspects. On one hand Soeharto’s regime resulted in strong development growth and strong economic fundamentals, resulting in Indonesia being recognised as one of the Asian economic tigers prior to the 1997 Asian financial crises. The financial crises however revealed a bureaucratic culture that was rife with corruption, collusion, and nepotism. Although subsequent Indonesian governments have been committed to eradicating entrenched practices it seems apparent that the culture is ingrained within the bureaucracy and eradication of it will take time. Informants from regional government agree with this observation, as they identify good governance as an innovative mechanism and to implement it will mean a deviation from the “old ways.” Thus there is a need for a “changed” mind set in order to implement sustained governance practices. Such an exercise has proven to be challenging so far, as there is “hidden” resistance from within the bureaucracy to change its ways. The inertia of such bureaucratic cultures forms a tension against the opportunity for the implementation of good governance. From this context an emergent finding is the existence of a ‘bureaucratic generation gap’ as an impeding variable to enhanced and more efficient implementation of governance systems. It was found that after the Asian financial crises the Indonesian government (both at national and regional level) drew upon a wider human resources pool to fill government positions – including entrants from academia, the private sector, international institutions, foreign nationals and new graduates. It suggested that this change in human capital within government is at the core of this ‘inter-generational divide.’ This divergence is exemplified, at one extreme, by [older] bureaucrats who have been in-position for long periods of time serving during the extended Soeharto regime. The “new” bureaucrats have only sat in their positions since the end of Asian financial crisis and did not serve during Soeharto’s regime. It is argued that the existence of this generation gap and associated aspects of organisational culture have significantly impeded modernising governance practices across regional Indonesia. This paper examines the experiences of government employees in five Indonesian regions: Solok, Padang, Gorontalo, Bali, and Jakarta. Each regional government is examined using a mixed methodology comprising of on-site observation, document analysis, and iterative semi-structured interviewing. Drawing from the experiences of five regional governments in implementing good governance this paper seeks to better understand the causal contexts of variable implementation governance practices and to suggest enhancements to the development of policies for sustainable inter-generational change in governance practice across regional government settings.

In search of good governance for Asian family listed companies : a case study on Hong Kong

Discusses the importation of Western concepts of corporate governance into Hong Kong where many companies are family companies to which Asian culture is more familiar. Considers different models of corporate governance and questions the application of Western structures to family owned companies. Examines the weaknesses inherent in the typical structure of Asian companies, particularly from the point of view of minority shareholders. Suggests that a system of governance based on Confucian philosophy may be more effective in Hong Kong.

Pretty good governance: balancing policy drivers and stakeholder interests in developing fisheries ecosystem plans

The central research question that this thesis addresses is whether there is a significant gap between fishery stakeholder values and the principles and policy goals implicit in an Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management (EAFM). The implications of such a gap for fisheries governance are explored. Furthermore an assessment is made of what may be practically achievable in the implementation of an EAFM in fisheries in general and in a case study fishery in particular. The research was mainly focused on a particular case study, the Celtic Sea Herring fishery and its management committee, the Celtic Sea Herring Management Advisory Committee (CSHMAC). The Celtic Sea Herring fishery exhibits many aspects of an EAFM and the fish stock has successfully recovered to healthy levels in the past 5 years. However there are increasing levels of governance related conflict within the fishery which threaten the future sustainability of the stock. Previous research on EAFM governance has tended to focus either on higher levels of EAFM governance or on individual behaviour but very little research has attempted to link the two spheres or explore the relationship between them. Two main themes within this study aimed to address this gap. The first was what role governance could play in facilitating EAFM implementation. The second theme concerned the degree of convergence between high-level EAFM goals and stakeholder values. The first method applied was governance benchmarking to analyse systemic risks to EAFM implementation. This found that there are no real EU or national level policies which provide stakeholders or managers with clear targets for EAFM implementation. The second method applied was the use of cognitive mapping to explore stakeholders understandings of the main ecological, economic and institutional driving forces in the Celtic Sea Herring fishery. The main finding from this was that a long-term outlook can and has been incentivised through a combination of policy drivers and participatory management. However the fundamental principle of EAFM, accounting for ecosystem linkages rather than target stocks was not reflected in stakeholders cognitive maps. This was confirmed in a prioritisation of stakeholders management priorities using Analytic Hierarchy Process which found that the overriding concern is for protection of target stock status but that wider ecosystem health was not a priority for most management participants. The conclusion reached is that moving to sustainable fisheries may be a more complex process than envisioned in much of the literature and may consist of two phases. The first phase is a transition to a long-term but still target stock focused approach. This achievable transition is mainly a strategic change, which can be incentivised by policies and supported by stakeholders. In the Celtic Sea Herring fishery, and an increasing number of global and European fisheries, such transitions have contributed to successful stock recoveries. The second phase however, implementation of an ecosystem approach, may present a greater challenge in terms of governability, as this research highlights some fundamental conflicts between stakeholder perceptions and values and those inherent in an EAFM. This phase may involve the setting aside of fish for non-valued ecosystem elements and will require either a pronounced mind-set and value change or some strong top-down policy incentives in order to succeed. Fisheries governance frameworks will need to carefully explore the most effective balance between such endogenous and exogenous solutions. This finding of low prioritisation of wider ecosystem elements has implications for rights based management within an ecosystem approach, regardless of whether those rights are individual or collective.

Good governance of gender balance. CEPS Commentary, 16 November 2012

CEPS Chief Executive Karel Lannoo observes in this CEPS Commentary that there is a compelling need to attract more women to positions of high responsibility in Europe in light of their demonstrated capacity to contribute significantly to the improvement of governance.