The false promises of the (second) Washington consensus: evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean (1990-2003)

The objective of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we show how, and to what extent, Latin American and Caribbean countries applied the precepts of the second Washington consensus, i.e. a consensus which stresses the capital account liberalization. Secondly, we highlight the effects of this set of reforms on their economies. Thus, we show that countries having most scrupulously followed these recommendations did not experience better economic results. On the contrary, their situation as regards inequality and debt is getting worse than others.

Beyond the Washington Consensus: an ECLAC perspective

Includes bibliography

Industrialización y desarrollo en la Argentina pos-“Washington Consensus”: un abordaje crítico desde la perspectiva sectorial, actoral y espacial

Argentina, en 2001, luego de experimentar una de las crisis más profunda de su historia, consecuencia de la primacía de las políticas neoliberales durante la década de 1990 y de los resultados negativos en términos de crecimiento y desigualdad socio-espacial a que estas dieron lugar, comenzó a reconsiderar el rol del Estado en la economía. En dicho contexto se lo sindicó como un actor estratégico para dinamizar un crecimiento inclusivo que viabilice el desarrollo. La promoción estatal a la actividad industrial ocupó un lugar central en la consecución de dicho objetivo. Transcurrida ya más de una década, en el presente trabajo se demuestra, a través del análisis de estadísticas oficiales, cómo la re-intervención del Estado poco ha podido hacer para avanzar en la conformación de un tejido industrial complejo, dinámico y descentralizado –actoral y espacialmente–, que permita viabilizar el desarrollo.

El condicionamiento al capital externo como instrumento para la implementación de reformas neoliberales en América Latina: la aplicación del Consenso de Washington en Argentina (1989 – 2001)

Esta monografía pretende analizar qué tipo de condiciones externas e internas son contundentes a la hora de darle un viraje tan profundo a la política económica de países subdesarrollados, como la experimentada durante la década de los 90 cuando la oferta y demanda de capital financiero internacional estuvo condicionada a la implementación de políticas neoliberales, en el marco del Consenso de Washington. En este sentido, esta monografía busca responder interrogantes como: ¿Qué tipo de elementos externos pueden conducir a un cambio en la política económica de un país?, ¿Hasta qué punto un actor externo como el FMI incide en la formulación e instrumentación de tales políticas?, ¿Cómo responden los gobiernos a las presiones de esos intereses y qué sucede cuando no lo hace?.

Washington's growth and opportunity act or Beijing's 'Overarching Brilliance': will African governments choose neither?

Growing criticism of Chinese engagement in Africa centres on the risk to African development posed by China's aggressive export policies and the threat to the Washington Consensus and African governance posed by China's 'non-interference' approach to engagement. This article challenges both these assumptions. The growth of Chinese trade has a wide range of impacts, depending on the sector in question, and the current terms of trade Washington extends to Africa under the auspices of the AGOA do not result in uniformly beneficial effects. With regard to African governance, it is argued that the 'Washington Consensus' has been based on competing and often muddled perceptions of US national interest. This fact tempers the regret felt at Washington's loss of influence over the good governance agenda. Evidence is provided to show that China can work within properly regulated countries and industries, if the African governments in question can provide fair, efficient and transparent environments in which to operate.

Financiamento para o subdesenvolvimento, o Brasil e o segundo consenso de Washington

While in the social and in the ethical realms the Cardoso administration was successful, its economic outcomes were frustrating. In this administration’s eight years the investment rate did not increase and income per capita growth lagged, while the public debt and the foreign debt increased substantially. This poor economic performance may be explained by three chained causes: a mistake in agenda setting, the adoption of the Second Washington Consensus, and the alienation of elites. The decision of setting high inflation as the major problem to be tackled instead of achieving equilibrium in foreign accounts represented a major macroeconomic mistake, which can be explained by the Second Washington Consensus. This consensus proposed in the 1990s that highly indebted countries should grow counting on foreign savings, although this is not the experience among OECD countries. The outcome was to evaluate the real, to increase artificially wages and consumption, so that instead of growth what we have been increased indebtedness. Why this flopped strategy was adopted? Rich countries’ interests are not difficult to guess. On the part of Brazil, the only explanation is Brazilian elites’ alienation in relation to the country’s national interest. As a final outcome, the Cardoso administration ends with another balance of payments crisis, which was empowered by the coming presidential elections. Yet, the solvency situation of the Brazilian economy have been improving since the 1999 successful floatation of the real, so that I believe that, adopted a policy that deepens fiscal adjustment, while lowers the interest rate, and avoids new evaluation of the real, the country will eventually be able to avoid default.

Interesse, ideologia & incompetência: a guerra do Iraque e o segundo consenso de Washington

Este projeto continua a avançar o programa de pesquisa que relaciona desenvolvimento econômico e democracia: pretende-se neste projeto dar um passo adiante e examinar como a democracia, uma vez consolidada como fruto do desenvolvimento capitalista, se torna ela própria um fator de desenvolvimento, particularmente quando ela deixa de ser uma mera democracia de elites para se tornar uma democracia de sociedade civil, na qual o debate público passa a ser um elemento central.

A Bridge Builder or a Raconteur? How Japan Manoeuvres the Global Development Discourse within the TICAD Process

Japan has been a major actor in the field of development cooperation for five decades, even holding the title of largest donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) during the 1990s. Financial flows, however, are subject to pre-existing paradigms that dictate both donor and recipient behaviour. In this respect Japan has been left wanting for more recognition. The dominance of the so called ‘Washington Consensus’ embodied in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank has long circumvented any indigenous approaches to development problems. The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) is a development cooperation conference that Japan has hosted since 1993 every five years. As the main organizer of the conference Japan has opted for the leading position of African development. This has come in the wake of success in the Asian region where Japan has called attention to its role in the so called ‘Asian Miracle’ of fast growing economies. These aspirations have enabled Japan to try asserting itself as a major player in directing the course of global development discourse using historical narratives from both Asia and Africa. Over the years TICAD has evolved into a continuous process with ministerial and follow-up meetings in between conferences. Each conference has produced a declaration that stipulates the way the participants approach the question of African development. Although a multilateral framework, Japan has over the years made its presence more and more felt within the process. This research examines the way Japan approaches the paradigms of international development cooperation and tries to direct them in the context of the TICAD process. Supplementing these questions are inquiries concerning Japan’s foreign policy aspirations. The research shows that Japan has utilized the conference platform to contest other development actors and especially the dominant forces of the IMF and the World Bank in development discourse debate. Japan’s dominance of the process is evident in the narratives found in the conference documents. Relative success has come about by remaining consistent as shown by the acceptance of items from the TICAD agenda in other forums, such as the G8. But the emergence of new players such as China has changed the playing field, as they are engaging other developing countries from a more equal level.