The Global War on Terrorism in the Horn of Africa

Ever since Siad Barre’s regime was toppled in the beginning of the 1990’s Somalia has been without an effective central government. As a result Somalia has remained in an anarchic condition of state collapse for nearly two decades. This anarchy has often been put forward as a potential breeding ground for terrorism. As a response to this threat the United States has undertaken several policies, initiatives, and operations in the Horn of Africa generally and in Somalia specifically. In this descriptive study a twofold analysis has been undertaken. First, conditions in present day Somalia as well as Somali history have been analyzed to evaluate the potential Somalia holds as a terrorist base of operations or a recruiting- or staging area. Second, US strategies and actions have been analyzed to evaluate the adequacy of the US response to the threat Somalia poses in terms of terrorism. Material for the analyses have been derived from anthropological, political, and security studies dealing with Somalia. This material has been augmented by a wide range of news coverage, western and non-western. Certain different US policy documents from different levels have been chosen to represent US strategies for the Global War on Terrorism. Because Somali social institutions, such as the clan system, hold great weight in Somali society, Somalia is a difficult area of operations for terrorist networks. In addition the changing nature of Somali alliances and the tangled webs of conflict that characterize present day Somalia aggravate the difficulties that foreign terrorist networks would encounter in Somalia, would they choose to try to utilize it in any great extent. The US has taken potential terrorism threats in Africa and specifically Somalia very seriously. US actions in Somalia have mainly focused on apprehending or neutralizing terror suspects. Such policies, coupled with backing the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia may have actually turned out increasing Somalia’s terror potential.

A sermon, preached in Boston, August 20, 1812, the day of humiliation and prayer, appointed by the President of the United States, in consequence of the declaration of war against Great Britain /

Published at the request of the hearers.

A sermon, preached in Boston, August 20, 1812, the day of humiliation and prayer, appointed by the President of the United States, in consequence of the declaration of war against Great Britain

Published at the request of the hearers. Printed by C. Stebbins

A sermon, preached in Boston, July 23, 1812, the day of the publick fast, appointed by the Executive of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in consequence of the declaration of war against Great Britain

Published at the request of the hearers Printed by Greenough and Stebbins

Message from the President of the United States, Recommending an Immediate Declaration of War Against Great Britain (1812)

"June 1st, 1812. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. June 3d, 1812. Bill reported, declaring war ..."

The three systems for the protection of fundamental human rights in the European Union and exceptional measures against terrorism: the case of extraordinary extraditions (the CIA flights) with special reference to the Spanish case

This document is aimed first of all, make a small introductory reference on the three levels of protection of fundamental rights in Europe with the idea of helping to clarify and understand mainly to non-European systems that we are not talking. For that, based on this, going on to assess the impact generated in these systems suggest that the complaints alleged involvement of European countries in secret CIA flights to combat international terrorism, as well as investigate the responses that have given each protection of these areas to try to clarify them. 

A tax on currency transactions as an instrument in the war against poverty

Includes bibliography

Russia's Clandestine War against the United States: The Resurrection of the KGB and Russian Organized Crime Post 9/11

As American leadership has narrowly focused on fighting global terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, the modern version of the KGB, now known as the FSB, has been conducting continuous clandestine warfare operations against the United States. These warfare operations include strategic economic and political partnerships with anti-American entities worldwide and direct embedding of double agents in the US intelligence community. This paper investigates the role of Russia's cultural history leading to the merger of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Russian Organized Crime (ROC). This paper concludes that the FSB is the most pervasive security threat to the United States and that employing Russian native and heritage speakers of Russian in the US intelligence community compromises US national security.

EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? Research Papers in Law, 3/2008

From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.