Collective Voluntary Agreements and the Production of Less Polluting Products

Recently, some industries have collectively agreed not to produce models that do not meet an energy efficiency (and hence an environmental) standard. This paper presents a simple model that can be used to examine a voluntary collective agreement to limit or completely eliminate the low efficiency model of a given product (e.g., a low efficiency washing machine). We show that, when there is competition between firms, a collective agreement to limit or even eliminate production of the polluting model can actually increase profits for all firms in the industry. This suggests that a collective agreement of this type might actually be beneficial to firms, while at the same time improving environmental quality. However, the implicit enforcement that comes from the public nature of the commitment is necessary to ensure this outcome. This suggests that, by promoting such agreements, policymakers may be able to achieve substantial environmental gains with relatively little inducement. The impact on social welfare will then depend on whether these gains are sufficiently large to offset consumer losses from reductions in product variety and the associated price increases.

Allocation of scarce commodities through voluntary agreements; a report to the Secretary of Commerce.

Mode of access: Internet.

The role of municipalities in air toxics regulation: The Houston experience

The federal regulatory regime for addressing airborne toxic pollutants functions fairly well in most of the country. However, it has proved deficient in addressing local risk issues, especially in urban areas with densely concentrated sources. The problem is especially pronounced in Houston, which is home to one of the world's biggest petrochemical complexes and a major port, both located near a large metropolitan center. Despite the fact that local government's role in regulating air toxics is typically quite limited, from 2004-2009, the City of Houston implemented a novel municipality-based air toxics reduction strategy. The initiatives ranged from voluntary agreements to litigation and legislation. This case study considers why the city chose the policy tools it did, how the tools performed relative to the designers' intentions, and how the debate among actors with conflicting values and goals shaped the policy landscape. The city's unconventional approach to controlling hazardous air pollution has not yet been examined rigorously. The case study was developed through reviews of publicly available documents and quasi-public documents obtained through public record requests, as well as interviews with key informants. The informants represented a range of experience and perspectives. They included current and former public officials at the city (including Mayor White), former Texas Commission on Environmental Quality staff, faculty at local universities, industry representatives, and environmental public health advocates. Some of the city's tools were successful in meeting their designers' intent, some were less successful. Ultimately, even those tools that did not achieve their stated purpose were nonetheless successful in bringing attention and resources to the air quality issue. Through a series of pleas and prods, the city managed to draw attention to the problem locally and get reluctant policymakers at higher levels of government to respond. This work demonstrates the potential for local government to overcome limitations in the federal regulatory regime for air toxics control, shifting the balance of local, state, and federal initiative. It also highlights the importance of flexible, cooperative strategies in local environmental protection.^

Voluntary employment agreements in the pioneer state

Research Paper examining the introduction of VEA’s on the industrial and political framework of Queensland

An evaluation of the sustainability of agreements reached through mediations conducted by the dispute resolution centres of the Department of Justice and Attorney General, Queensland between 1999 to 2003

In 1990 the Dispute Resolution Centres Act, 1990 (Qld) (the Act) was passed by the Queensland Parliament. In the second reading speech for the Dispute Resolution Centres Bill on May 1990 the Hon Dean Wells stated that the proposed legislation would make mediation services available “in a non-coercive, voluntary forum where, with the help of trained mediators, the disputants will be assisted towards their own solutions to their disputes, thereby ensuring that the result is acceptable to the parties” (Hansard, 1990, 1718). It was recognised at that time that a method for resolving disputes was necessary for which “the conventional court system is not always equipped to provide lasting resolution” (Hansard, 1990, 1717). In particular, the lasting resolution of “disputes between people in continuing relationships” was seen as made possible through the new legislation; for example, “domestic disputes, disputes between employees, and neighbourhood disputes relating to such issues as overhanging tree branches, dividing fences, barking dogs, smoke, noise and other nuisances are occurring continually in the community” (Hansard, 1990, 1717). The key features of the proposed form of mediation in the Act were articulated as follows: “attendance of both parties at mediation sessions is voluntary; a party may withdraw at any time; mediation sessions will be conducted with as little formality and technicality as possible; the rules of evidence will not apply; any agreement reached is not enforceable in any court; although it could be made so if the parties chose to proceed that way; and the provisions of the Act do not affect any rights or remedies that a party to a dispute has apart from the Act” (Hansard, 1990, 1718). Since the introduction of the Act, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Branch of the Queensland Department of Justice and Attorney General has offered mediation services through, first the Community Justice Program (CJP), and then the Dispute Resolution Centres (DRCs) for a range of family, neighbourhood, workplace and community disputes. These services have mirrored those available through similar government agencies in other states such as the Community Justice Centres of NSW and the Victorian Dispute Resolution Centres. Since 1990, mediation has become one of the fastest growing forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Sourdin has commented that "In addition to the growth in court-based and community-based dispute resolution schemes, ADR has been institutionalised and has grown within Australia and overseas” (2005, 14). In Australia, in particular, the development of ADR service provision “has been assisted by the creation and growth of professional organisations such as the Leading Edge Alternative Dispute Resolvers (LEADR), the Australian Commercial Dispute Centres (ACDC), Australian Disputes Resolution Association (ADRA), Conflict Resolution Network, and the Institute of Arbitrators and Mediators Australia (IAMA)” (Sourdin, 2005, 14). The increased emphasis on the use of ADR within education contexts (particularly secondary and tertiary contexts) has “also led to an increasing acceptance and understanding of (ADR) processes” (Sourdin, 2005, 14). Proponents of the mediation process, in particular, argue that much of its success derives from the inherent flexibility and creativity of the agreements reached through the mediation process and that it is a relatively low cost option in many cases (Menkel-Meadow, 1997, 417). It is also accepted that one of the main reasons for the success of mediation can be attributed to the high level of participation by the parties involved and thus creating a sense of ownership of, and commitment to, the terms of the agreement (Boulle, 2005, 65). These characteristics are associated with some of the core values of mediation, particularly as practised in community-based models as found at the DRCs. These core values include voluntary participation, party self-determination and party empowerment (Boulle, 2005, 65). For this reason mediation is argued as being an effective approach to resolving disputes, that creates a lasting resolution of the issues. Evaluation of the mediation process, particularly in the context of the growth of ADR, has been an important aspect of the development of the process (Sourdin, 2008). Writing in 2005 for example, Boulle, states that “although there is a constant refrain for more research into mediation practice, there has been a not insignificant amount of mediation measurement, both in Australia and overseas” (Boulle, 2005, 575). The positive claims of mediation have been supported to a significant degree by evaluations of the efficiency and effectiveness of the process. A common indicator of the effectiveness of mediation is the settlement rate achieved. High settlement rates for mediated disputes have been found for Australia (Altobelli, 2003) and internationally (Alexander, 2003). Boulle notes that mediation agreement rates claimed by service providers range from 55% to 92% (Boulle, 2005, 590). The annual reports for the Alternative Dispute Resolution Branch of the Queensland Department of Justice and Attorney-General considered prior to the commencement of this study indicated generally achievement of an approximate settlement figure of 86% by the Queensland Dispute Resolution Centres. More recently, the 2008-2009 annual report states that of the 2291 civil dispute mediated in 2007-2008, 86% reached an agreement. Further, of the 2693 civil disputes mediated in 2008-2009, 73% reached an agreement. These results are noted in the report as indicating “the effectiveness of mediation in resolving disputes” and as reflecting “the high level of agreement achieved for voluntary mediations” (Annual Report, 2008-2009, online). Whilst the settlement rates for the DRCs are strong, parties are rarely contacted for long term follow-up to assess whether agreements reached during mediation lasted to the satisfaction of each party. It has certainly been the case that the Dispute Resolution Centres of Queensland have not been resourced to conduct long-term follow-up assessments of mediation agreements. As Wade notes, "it is very difficult to compare "success" rates” and whilst “politicians want the comparison studies (they) usually do not want the delay and expense of accurate studies" (1998, 114). To date, therefore, it is fair to say that the efficiency of the mediation process has been evaluated but not necessarily its effectiveness. Rather, the practice at the Queensland DRCs has been to evaluate the quality of mediation service provision and of the practice of the mediation process. This has occurred, for example, through follow-up surveys of parties' satisfaction rates with the mediation service. In most other respects it is fair to say that the Centres have relied on the high settlement rates of the mediation process as a sign of the effectiveness of mediation (Annual Reports 1991 - 2010). Research of the mediation literature conducted for the purpose of this thesis has also indicated that there is little evaluative literature that provides an in-depth analysis and assessment of the longevity of mediated agreements. Instead evaluative studies of mediation tend to assess how mediation is conducted, or compare mediation with other conflict resolution options, or assess the agreement rate of mediations, including parties' levels of satisfaction with the service provision of the dispute resolution service provider (Boulle, 2005, Chapter 16).

Safer driving agreements in the Australian context : can they be effective?

Prior research suggests that greater parental involvement in the safety and learning of their young novice driver can have a positive impact on their child’s safety. Safer driving agreements, which typically involve a formal statement of driving conditions and restrictions ratified by a driver and another party, most often parents, are an increasingly common initiative to enhance young novice driver safety. However, there are few formal evaluations of such initiatives and the limited available research suggests only modest differences in traffic violations, and minimal impacts on crash involvement. The current paper reports on an assessment of the potential efficacy of safer driving agreements in the Australian context, via a literature review and extensive stakeholder and community consultations. Specifically, discussions were conducted with an expert panel of United States researchers and program developers; a survey was completed with Australian police, transport and motoring stakeholders; and focus groups and surveys were completed with young drivers and parents. Overall, results suggested mixed understanding of, and support for, safer driving agreements in Australia, with issues relating to voluntary participation and accurate monitoring of behaviour cited as major barriers. Indeed, the potential effectiveness of the initiative was largely perceived as being limited to those young drivers who are already safety conscious, and as being dependent on existing strong relationships with parents (e.g., trust, honesty and respect). Implications of the study and recommendations for future research are discussed.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.

Safer construction voluntary code of practice : implications for SMEs

The majority of Australian construction firms are small businesses, with 97% of general construction businesses employing less than 20 employees and 85% employing less than five employees (Lin and Mills, 2001; Lingard and Holmes, 2001). The Australian Bureau of Statistics’ definition of a small to medium enterprise was used for the purpose of this study (McLennan, 2000). This included small business employing less than twenty people and medium business employing less than 200 people. Although small to medium enterprises (SME) make up the major share of construction organisations in Australia, there is a paucity of published research in relation to occupational health and safety (OHS) issues for this group. Typically, SME organisations “are frequently undercapitalized and depend on continuous cash flow for their continued business” (Cole, 2003; 12). Research by Lin and Mills (2001) indicates that these factors influence the smaller operators’ ability and motivation to achieve high levels of OHS compared to larger firms which tend to integrate OHS into their management systems. According to Lin and Mills (2001; 137) small firms “do not feel the need to focus on OHS in their management systems, instead they often believe that the control of risk is the responsibility of employees”. This report documents findings from a qualitative research study that examined SME organisations’ views of a newly developed voluntary code of practice (VCOP), and ways in which they might implement the code in their businesses. The research also explored respondents’ awareness of current safety issues in industry in the context of their personal experiences.

Safer construction : the development of a voluntary code of practice to improve safety performance in the Australian construction industry

In Australia, between 1994 and 2000, 50 construction workers were killed each year as a result of their work, the industry fatality rate, at 10.4 per 100,000 persons, is similar to the national road toll fatality rate and the rate of serious injury is 50% higher than the all industries average. This poor performance represents a significant threat to the industry’s social sustainability. Despite the best efforts of regulators and policy makers at both State and Federal levels, the incidence of death, injury and illness in the Australian construction industry has remained intransigently high, prompting an industry-led initiative to improve the occupational health and safety (OHS) performance of the Australian construction industry. The ‘Safer Construction’ project involves the development of an evidence-based Voluntary Code of Practice for OHS in the industry.

Licensing technology : negotiating and drafting technology transfer agreements [3rd ed.]

Part I of this book covers the commercial and contractual background to technology licensing agreements. Part II discusses the European Community's new regime on the application and enforcement of Article 81 to technology licensing agreements. EC Council Regulation 1/2003 replaced the Council Regulation 17/1962 and repealed the system under which restrictive agreements and practices could be notified to the EC Commission. A new Commission regulation on technology transfer agreements, Regulation 772/2004. These two enactments required consequential amendments to the chapters in Part III where the usual terms of technology licensing agreements are analysed and exemplified by reference to decided cases.