La cooperación cultural como herramienta para la reafirmación identitaria en el Grupo Visegrád y sus efectos en el posicionamiento del mismo dentro de la Unión Europea 2004-2012

El Grupo Visegrád es un escenario de cooperación multilateral, conformado por Polonia, República Checa, Eslovaquia y Hungría, el cual tiene como objetivo principal contribuir al cumplimiento de los intereses de dichos países, por medio de la financiación de proyectos culturales. El interés de esta monografía consiste en determinar la incidencia de la cooperación cultural en la reafirmación identitaria de cada uno de los miembros del Grupo y, por ende, en la manera como éstos se proyectan dentro de la Unión Europea. Así pues, se identifican los principales hechos históricos que han moldeado los intereses de los países del V4 y que condujeron a la creación de una estructura institucional sólida, que ha servido como plataforma para el accionar de dichos países dentro del bloque europeo. Se utiliza la perspectiva constructivista de Alexander Wendt, la cual permite entender la naturaleza de la cooperación y, su relación con las identidades y los intereses de los Estados.

A new Visegrad Group in the new European Union - possibilities and opportunities for development. OSW Point of View, June 2003

The Visegrad Group has fulfilled the tasks it was set when established. It seems unjustified, therefore, to ponder the need for it to function further. However, it is advisable to lay out new tasks, suitable for the group's operation in the new European reality - following EU accession of Visegrad countries in May 2004.

Strategia unii europejskiej dla regionu dunaju. Implikacje dla Polski i Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Prace OSW 37/2011. = European Union Strategy for the Danube region. Implications for the Polish and the Visegrad Group. OSW Study 37/2011

Strategia dunajska jest drugim po strategii bałtyckiej przykładem rosnącego znaczenia makroregionów w Unii Europejskiej. Na politykę regionalną patrzy się przy tym coraz częściej przez pryzmat realizacji nie tylko spójności wewnętrznej, ale także działań na rzecz lepszego powiązania państwa z otoczeniem zewnętrznym – zarówno unijnym, jak i pozaunijnym. Polska współtworzy strategię bałtycką, ale nie została włączona do ścisłego grona państw przygotowujących strategię dunajską. Wyzwaniem dla Grupy Wyszehradzkiej jest określenie stanowiska w sprawie roli strategii makroregionalnych w budowaniu spójności Europy Środkowej i harmonijnego rozwoju całej UE. Postulat lepszej koordynacji polityk i środków UE w celu wdrażania strategii makroregionalnych należy traktować także jako wezwanie do zacieśnienia współpracy między Polską a jej południowymi sąsiadami, bezpośrednio zaangażowanymi w realizację strategii dunajskiej.

Latin America-European Union cooperation: A partnership for development

The European Union has taken special interest in promoting development cooperation as an instrument along with framework and association agreements. Today, the countries making up the strategic partnership between the European Union and the current Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) are in a far different position from the one envisaged in the early 1990s. Nearly 15 years on from the launch of the strategic partnership between the European Union and the current Community of Latin American and Caribberan States (CELAC, formerly the Rio Group), it is important to look at the future prospects for cooperation. During this change, the strategic partnership between the European Union and CELAC will continue, so European Union cooperation must also change to meet this challenge.

Central Europeans towards Integration with the European Union: A Study of Public Opinion, Social Attitudes and National Identities

Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.

European Union and the developing nations' external debt : EU-15's debt policy, 1960–2008

This Master's Thesis defines the debt policy of the current European Union Member States towards the developing nations. Since no official policy for debt exists in the EU, it is defined to include debt practices (loans and debt relief in development cooperation) and debt within the EU development policy framework. This study (1) describes how the issue of external debt appears in the development policy framework, (2) compares EU Member States' given loans and debt relief to grants for the developing nations (1960s to the 2000s), and (3) measures the current orientation in ODA of each EU Member State between grant aid and loan aid using the Grant-Loan Index (GLI). Theoretical aspects include reasons for selecting between loans (Bouchet 1987) and grants (Odedokun 2004, O'Brien and Williams 2007), policy context of the EU (Van Reisen 2007) and the meaning of external debt in the set-up between the North and the South. In terms of history, the events and impact of the colonial period (where loans have originated) are overviewed and compared in light of today's policies. Development assistance statistics are derived from the OECD DAC statistics portal and EU development policy framework documents from the EU portal. Methodologically, the structure of this study is from policy analysis (Barrien 1999, Hill 2008, Berndtson 2008), but it has been modified to fit the needs of studying a non-official policy. EU Member States are divided into three groups by Carbone (2007a), the Big-3, Northern and Southern donors, based on common development assistance characteristics. The Grant-Loan Index is used to compare Carbone's model, which measures quality of aid, to the GLI measuring the structure of aid. Results indicate that EU- 15 countries (active in debt practices) differ in terms of timing, stability and equality of debt practices in the long-term (1960s to the 2000s). In terms of current practices, (2000-2008), it is noted that there lies a disparity between the actual practices and the way in which external debt is represented in the development policy framework, although debt practices form a relevant portion of total ODA practices for many EU-15 Member States, the issue itself plays a minor role in development policy documents. Carbone’s group division applies well to the Grant – Loan Index’s results, indicating that countries with similar development policy behaviour have similarities in debt policy behaviour, with one exception: Greece. On the basis of this study, it is concluded that EU development policy framework content in terms of external debt and debt practices are not congruent. The understanding of this disparity between the policy outline and differences in long-term practices is relevant in both, reaching the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, and in the actual process of developing development aid.

European Union Cross-Border Cooperation and Conflict Amelioration

The relevance of European Union (EU) cross-border cooperation for European border con?ict amelioration may be questioned in the contemporary global climate of threat and insecurity posed by forces of ’dark globalisation’. In any case, empirical evidence exposes the limitations of cross-border cooperation in advancing con?ict amelioration in some border regions. Nevertheless, in an enlarged EU which encompasses Central and East European member states and reaches out to neighbouring states through cross-border cooperation initiatives, the number of real and potential border con?icts with which it is concerned has risen exponentially. Fortunately, there are cases of EU ’borderscapes’ that have adopted a cross-border ’peace-building from below’ approach leading to border con?ict amelioration. Unfortunately, countervailing pressures on EU cross-border cooperation from border security regimes (principally Schengen), the Eurozone crisis, EU budgetary constraints, the conceptualisation of ’Europe as Empire’, and the possible recon?guration of the EU itself compromises this approach. Therefore, the path of European integration may well shift from one of inter-state peace-building and regional crossborder cooperation after the Second World War, to border con?ict and coercion in constituting and reconstituting state borders after the recon?guration of the EU.

European Union Cross-Border Cooperation as Conflict Transformation:Potential and Limits

Cross-border cooperation as conflict transformation provides a potential strategy for the European Union (EU) to help realise its founding peacebuilding objective. A wealth of cross-border cooperation activity sponsored by the EU spans a quarter of a century. Although the conflict transformation capacity of that cooperation is questionable in some border regions there is evidence to suggest that it has delivered peacebuilding dividends in other border regions. However, EU cross-border cooperation as conflict transformation faces a number of significant twenty-first century challenges including: ghost borders of the communal imagination; EU external border securitization; perceptions of EU and Russian empire-building; and the Mediterranean transmigrant/refugee crisis. It is argued that these challenges pose significant obstacles to EU cross-border cooperation as conflict transformation and undermine the peacebuilding objective of European integration.