A correlation sensitivity analysis of non-life underwriting risk in solvency capital requirement estimation

This paper analyses the impact of using different correlation assumptions between lines of business when estimating the risk-based capital reserve, the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR), under Solvency II regulations. A case study is presented and the SCR is calculated according to the Standard Model approach. Alternatively, the requirement is then calculated using an Internal Model based on a Monte Carlo simulation of the net underwriting result at a one-year horizon, with copulas being used to model the dependence between lines of business. To address the impact of these model assumptions on the SCR we conduct a sensitivity analysis. We examine changes in the correlation matrix between lines of business and address the choice of copulas. Drawing on aggregate historical data from the Spanish non-life insurance market between 2000 and 2009, we conclude that modifications of the correlation and dependence assumptions have a significant impact on SCR estimation.

A correlation sensitivity analysis of non-life underwriting risk in solvency capital requirement estimation

This paper analyses the impact of using different correlation assumptions between lines of business when estimating the risk-based capital reserve, the Solvency Capital Requirement -SCR-, under Solvency II regulations. A case study is presented and the SCR is calculated according to the Standard Model approach. Alternatively, the requirement is then calculated using an Internal Model based on a Monte Carlo simulation of the net underwriting result at a one-year horizon, with copulas being used to model the dependence between lines of business. To address the impact of these model assumptions on the SCR we conduct a sensitivity analysis. We examine changes in the correlation matrix between lines of business and address the choice of copulas. Drawing on aggregate historical data from the Spanish non-life insurance market between 2000 and 2009, we conclude that modifications of the correlation and dependence assumptions have a significant impact on SCR estimation.

Pré-ipo capital infusion and underwriting in Brazil: a study on conflicts of interests in the universal banking system

Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas

What constitutes a reasonable underwriting profit and the method of determining same.

Supplemental report also issued, which was filed at the Commissioner's meeting of December 7th, 1921. Titled: Report of the Fire Insurance Committee of the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners, approved and adoped December 7, 1921.

How to use the standard model with own data?

In this work discuss the use of the standard model for the calculation of the solvency capital requirement (SCR) when the company aims to use the specific parameters of the model on the basis of the experience of its portfolio. In particular, this analysis focuses on the formula presented in the latest quantitative impact study (2010 CEIOPS) for non-life underwriting premium and reserve risk. One of the keys of the standard model for premium and reserves risk is the correlation matrix between lines of business. In this work we present how the correlation matrix between lines of business could be estimated from a quantitative perspective, as well as the possibility of using a credibility model for the estimation of the matrix of correlation between lines of business that merge qualitative and quantitative perspective.

Get a GRIP: Should Area Revenue Coverage Be Offered through the Farm Bill or as a Crop Insurance Program? 2007

The successful expansion of the U.S. crop insurance program has not eliminated ad hoc disaster assistance. An alternative currently being explored by members of Congress and others in preparation of the 2007 farm bill is to simply remove the “ad hoc” part of disaster assistance programs by creating a standing program that would automatically funnel aid to hard-hit regions and crops. One form such a program could take can be found in the area yield and area revenue insurance programs currently offered by the U.S. crop insurance program. The Group Risk Plan (GRP) and Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) programs automatically trigger payments when county yields or revenues, respectively, fall below a producer-elected coverage level. The per-acre taxpayer costs of offering GRIP in Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa for corn and soybeans through the crop insurance program are estimated. These results are used to determine the amount of area revenue coverage that could be offered to farmers as part of a standing farm bill disaster program. Approximately 55% of taxpayer support for GRIP flows to the crop insurance industry. A significant portion of this support comes in the form of net underwriting gains. The expected rate of return on money put at risk by private crop insurance companies under the current Standard Reinsurance Agreement is approximately 100%. Taking this industry support and adding in the taxpayer support for GRIP that flows to producers would fund a county target revenue program at the 93% coverage level.

Some optimization and decision problems in proportional reinsurance

Reinsurance is one of the tools that an insurer can use to mitigate the underwriting risk and then to control its solvency. In this paper, we focus on the proportional reinsurance arrangements and we examine several optimization and decision problems of the insurer with respect to the reinsurance strategy. To this end, we use as decision tools not only the probability of ruin but also the random variable deficit at ruin if ruin occurs. The discounted penalty function (Gerber & Shiu, 1998) is employed to calculate as particular cases the probability of ruin and the moments and the distribution function of the deficit at ruin if ruin occurs.

Life Insurance and Genetics: A Comparative International Overview

La possibilité d'utiliser l'information génétique dans le domaine de l'assurance vie a soulevé des discussions autour des politiques et des législations, et ce, au niveau international, régional et national. Dans certains pays offrant des services de santé universels, le débat sur la génétique et l'assurance vie a envisagé de possibles restrictions quant à l'utilisation de l’information génétique en matière d’assurance.

Genetics and Life Insurance: A Comparative Analysis

The debate surrounding the role of life insurance, the necessity of risk rating, and the notion of “acceptable discrimination” has raised questions about the larger social role of insurance. Recent developments in the field of genetics, allowing insurers to make use of genetic testing technology as a new underwriting tool, have reinvigorated this debate. This article presents a comparative study of positions taken in countries on issues in genetics and life insurance. We will analyze the 43 selected countries and comment on their potential for ensuring a more equitable access for life insurance applicants.

Sélection des risques de morbidité et de mortalité en Afrique subsaharienne aux fins d’une tarification en assurance-vie

Résumé: Les progrès réalisés dans le domaine médical ont permis un prolongement de l’espérance de vie, l’amélioration de la qualité de vie des patients; ce qui implique aussi des changements dans des domaines comme l’assurance-vie. Le principe de la tarification en assurance-vie est basé sur la comparaison du risque (probabilité) de décès d’un individu candidat à une police d’assurance à celui d’une population de référence la plus proche possible du candidat. C’est ainsi que l’analyse de la littérature médicale est devenue un outil indispensable dans la sélection des risques. L’assurance-vie est présente en Afrique subsaharienne depuis environ deux cents ans, mais les assureurs ne disposaient pas jusqu'à nos jours d’outils de tarification spécifiques au contexte africain. A notre connaissance notre travail est le premier effort de ce type à s’intéresser à ce sujet. Son objectif est d’élaborer un outil de tarification qui tiendra compte des aspects spécifiques de la mortalité et de la morbidité sur le continent africain. Dans une première partie nous avons conduit une revue de la littérature médicale disponible sur différents problèmes de santé; dans une seconde étape nous avons identifié les facteurs de risque de morbidité et de mortalité afin de proposer une sélection des risques pour une tarification. Les résultats montrent que les études de mortalité, et principalement les cohortes de suivi à long terme sont rares en Afrique subsaharienne; la majorité des études sont de courte durée et en plus elles enrôlent un nombre restreint de patients. Ces insuffisances ne permettent pas une analyse actuarielle approfondie et les résultats sont difficiles à extrapoler directement dans le domaine de la tarification. Cependant, l’identification des facteurs d’aggravation de la mortalité et de la morbidité permettra un ajustement de la tarification de base. Le sujet noir africain présente un profil de mortalité et de morbidité qui est sensiblement différent de celui du sujet caucasien, d’où la nécessité d’adapter les outils de tarification actuellement utilisés dans les compagnies d’assurance qui opèrent en Afrique subsaharienne. L’Afrique au sud du Sahara a besoin aujourd’hui plus que jamais de données épidémiologiques solides qui permettront de guider les politiques sanitaires mais aussi servir au développement d’une sélection des risques adaptés au contexte africain. Ceci passera par la mise en place d’un réseau coordonné de santé publique, un système de surveillance démographique fiable et un suivi continu des mouvements de la population. Pour atteindre un tel objectif, une collaboration avec les pays développés qui sont déjà très avancés dans de tels domaines sera nécessaire.

Ambiguity on the insurer's side: the demand for insurance

Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured individuals (e.g., [23]). Motivated by these findings, we consider a problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the realizations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an expected-utility maximizer. We show that if the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured, then there exist optimal monotonic indemnity schedules. By virtue of monotonicity, no ex-post moral hazard issues arise at our solutions (e.g., [25]). In addition, in the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse, we show that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedule reduces to that of solving an auxiliary problem that is simpler than the original one in that it does not involve ambiguity. Finally, under additional assumptions, we give an explicit characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, and we show how our results naturally extend the classical result of Arrow [5] on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule.

Ambiguity on the insurer's side: the demand for insurance

Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured individuals (e.g., [23]). Motivated by these findings, we consider a problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the realizations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an expected-utility maximizer. We show that if the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured, then there exist optimal monotonic indemnity schedules. By virtue of monotonicity, no ex-post moral hazard issues arise at our solutions (e.g., [25]). In addition, in the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse, we show that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedule reduces to that of solving an auxiliary problem that is simpler than the original one in that it does not involve ambiguity. Finally, under additional assumptions, we give an explicit characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, and we show how our results naturally extend the classical result of Arrow [5] on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule.