Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.

Three essays on game theory and bargaining

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Inhomogeneous Fermi and quantum spin systems on lattices

We study the thermodynamic properties of a certain type of space-inhomogeneous Fermi and quantum spin systems on lattices. We are particularly interested in the case where the space scale of the inhomogeneities stays macroscopic, but very small as compared to the side-length of the box containing fermions or spins. The present study is however not restricted to "macroscopic inhomogeneities" and also includes the (periodic) microscopic and mesoscopic cases. We prove that - as in the homogeneous case - the pressure is, up to a minus sign, the conservative value of a two-person zero-sum game, named here thermodynamic game. Because of the absence of space symmetries in such inhomogeneous systems, it is not clear from the beginning what kind of object equilibrium states should be in the thermodynamic limit. However, we give rigorous statements on correlations functions for large boxes. (C) 2012 American Institute of Physics. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.4763465]

Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intendingdefectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information

A correlation scheme (leading to a special equilibrium called “soft” correlated equilibrium) is applied for two-person finite games in extensive form with perfect information. Randomization by an umpire takes place over the leaves of the game tree. At every decision point players have the choice either to follow the recommendation of the umpire blindly or freely choose any other action except the one suggested. This scheme can lead to Pareto-improved outcomes of other correlated equilibria. Computational issues of maximizing a linear function over the set of soft correlated equilibria are considered and a linear-time algorithm in terms of the number of edges in the game tree is given for a special procedure called “subgame perfect optimization”.

On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games

The “Nash program” initiated by Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) is a research agenda aiming at representing every axiomatically determined cooperative solution to a game as a Nash outcome of a reasonable noncooperative bargaining game. The L-Nash solution first defined by Forgó (Interactive Decisions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 229. Springer, Berlin, pp 1–15, 1983) is obtained as the limiting point of the Nash bargaining solution when the disagreement point goes to negative infinity in a fixed direction. In Forgó and Szidarovszky (Eur J Oper Res 147:108–116, 2003), the L-Nash solution was related to the solution of multiciteria decision making and two different axiomatizations of the L-Nash solution were also given in this context. In this paper, finite bounds are established for the penalty of disagreement in certain special two-person bargaining problems, making it possible to apply all the implementation models designed for Nash bargaining problems with a finite disagreement point to obtain the L-Nash solution as well. For another set of problems where this method does not work, a version of Rubinstein’s alternative offer game (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982) is shown to asymptotically implement the L-Nash solution. If penalty is internalized as a decision variable of one of the players, then a modification of Howard’s game (J Econ Theory 56:142–159, 1992) also implements the L-Nash solution.

Zero-sum problems in finite cyclic groups

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate some open problems in the area of combinatorial number theory referred to as zero-sum theory. A zero-sequence in a finite cyclic group G is said to have the basic property if it is equivalent under group automorphism to one which has sum precisely IGI when this sum is viewed as an integer. This thesis investigates two major problems, the first of which is referred to as the basic pair problem. This problem seeks to determine conditions for which every zero-sequence of a given length in a finite abelian group has the basic property. We resolve an open problem regarding basic pairs in cyclic groups by demonstrating that every sequence of length four in Zp has the basic property, and we conjecture on the complete solution of this problem. The second problem is a 1988 conjecture of Kleitman and Lemke, part of which claims that every sequence of length n in Zn has a subsequence with the basic property. If one considers the special case where n is an odd integer we believe this conjecture to hold true. We verify this is the case for all prime integers less than 40, and all odd integers less than 26. In addition, we resolve the Kleitman-Lemke conjecture for general n in the negative. That is, we demonstrate a sequence in any finite abelian group isomorphic to Z2p (for p ~ 11 a prime) containing no subsequence with the basic property. These results, as well as the results found along the way, contribute to many other problems in zero-sum theory.

Market Index Biases and Minimum Risk Indices

Markets, in the real world, are not efficient zero-sum games where hypotheses of the CAPM are fulfilled. Then, it is easy to conclude the market portfolio is not located on Markowitz"s efficient frontier, and passive investments (and indexing) are not optimal but biased. In this paper, we define and analyze biases suffered by passive investors: the sample, construction, efficiency and active biases and tracking error are presented. We propose Minimum Risk Indices (MRI) as an alternative to deal with to market index biases, and to provide investors with portfolios closer to the efficient frontier, that is, more optimal investment possibilities. MRI (using a Parametric Value-at-Risk Minimization approach) are calculated for three stock markets achieving interesting results. Our indices are less risky and more profitable than current Market Indices in the Argentinean and Spanish markets, facing that way the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Two innovations must be outlined: an error dimension has been included in the backtesting and the Sharpe"s Ratio has been used to select the"best" MRI

Market Index Biases and Minimum Risk Indices

Markets, in the real world, are not efficient zero-sum games where hypotheses of the CAPM are fulfilled. Then, it is easy to conclude the market portfolio is not located on Markowitz"s efficient frontier, and passive investments (and indexing) are not optimal but biased. In this paper, we define and analyze biases suffered by passive investors: the sample, construction, efficiency and active biases and tracking error are presented. We propose Minimum Risk Indices (MRI) as an alternative to deal with to market index biases, and to provide investors with portfolios closer to the efficient frontier, that is, more optimal investment possibilities. MRI (using a Parametric Value-at-Risk Minimization approach) are calculated for three stock markets achieving interesting results. Our indices are less risky and more profitable than current Market Indices in the Argentinean and Spanish markets, facing that way the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Two innovations must be outlined: an error dimension has been included in the backtesting and the Sharpe"s Ratio has been used to select the"best" MRI

“Financial alchemy” or a zero sum game? Real estate finance, securitisation and the UK property market

Following the US model, the UK has seen considerable innovation in the funding, finance and procurement of real estate in the last decade. In the growing CMBS market asset backed securitisations have included $2.25billion secured on the Broadgate office development and issues secured on Canary Wharf and the Trafford Centre regional mall. Major occupiers (retailer Sainsbury’s, retail bank Abbey National) have engaged in innovative sale & leaseback and outsourcing schemes. Strong claims are made concerning the benefits of such schemes – e.g. British Land were reported to have reduced their weighted cost of debt by 150bp as a result of the Broadgate issue. The paper reports preliminary findings from a project funded by the Corporation of London and the RICS Research Foundation examining a number of innovative schemes to identify, within a formal finance framework, sources of added value and hidden costs. The analysis indicates that many of the gains claimed conceal costs – in terms of market value of debt or flexibility of management – while others result from unusual firm or market conditions (for example utilising the UK long lease and the unusual shape of the yield curve). Nonetheless, there are real gains resulting from the innovations, reflecting arbitrage and institutional constraints in the direct (private) real estate market

Video stimuli reduce object-directed imitation accuracy: a novel two-person motion-tracking approach

Imitation is an important form of social behavior, and research has aimed to discover and explain the neural and kinematic aspects of imitation. However, much of this research has featured single participants imitating in response to pre-recorded video stimuli. This is in spite of findings that show reduced neural activation to video vs. real life movement stimuli, particularly in the motor cortex. We investigated the degree to which video stimuli may affect the imitation process using a novel motion tracking paradigm with high spatial and temporal resolution. We recorded 14 positions on the hands, arms, and heads of two individuals in an imitation experiment. One individual freely moved within given parameters (moving balls across a series of pegs) and a second participant imitated. This task was performed with either simple (one ball) or complex (three balls) movement difficulty, and either face-to-face or via a live video projection. After an exploratory analysis, three dependent variables were chosen for examination: 3D grip position, joint angles in the arm, and grip aperture. A cross-correlation and multivariate analysis revealed that object-directed imitation task accuracy (as represented by grip position) was reduced in video compared to face-to-face feedback, and in complex compared to simple difficulty. This was most prevalent in the left-right and forward-back motions, relevant to the imitator sitting face-to-face with the actor or with a live projected video of the same actor. The results suggest that for tasks which require object-directed imitation, video stimuli may not be an ecologically valid way to present task materials. However, no similar effects were found in the joint angle and grip aperture variables, suggesting that there are limits to the influence of video stimuli on imitation. The implications of these results are discussed with regards to previous findings, and with suggestions for future experimentation.