Levels of immune cells in transcendental meditation practitioners.

CONTEXT Relationships between mind and body have gradually become accepted. Yogic practices cause modulation of the immune system. Transcendental meditation (TM) is a specific form of mantra meditation. We reported previously different plasma levels of catecholamines and pituitary hormones in TM practitioners comparing with a control group, and patterns of the daytime secretion of these hormones different from those normally described. AIMS The aim of the following study is to evaluate the immune system in these meditation practitioners, by determining leukocytes and lymphocytes subsets. METHODS TM group consisted of 19 subjects who regularly practice either TM or the more advanced Sidhi-TM technique. A control group consisted of 16 healthy subjects who had not previously used any relaxation technique. Total leukocytes, granulocytes, lymphocytes and monocytes were counted by an automated quantitative hematology analyzer, whereas lymphocytes subsets were determined by flow cytometry. Samples were taken from each subject at 0900 h after an overnight fast. RESULTS The results indicated that the TM group had higher values than the control group in CD3+CD4-CD8+ lymphocytes (P < 0.05), B lymphocytes (P < 0.01) and natural killer cells (P < 0.01), whereas CD3+CD4+CD8- lymphocytes showed low levels in meditation practitioners (P < 0.001). No significant differences were observed in total leukocytes, granulocytes, monocytes, total lymphocytes or CD3+ lymphocytes comparing both groups. CONCLUSIONS The technique of meditation studied seems to have a significant effect on immune cells, manifesting in the different circulating levels of lymphocyte subsets analyzed. The significant effect of TM on the neuroendocrine axis and its relationship with the immune system may partly explain our results.

Growth of transcendental meditation: a sociological study

Sociology, in concerning itself with methodology and cultural determinism,may have overlooked the value of human experience in determining social action. We feel that the structural-functionalist point of view is not mutually exclusive with that of symbolic interaction theory. The field of collective behavior has not adequately explained a certain incidence of human activity called Transcendental Meditation. This paper will define Transcendental Meditation in sociological terms and explore its growth in terms of structural-functionalism,as well as in terms of the symbol-making faculty of human experience. In the first chapter, the author will state his biases and background as well as the problem and purpose of the paper. In the second chapter, Transcendental Meditation will be defined through an explanation of its concepts in sociological terms. A view of the TM program will also be reported. Following this in the third chapter, the origins of TM will be discussed~showing its basis to be in a tradition of Indian gurus and following its development in the United states until the present. The history of TM will proceed through biography of leading figures, with special mention of innovations in the TM institution of teaching and events in the growth of the 'movement' of TOO that are of key importance. Having set down the history of TM, in the fourth chapter we will discuss TM in terms of various sociological models. We will try to identify TM as either a social movement; a charismatic organization or a bureaucracy. In the fifth chapter we will look more closely at the structure of the organization that teaches TM in regard to its own functioning; that is, compliance, communication, socialization and recruitment, and also in regard to its relationship with national institutions, such as military, industry, religion, and government. Finally, we will explore TM in terms of individual and group goals and offer an explanation defining the growth of TM. Throughout-the paper, sociological perspectives will be applied to phenomena that exist in the society today. It is not within the scope of this paper to verify all the sociological implications and appraisals offered. It is hoped that this will not invalidate the ensuing discussion. It is also hoped that this paper will expand the horizons of sociology and offer some direction in future studies of collective behavior. If this is accomplished, the author will be gratified and indebted to his teachers. If not the author takes full responsibility. This paper is dedicated therefore to Mr. Birge, Mr Morrione, Mr. Geib as well as to my parents who have encouraged me, my friends whom I have interviewed, and to His Holiness, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi whose teaching has uplifted hundred of thousands of people in the world and may bring about the development of new thresholds of peace and prosperity for mankind.

A review of the effects of Transcendental Meditation on cardiovascular disease

Cardiovascular disease (CVD) is the single greatest cause of death in the United States, accounting for nearly 2400 deaths each day. It is estimated that 79.4 million American adults have some form of the disease, and CVD mortality rates are greater than those of cancer, chronic lower respiratory diseases, accidents and diabetes mellitus combined. Psychosocial stress is a nontraditional risk factor for CVD, and can contribute to the clustering of traditional risk factors as well as to vascular manifestations of the disease. The Transcendental Meditation (TM) technique has been researched as a cost effective intervention aimed at decreasing psychosocial stress. This literature review attempts to analyze randomized controlled clinical trials of TM on cardiovascular disease outcomes. Eleven studies met inclusion criteria and are described below, with statistically significant positive outcomes observed in each study. Studies are grouped by primary outcome reported in the categories of cardiovascular function, blood pressure, and exercise tolerance. The TM intervention significantly decreased insulin resistance, heart rate variability, and carotid intima media thickness and improved exercise tolerance compared to control groups. Seven studies also reported significant decreases in blood pressure among hypertensive and normotensive subjects. Five studies focused solely on African American subjects, a population that has disproportionately higher rates of CVD and hypertension, and found significant improvements in CVD outcomes. Further research is recommended to establish the efficacy of TM on CVD outcomes. Future trials should include larger sample populations, wider ethnic distributions of subjects, and longer follow-up to ascertain the impact of this particular stress reduction technique on cardiovascular disease.^

Transcendental meditation

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Le Nouveau Testament en franc̜ois , avec des reflexions morales sur chaque verset, pour en rendre la lecture plus utile, & la meditation plus aisée... Nouvelle edition. Tome premier [-quatrième]

[Bible. N.T. (latin-français). 1704-1705. Quesnel]

Le Nouveau Testament en franc̜ois , avec des reflexions morales sur chaque verset, pour en rendre la lecture plus utile, & la meditation plus aisée... Nouvelle edition. Tome premier [-quatrième]

[Bible. N.T. (latin-français). 1704-1705. Quesnel]

Le Nouveau Testament en franc̜ois , avec des reflexions morales sur chaque verset, pour en rendre la lecture plus utile, & la meditation plus aisée... Nouvelle edition. Tome premier [-quatrième]

[Bible. N.T. (latin-français). 1704-1705. Quesnel]

Le Nouveau Testament en franc̜ois , avec des reflexions morales sur chaque verset, pour en rendre la lecture plus utile, & la meditation plus aisée... Nouvelle edition. Tome premier [-quatrième]

[Bible. N.T. (latin-français). 1704-1705. Quesnel]

Le Nouveau Testament en franc̜ois , avec des reflexions morales sur chaque verset, pour en rendre la lecture plus utile, & la meditation plus aisée... Nouvelle edition. Tome premier [-quatrième]

[Bible. N.T. (latin-français). 1704-1705. Quesnel]

Le Nouveau Testament en franc̜ois , avec des reflexions morales sur chaque verset, pour en rendre la lecture plus utile, & la meditation plus aisée... Nouvelle edition. Tome premier [-quatrième]

[Bible. N.T. (latin-français). 1704-1705. Quesnel]

Le Nouveau Testament en franc̜ois , avec des reflexions morales sur chaque verset, pour en rendre la lecture plus utile, & la meditation plus aisée... Nouvelle edition. Tome premier [-quatrième]

[Bible. N.T. (latin-français). 1704-1705. Quesnel]

Le Nouveau Testament en franc̜ois , avec des reflexions morales sur chaque verset, pour en rendre la lecture plus utile, & la meditation plus aisée... Nouvelle edition. Tome premier [-quatrième]

[Bible. N.T. (latin-français). 1704-1705. Quesnel]

Dieter Henrich, leitor de Kant: sobre o fato legitimador na dedução transcendental das categorias

Este artigo reconstrói os momentos principais dos trabalhos de Dieter Henrich sobre a filosofia teórica de Immanuel Kant. Henrich procura esclarecer e recuperar os fundamentos da teoria do conhecimento de Kant, dos quais seus seguidores teriam se distanciado, a partir da análise da dedução transcendental das categorias. De início, Henrich investiga a estrutura da prova na dedução, comparando a primeira e a segunda edição da Crítica da Razão Pura. Em seguida, Henrich investiga no argumento kantiano a relação entre o princípio de identidade da consciência de si, por um lado, e objetividade, por outro. Por fim, estendendo a comparação à Crítica da Razão Prática, Henrich elucida o programa e a metodologia na dedução, mostrando como o "fato" legitimador se torna o elemento fundamental.