Information sharing with key suppliers : a transaction cost theory perspective

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explain variations in discretionary information shared between buyers and key suppliers. The paper also aims to examine how the extent of information shared affects buyers’ performance in terms of resource usage, output, and flexibility. ----- ----- Design/methodology/approach: The data for the paper comprise 221 Finnish and Swedish non-service companies obtained through a mail survey. The hypothesized relationships were tested using partial least squares modelling with reflective and formative constructs.----- ----- Findings: The results of the study suggest that (environmental and demand) uncertainty and interdependency can to some degree explain the extent of information shared between a buyer and key supplier. Furthermore, information sharing improves buyers’ performance with respect to resource usage, output, and flexibility.----- ----- Research limitations/implications: A limitation to the paper relates to the data, which only included buyers.Abetter approach would have been to collect data from both, buyers and key suppliers. Practical implications – Companies face a wide range of supply chain solutions that enable and encourage collaboration across organizations. This paper suggests a more selective and balanced approach toward adopting the solutions offered as the benefits are contingent on a number of factors such as uncertainty. Also, the risks of information sharing are far too high for a one size fits all approach.----- ----- Originality/value: The paper illustrates the applicability of transaction cost theory to the contemporary era of e-commerce. With this finding, transaction cost economics can provide a valuable lens with which to view and interpret interorganizational information sharing, a topic that has received much attention in the recent years.

Modelling the intention to adopt cloud computing services : a transaction cost theory perspective

This paper uses transaction cost theory to study cloud computing adoption. A model is developed and tested with data from an Australian survey. According to the results, perceived vendor opportunism and perceived legislative uncertainty around cloud computing were significantly associated with perceived cloud computing security risk. There was also a significant negative relationship between perceived cloud computing security risk and the intention to adopt cloud services. This study also reports on adoption rates of cloud computing in terms of applications, as well as the types of services used.

Transaction cost analysis

Transaction cost theory is one of the most widely used theories in marketing, management, and economics. The focus of the theory is on explaining how firms organize transactions. The rules by which transactions are organized is called governance. A wide variety of strategic decisions of firms, such as outsourcing, the mode of organizing exports, the use of crowdsourcing, or partner selection efforts, can be analyzed and understood using transaction cost theory. The basic argument of transaction cost theory is that firms economize on costs by choosing a form of governance that minimizes production and transaction costs. We discuss the origins and uses of the theory, critical variables, assumptions, and limitations.

Value creation in capital waterway projects: Application of a transaction cost and transaction benefit framework for the Miami River and the New Orleans Inner Harbour Navigation Canal

Waterways have many more ties with society than as a medium for the transportation of goods alone. Waterway systems offer society many kinds of socio-economic value. Waterway authorities responsible for management and (re)development need to optimize the public benefits for the investments made. However, due to the many trade-offs in the system these agencies have multiple options for achieving this goal. Because they can invest resources in a great many different ways, they need a way to calculate the efficiency of the decisions they make. Transaction cost theory, and the analysis that goes with it, has emerged as an important means of justifying efficiency decisions in the economic arena. To improve our understanding of the value-creating and coordination problems for waterway authorities, such a framework is applied to this sector. This paper describes the findings for two cases, which reflect two common multi trade-off situations for waterway (re)development. Our first case study focuses on the Miami River, an urban revitalized waterway. The second case describes the Inner Harbour Navigation Canal in New Orleans, a canal and lock in an industrialized zone, in need of an upgrade to keep pace with market developments. The transaction cost framework appears to be useful in exposing a wide variety of value-creating opportunities and the resistances that come with it. These insights can offer infrastructure managers guidance on how to seize these opportunities.

The transaction cost economics theory of the family firm: family-based human asset specificity and the bifurcation bias

We develop a transaction cost economics theory of the family firm, building upon the concepts of family-based asset specificity, bounded rationality, and bounded reliability. We argue that the prosperity and survival of family firms depend on the absence of a dysfunctional bifurcation bias. The bifurcation bias is an expression of bounded reliability, reflected in the de facto asymmetric treatment of family vs. nonfamily assets (especially human assets). We propose that absence of bifurcation bias is critical to fostering reliability in family business functioning. Our study ends the unproductive divide between the agency and stewardship perspectives of the family firm, which offer conflicting accounts of this firm type's functioning. We show that the predictions of the agency and stewardship perspectives can be usefully reconciled when focusing on how family firms address the bifurcation bias or fail to do so.

Networks and RegionalCompetitiveness: Towards a Transaction Cost Approach of Small-Scale Cooperation

A preoccupation with competition often dominates the study of governance. A focus on competition often unnecessarily precludes the possibility that regional institutions can suspend competition in certain areas and facilitate cooperation among potential rivals, thereby potentially contributing to their mutual success. In many ways companies cooperating through these types of networks have a greater degree of flexibility than firms which are forced to rely solely on hierarchies or markets for solutions to their problems. In order to fully understand how such networks work, this article first parses out differences in definitions of networks in order to understand how the type of network mentioned above actually differs from other uses of this term. Then it develops a theory of governance that goes beyond hierarchies and markets by demonstrating how this type of network can lead to reductions in transaction costs. This claim is illustrated on hand from examples of alternative forms of organization in Germany and Italy.

Allocating risks in public-private partnership projects using a transaction cost economics approach - a case study

Public-private partnership (PPP) projects are often characterised by increased complexity and uncertainty due to their idiosyncrasy in the management and delivery processes such as long-term lifecycle, incomplete contracting, and the multitude of stakeholders. An appropriate risk allocation is particularly crucial to achieving project success. This paper focuses on the risk allocation in PPP projects and argues that the transaction cost economics (TCE) theory can integrate the economics part, which is currently missing, into the risk management research. A TCE-based approach is proposed as a logical framework for allocating risks between public and private sectors in PPP projects. A case study of the Southern Cross Station redevelopment project in Australia is presented to illustrate the approach. The allocation of important risks is put under scrutiny. Lessons learnt are discussed and alternative management approaches drawing on TCE theory are proposed.

The role of Transaction Cost Economics in information technology outsourcing research : a meta-analysis of the choice of contract type

Two recent reviews report that the empirical findings in information technology outsourcing (ITO) research are frequently inconsistent with the prevailing dominant analytical framework of transaction cost economics (TCE). While employing similar methodologies, the two reviews propose different strategies to resolve the inconsistencies. One is to improve the methodological rigor, specifically, the operationalization of TCE constructs. The other is to abandon TCE in favor of a new analytical framework. This paper presents a meta-analysis of the empirical findings on the choice of contract type as a function of task uncertainty. The results support both strategies. Refining the operationalization of TCE constructs, specifically of task uncertainty, would have improved the reliability of findings on TCE-based relationships between task uncertainty and the choice of contract type. However, independent of such methodological improvements, TCE is of limited relevance in recent ITO research for predicting the choice of contract type. Generalizing these findings, we conclude that ITO research requires a new analytical framework to further develop the theory of ITO and to provide sound guidance to the ITO industry.

Transaction cost economics and industry maturity in it outsourcing: a meta-analysis of contract type choice

Recent reviews of the information technology outsourcing (ITO) literature report high variance in research results when Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is used as the analytical framework. Informed by ITO market developments, including increasing commoditisation, market consolidation, and market transparency, we develop an explanation for these mixed results contingent on ITO industry maturity. We adopt meta-analysis to show that ITO industry maturity significantly explains variance in the choice of contract type (time and materials vs. fixed price) in ITO projects. Our results suggest that TCE is relevant to explain the choice of contract type in the emerging phase of the ITO industry, but not in its current mature phase. We conclude that a TCE-based analytical framework is not well suited for the study of ITO in the current mature industry phase. Instead, we propose that an "endogenous" ITO theory should be developed that focuses on differences in client behaviour rather than vendor behaviour.