Examining Perspectives On China's Near-Monopoly Of Rare Earths

China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years. This thesis first examines the underlying causes behind China’s rise to the status of rare-earths near-monopolist, including government support; lax environmental controls; unregulated production; and relatively low costs compared to the rest of the world. Second, the thesis also examines the preeminent international and domestic factors influencing China’s behavior as a near-monopolist of rare earths. International factors include international demand; international trade pressure; international price-setting authority issues; and geopolitical factors. I next identify domestic factors that exert influence over China’s rare earths-related behavior: environmental protection; rare earth resource protection; rare earths industry regulation; and protecting and aiding China’s domestic rare earths industry. The study concludes with a synthesis of the factors influencing China’s rare-earths-related behavior in the overall context of support and direction by China’s Central Government.

Monopoly power, trade protection and growth: cross industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of monopoly power on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator, concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that industries with higher monopoly power are more protected than competitive sectors. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in sectors with higher monopoly power. We thus have evidence favoring recent growth literature which stresses that interest groups with control over creasing productivity. The results here confirm the first part of this argument and show that organized groups in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce competition.

Monopoly power and trade protection: cross- industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of industry concentration on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator. concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that the higher the concentration of a given industry the higher its leveI of trade protection. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in more concentrated sectors. Assuming that concentration is ;1 gCl()d proX\' for mOllopoh' po\\'er as it reduces the free-rider problem in coordinating a lobby the results in this paper indicates that interest groups with control over specific markets in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce (international) competition.

Procompetitive Losses from Trade

We argue that the procompetitive effect of international trade may bring about significant welfare costs that have not been recognized. We formulate a stylized general equilibrium model with a continuum of imperfectly competitive industries to show that, under plausible conditions, a trade-induced increase in competition can actually amplify monopoly distortions. This happens because trade, while lowering the average level of market power, may increase its cross-sectoral dispersion. Using data on US industries, we document a dramatic increase in the dispersion of market power overtime. We also show evidence that trade might be responsible for it and provide some quantifications of the induced welfare cost. Our results suggest that, to avoid some unpleasant effects of globalization, trade integration should be accompanied by procompetitive reforms (i.e., deregulation) in the nontraded sectors.

Trade, markup heterogeneity and misallocations

We argue that the procompetitive effect of international trade may bring about significant welfare costs that have not been recognized. We formulate a stylized general equilibrium model with a continuum of imperfectly competitive industries to show that, under plausible conditions, a trade-induced increase in competition can actually amplify monopoly distortions. This happens because trade, while lowering the average level of market power, may increase its cross-sectoral dispersion. Using data on US industries, we document a dramatic increase in the dispersion of market power overtime. We also show evidence thattrade might be responsible for it and provide some quantifications of the induced welfare cost. Our results suggest that, to avoid some unpleasant effects of globalization, trade integration should be accompanied by procompetitive reforms (i.e., deregulation) in the nontraded sectors.

Bundling under the Threat of Parallel Trade

This paper examines the use of bundling by a firm that sells in two national markets and faces entry by parallel traders. The firm can bundle its main product, - a tradable good- with a non-traded service. It chooses between the strategies of pure bundling, mixed bundling and no bundling. The paper shows that in the low-price country the threat of grey trade elicits a move from mixed bundling, or no bundling, towards pure bundling. It encourages a move from pure bundling towards mixes bundling or no bundling in the high-price country. The set of parameter values for which the profit maximizing strategy is not to supply the low price country is smaller than in the absence of bundling. The welfare effects of deterrence of grey trade are not those found in conventional models of price arbitrage. Some consumers in the low-price country may gain from the threat of entry by parallel traders although they pay a higher price. This is due to the fact that the firm responds to the threat of arbitrageurs by increasing the amount of services it puts in the bundle targeted at consumers in that country. Similarly, the threat of parallel trade may affect some consumers in the hight-price country adversely.

Rezension zu: Inge Govaere and Hanns Ulrich (eds.): Intellectual Property, Public Policy and International Trade

The contemporary intellectual property rights (IPR) system is not a simple, smoothly working block of rules but is complex and full of ambiguities, and as many argue, imperfections. Some deficits relate on the one hand to the inherent centrality of authorship, originality and mercantilism to the ‘Western’ IP model, which leaves numerous non-Western, collaborative or folkloric modes of production outside the scope of protection. On the other hand, some imperfections stem from the way IPR are granted, whereby creators acquire a temporary monopoly over their works and thus exclude the public from having access to them. In this sense, it is often uncertain whether the existent IPR model appropriately reflects the precarious balance between private and public interests, and whether the best incentives to promote creativity and innovation - the initially stated objectives of intellectual property protection - are offered. The matter becomes still more complicated when one considers that the IPR system is not domestically contained but is globalised and strongly affected by rules at the regional and international levels. The question of whether the balance between private interests and public values is sustained within the international legal framework, epitomised by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), is precisely the topic of the book reviewed here. Review of Intellectual Property, Public Policy, and International Trade, edited by Inge Govaere and Hanns Ullrich, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2007.

Changes in the foreign trade structure of the Russian Far East under the process of transition toward a market economy

Under the process of transition toward a market economy, the economic connections of the Russian Far East (RFE) with external regions changed from a division of labor among the regions of the USSR (Russia) to an international division of labor. This happened due to factors including the liberalization of the trade system away from a state monopoly, the presence of rich natural resources and of developed industries related to these resources, the advantage of geographically proximity to Asia-Pacific countries, and the political and economic division of the once unified national economic space during the process of transition. The economic connections of RFE with external economies changed radically under the transition toward the market economy. First, the value of foreign trade increased dramatically and the importance of foreign trade for the RFE economy increased enormously. Second, however, different territories of RFE traveled along different trajectories, due to factors involving their industrial structure and geographical conditions. Third, in recent years connections with China, in the areas of both exports and imports, have grown. Fourth, the share within exports of "fuel, mineral resources and metal" increased radically from the end of the 1990s, and the share of "machine, facilities and transportation means" increased from 2002 year within imports. Under this situation, especially since 2002, there has been a major change in the structure of foreign trade.

Study of monopoly power.

Emanuel Celler, chairman.

"Our daily bread" must be freed from the greed of private monopoly /

Mode of access: Internet.

Three essays on trade and investment

From H. G. Johnson's work (Review of Economic Studies, 1953–54) on tariff retaliation, the questions of whether a country can win a “tariff war” and how or even the broader question of what will affect a country's strategic position in setting bilateral tariff have been tackled in various situations. Although it is widely accepted that a country will have strategic advantages in winning the tariff war if its relative monopoly power is sufficiently large, it is unclear what are the forces behind such power formation. The goal of this research is to provide a unified framework and discuss various forces such as relative country size, absolute advantages and relative advantages simultaneously. In a two-country continuum-of-commodity neoclassical trade model, it is shown that sufficiently large relative country size is a sufficient condition for a country to choose a non-cooperative tariff Nash equilibrium over free trade. It is also shown that technology disparities such as absolute advantage, rate of technology disparity and the distribution of the technology disparity all contribute to a country's strategic position and interact with country size. ^ Leverage effect is usually used to explain the phenomenon of asymmetric volatility in equity returns. However, leverage itself can only account for parts of the asymmetry. In this research, it is shown that stock return volatility is related to firms’ financial status. Financially constrained firms tend to be more sensitive to the return changes. Financial constraint factor explains why some firms tend to be more volatile than others. I found that the financial constraint factor explains the stock return volatility independent of other factors such as firm size, industry affiliation and leverage. Firms’ industry affiliations are shown to be very weak in differentiating volatility. Firm size is proven to be a good factor in distinguishing the different levels of volatility and volatility-return sensitivity. Leverage hypothesis is also partly corroborated and the situation where leverage effect is not applicable is discussed. Finally, I examined the macroeconomic policy's effects on overall market volatility. ^

Wildlife Trade In Brazil: A Closer Look At Wild Pets Welfare Issues.

Wild animals have been kept as pets for centuries, in Brazil companionship is one of the main reasons why wild species are legally bred and traded. This paper is an attempt to call the attention for problems concerning the welfare of wild pets involved in the trading system in Brazil. Some issues presented are: a) the significant increase in the number of wildlife breeders and traders and the difficulties faced by of the Brazilian government in controlling this activity; b) the main welfare issues faced by breeders and owners of wild pets; and c) the destination of wild pets no longer wanted. Finally, some recommendations are made having the welfare of the animals as a priority.

Trade unions and the economic performance of brazilian establishments

Este artigo analisa, pela primeira vez na literatura, o impacto dos sindicatos de trabalhadores em vários indicadores de desempenho econômico de firmas industriais brasileiras. Realizou-se uma pesquisa retrospectiva sobre a densidade sindical de 1000 estabelecimentos industriais brasileiros e seus resultados foram combinados aos indicadores de desempenho econômico da Pesquisa Industrial Anual (PIA) de 1990 a 2000. Os resultados indicam que a relação entre a densidade sindical na firma e seus salários, emprego e produtividade, é não-linear, ou seja, um aumento no grau de sindicalização leva a um melhor desempenho, porém a taxas decrescentes. Observou-se, também, uma relação negativa entre sindicalização e rentabilidade. Finalmente, estabelecimentos que introduziram mecanismos de 'participação nos lucros' aumentaram sua produtividade e rentabilidade no período e pagaram maiores salários nas firmas onde o grau de sindicalização era maior.

Do synergies improve accuracy? A study of speed-accuracy trade-offs during finger force production

We explored possible effects of negative covariation among finger forces in multifinger accurate force production tasks on the classical Fitts's speed-accuracy trade-off. Healthy subjects performed cyclic force changes between pairs of targets ""as quickly and accurately as possible."" Tasks with two force amplitudes and six ratics of force amplitude to target size were performed by each of the four fingers of the right hand and four finger combinations. There was a close to linear relation between movement time and the log-transformed ratio of target amplitude to target size across all finger combinations. There was a close to linear relation between standard deviation of force amplitude and movement time. There were no differences between the performance of either of the two ""radial"" fingers (index and middle) and the multifinger tasks. The ""ulnar"" fingers (little and ring) showed higher indices of variability and longer movement times as compared with both ""radial"" fingers and multifinger combinations. We conclude that potential effects of the negative covariation and also of the task-sharing across a set of fingers are counterbalanced by an increase in individual finger force variability in multifinger tasks as compared with single-finger tasks. The results speak in favor of a feed-forward model of multifinger synergies. They corroborate a hypothesis that multifinger synergies are created not to improve overall accuracy, but to allow the system larger flexibility, for example to deal with unexpected perturbations and concomitant tasks.

Trade unionists unite to win banner in Mayday march Brisbane 1965

Truck with banner Trade unionists unite to win in Brisbane, Australia, during the Labor Day procession, May 1965. Truck has another banner Trades and Labor Council of Queensland and affiliated unions.