Tied aid, unemployment and welfare

The effect of foreign aid on the welfare levels of both the recipient and the donor country has been a much analysed topic for research in both the theory of international trade and development economics. In the development economics literature, concerns have been raised since the 1960s on the possible adverse effect of foreign aid on domestic savings and growth.1 The trade theory literature in this respect is much older and dates back to the 1920s when Professors Keynes and Ohlin debated on the effect of foreign aid on international terms of trade.2 Ever since, the terms of trade effect has been the cornerstone in the analysis of the welfare effect of foreign aid in the trade theory literature.3 After some early confusion, it is now well established that in a Walrasian stable world economy with two countries, a necessary condition for foreign aid to have perverse effects is that there is some distortion in either of the two countries.4 It is also known that, under normality and substitutability of goods, untied aid cannot be strictly Pareto-improving in a tariff distorted world.5

Legal Aspects of Sino-­African Tied Aid: The Art of Playing with a Legal Grey Area

Sino-African trade has seen a fifty-fold increase in the years 1999 to 2008. In some African regions, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, China has even replaced the US as the most important trading partner today. But China holds not a single FTA on the African continent, while other major trading partners of African economies rely on an extensive framework of different trade agreements. What is, thus, the legal basis of the recent increase of Sino-African trade? Interestingly, Sino-African trade has seen a particularly strong increase in countries that have entered into tied aid agreements with China. These agreements are commonly known under the term ‘Angola-Model’ and consist of a multifaceted network of barter-trading-systems, aspects of tied aid and concessions for oil and other commodities linked with a state loan. It is likely that these agreements have an impact on the trade-flows between African countries and China. This paper discusses the legal character of this new form of economic cooperation, or modern version of tied aid. Critical legal aspects related to this form of tied aid refer to violation of the principle of most-favoured nation (MFN), illegitimate export subsidies, market access, public procurement and transparency in the international trading system. However, despite the recent outcry of the foremost Western community against the strategy of the Chinese government on the African continent, the practice of the Angola-Model based tied aid is not entirely new, and neither is it against the law. The case of tied aid is situated in a legal grey area that should be examined thoroughly in order to strengthen the international trading system and to support developing countries in their attempt to gain from tied aid arrangements.

The Legal Character of Sino-African Tied Aid: Cunning Fox or Wise Dragon?

Paper presented by Charlotte Sieber-Gasser at the African IEL Network Conference, 5th-6th of May 2011, The Mandela Institute, Johannesburg (South Africa) Sino-African trade has seen a fifty-fold increase in the years 1999 to 2008. China became the second most important trading partner for the African economy and already overtook the US as the most important trading partner in some African regions. However, all of this trade is taking place independent from legal regulation by a preferential or other trade agreement. Interestingly, Sino-African trade has seen particular increase in countries that have agreed to tied aid arrangements with China. Taking a closer look at these tied aid arrangements (the so-called Angola-Model) reveals, that some aspects might indeed have a positive effect on Sino-African trade in general. Several grey areas might potentially conflict with WTO-law. However, tied aid is excluded from the GATS, the GATT, and the GPA – in other words, it is outside the sphere of WTO-law. The paper analyses three critical aspects of the Angola-Model version of tied aid with reference to WTO-law, and elaborates the importance of regulating trade-distorting aspects of modern tied aid.

On the tying of aid to tariff reform

This paper considers the welfare effects of foreign aid that is tied to changes in the recipient's tariff. By constructing a three-country model with tariffs, and by allowing for changes both in the amount of aid and in the tariff rates, we are able to consider the welfare implications of two different rules of aid conditionality: (i) a rule which leaves the donor's welfare unchanged, and (ii) a rule which leaves the recipient government's total revenue unchanged. It is shown that the tying of aid to a tariff reform can, inter alia, be used to ensure Pareto improvement.

Optimal foreign aid and tariffs

This paper investigates the optimal choice of foreign aid when trade policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion. Three alternative scenarios, depending on the timing of the actions and on whether aid is tied, are analyzed. It is shown that, in the case where aid is decided before tariffs, untied aid can lead to the reduction of the recipient's optimal trade tax. When the donor can tie the aid to a reduction in the recipient's tariff, the optimal aid level is always positive and the world can always achieve a Pareto-efficient equilibrium.

Welfare effects of aid under quantitative trade restrictions

The paper examines the effects of tied-aid on the welfare of both the donor and the recipient countries. We depart from the previous literature by assuming preexistence of quantitative trade distortions. To mitigate these distortions the donor country provides aid that is tied to the rationed good. Conditions for the presence of the transfer paradox and of the enrichment of both countries are derived and interpreted under the stability of the system. Furthermore, we show that whereas untied aid cannot increase global welfare, tied-aid unambiguously does so.

Foreign aid, wage inequality and welfare for a small open economy with tourism

While the welfare effect of foreign aid has been extensively analyzed, the impact on the distribution of income has received less attention. At the same time, there has been recent work on tourism where it is complementary to aid in improving welfare.By combining these two strands, this paper concentrates on wage inequality in developing countries.We find that an increase in aid in the form of tied aid can lower the relative price of nontraded goods. The rent extracted from tourists declines, reducing welfare of domestic residents. In addition, the fall in the nontradable price can widen the wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.Thus, increased foreign aid may have detrimental effects on national welfare and the distribution of income. Rising wage inequality is confirmed by numerical simulations.

Quotas, spillovers, and the transfer paradox in an economy with tourism

This paper examines the welfare implications of quotas for an economy that is small in terms of traditionally traded goods and has monopoly power over the trade of goods consumed by tourists. Inbound tourism converts local nontraded goods into tradable goods, creating a tourism terms-of-trade effect for the touristreceiving economy. Through this effect, quotas result in a spillover to the nontraded sector. Hence, in the presence of tourism, the traditional free-trade prescription for the small open economy is no longer valid. This lends support to the setting of import quotas. Using the optimal quota as a benchmark, we further examine the welfare effect of tied aid. If tied aid brings about an excessive supply of importable goods, then the transfer paradox of the immiserization of the tourist- receiving economy may occur.

Altruism, Trade Policy, and the Optimality of Foreign Aid

There are many studies in the literature that deal with the welfare effects of income transfers between nations in a general equilibrium setting. An important impetus for this extensive literature was the demonstration of the transfer paradox; that the donor country could actually gain from a transfer of income to another, and that the recipient could lose as a result of the gift. The reason for this paradoxical result is that the transfer gives rise to a terms-of-trade effect that may be especially beneficial to the donor and detrimental to the recipient. Subsequently, many papers have established conditions under which this paradox will or will not occur. Early work by Samuelson (1954) was followed by demonstrations of paradoxes by Gale (1974), Ohyama (1974), Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) and Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta 1983, 1985, and Dixit (1983)) among others.1 More recently, many studies have examined whether or not foreign aid — tied and untied — can be welfare improving for both the donor and the recipient (see, for example, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988), Kemp and Wong (1993), Schweinberger (1990), Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995), Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 1995, 1997, Djajić, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 1996a, 1996b, and Lahiri, Raimondos-Møller, Wong and Woodland 1997.2

Food aid and food production: A theoretical analysis

It has been claimed that food aid leads to permanent dependency as it depresses domestic food prices and thus farmers find it profitable to take land out of food production and into more lucrative activities. This paper develops two alternative scenarios under which the hypothesis about the damaging effect of food aid may not be true. Under the first scenario, it is argued that food production in developing countries is often low due to unfavourable trade policies and if food aid is tied to the removal of bias against the agricultural sector, food aid will not have any disincentive effect on food production. The second exercise argues that the revenue raised by the recipient government by selling aid could be used for R and D in agricultural production.

The link between foreign aid, public investment and economic growth

Länsimaat ovat rahoittaneet kehitysyhteistyöhankkeita jo lähes kuuden vuosikymmenen ajan, mutta kehitysavun tehokkuudesta ei olla edelleenkään päästy yksimielisyyteen. Yksi avunantajamaiden tapa vaikuttaa kehitysavun tehokkuuteen, eli avun vaikutukseen vastaanottajamaan taloudellisen kasvun kiihdyttäjänä, on sitoa ne julkisen sektorin infrastruktuurihankkeisiin. Joissain tapauksissa tämä vaikuttaa avun vastaanottajan käytökseen ja asenteisiin kehitysapua kohtaan. Tutkielmassa käsitellään kehitysavun tehokkuutta tilanteessa, jossa se on sidottu julkisen sektorin investointeihin kehitysmaassa. Tutkimus pohjaa Kalaitzidakisin ja Kalyvitisin (2008) malliin, jossa osa kehitysmaan julkisen talouden investoinneista rahoitetaan kehitysavulla. Seuraavaksi tarkastellaan ylijäämää tavoittelevan käyttäytymisen (rent- seeking) vaikutusta kehitysavun tehokkuuteen pohjaten Economidesin, Kalyvitisin ja Philippopoulosin (2008) malliin. Tutkielmassa referoidaan lisäksi tutkimuskysymystä sivuavia empiirisiä tutkimuksia, esitellään aluksi tavallisimmat kehitysyhteistyön muodot, sekä esitellään talousteoreettisia näkökulmia kehitysyhteistyön tehokkuuden määrittelylle. Tutkielma perustuu puhtaasti teoreettisiin malleihin ja niissä sovelletut menetelmät ovat matemaattisia. Tutkielmassa käsitellään ensin tapaus, jossa kehitysyhteistyöllä rahoitetaan julkisen sektorin investointihankkeita. Jossain tapauksissa kehitysavun kasvu lasku siirtää vastaanottajamaan kulutusta julkisista investoinneista kulutukseen, jolloin kehitysyhteistyövaroin osittain rahoitettujen hankkeiden koko pienenee, ja suhteellinen tehokkuus laskee. Seuraavaksi tarkastellaan tilannetta, jossa kehitysyhteistyövaroista vain osa päätyy hankkeen rahoittamiseen, ja todetaan, että kehitysavun tehokkuus ja vaikutus maan kansantulon kasvuun vähenee talouden toimijoiden ylijäämää tavoittelevan käyttäytymisen (mukaan lukien korruptio) myötä entisestään. Tämän tutkimuksen perusteella voidaan todeta, että kehitysapu vaikuttaa kehittyvän maan talouden kasvuun tapauksessa, jossa julkisia infrastruktuurihankkeita rahoitetaan osittain maan omin verovaroin ja osittain kehitysyhteistyövaroin. Ylijäämää tavoitteleva käyttäytyminen vaikuttaa kehitysavun tehokkuuteen negatiivistesti vähentäen kehitysavun positiivisia kasvuvaikutuksia.

Foreign Aid Linked to Infrastructure and/or Pollution Abatement

This paper studies the macroeconomic effects of a permanent increase in foreign aid in a model that takes into account environmental quality. We develop a dynamic equilibrium model in which both public investment in infrastructure and environmental protection can be financed using domestic resources and international aid programs. The framework considers four scenarios for international aid: untied aid,aid fully tied to infrastructure, aid fully tied to abatement, and aid equally tied to both types of expenditures. We find that the effects of the transfers may depend on (i) the structural characteristics of the recipient country (the elasticity of substitution in production and its dependence on environment and natural resources) and on (ii) how recipient countries distribute their public expenditure. These results underscore the importance of these factors when deciding how and to what extent to tie aid to infrastructure and/or pollution abatement.