Open Personalization: Involving Third Parties in Improving the User Experience of Websites

Traditional software development captures the user needs during the requirement analysis. The Web makes this endeavour even harder due to the difficulty to determine who these users are. In an attempt to tackle the heterogeneity of the user base, Web Personalization techniques are proposed to guide the users’ experience. In addition, Open Innovation allows organisations to look beyond their internal resources to develop new products or improve existing processes. This thesis sits in between by introducing Open Personalization as a means to incorporate actors other than webmasters in the personalization of web applications. The aim is to provide the technological basis that builds up a trusty environment for webmasters and companion actors to collaborate, i.e. "an architecture of participation". Such architecture very much depends on these actors’ profile. This work tackles three profiles (i.e. software partners, hobby programmers and end users), and proposes three "architectures of participation" tuned for each profile. Each architecture rests on different technologies: a .NET annotation library based on Inversion of Control for software partners, a Modding Interface in JavaScript for hobby programmers, and finally, a domain specific language for end-users. Proof-of-concept implementations are available for the three cases while a quantitative evaluation is conducted for the domain specific language.

Organizational injustice : Third parties’ reactions to mistreatmentof employee

Resumen tomado de la publicación

Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties: The Case of Website Blocking

The paper discusses the phenomenon of injunctions against third parties that are innocent from the tort law perspective. One such type of injunction, website blocking, is currently appearing in the spotlight around various European jurisdictions as a consequence of the implementation of Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive and Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive. Website-blocking injunctions are used in this paper only as a plastic and perhaps also canonical example of the paradigmatic shift we are facing: the shift from tort-law-centric injunctions to in rem injunctions. The author of this paper maintains that the theoretical framework for the latter injunctions is not in the law of civil wrongs, but in an old Roman law concept of ‘in rem actions’ (actio in rem negatoria). Thus the term ‘in rem injunctions’ is coined to describe this paradigm of injunctions. Besides the theoretical foundations, this paper explains how a system of injunctions against innocent third parties fits into the private law regulation of negative externalities of online technology and explores the expected dangers of derailing injunctions from the tracks of tort law. The author’s PhD project – the important question of the justification of an extension of the intellectual property entitlements by the in rem paradigm, along with its limits or other solutions – is left out from the paper.

Mere equities and third parties in leasehold law

Examines the concept of a "mere equity" in the context of the Land Registration Act 2002 s.116(b). Considers, by reference to case law, the nature and status of a mere equity and equities coming within the category of equitable rights binding third parties, including a landlord's right to rectification of a lease, the right to set aside a lease and a tenant's right to relief against forfeiture of a lease. Comments on the extent to which s.116(b) requires a mere equity to be more than just procedural and to be an equitable proprietary right capable of binding successors in title.

Not-for-profits and risk accountability : insuring the third sector

Not for profit organisations face significant challenges in managing organisational risk. In this regard not-for-profits are not unique but they are distinguishable from their 'for-profit' counterparts in that they are less likely to have the resources to find sufficient risk management strategies and plans, are very vunerable to cyclical changes in the insurance market and are not usually in a position to pass on the costs of increased premiums to third parties such as consumers of their services. This article explores the nature and extent of risks faced by the not-for-profit sector; the appropriateness and scope of risk management to reduce and manage the likelihood and incidence of risk; and the types of insurance and options to cover risks that materialise. It concludes with a recommendation for a potential course of action.

What’s information got to do with it? Third-party voting in plurality systems

Although strategic voting theory predicts that the number of parties will not exceed two in single-member district plurality systems, the observed number of parties often does. Previous research suggests that the reason why people vote for third parties is that they possess inaccurate information about the parties’ relative chances of winning. However, research has yet to determine whether third-party voting persists under conditions of accurate information. In this article, we examine whether possessing accurate information prevents individuals from voting for third-placed parties in the 2005 and 2010 British elections. We find that possessing accurate information does not prevent most individuals from voting for third-placed parties and that many voters possess reasonably accurate information regarding the viability of the parties in their constituencies. These findings suggest that arguments emphasizing levels of voter information as a major explanation for why multiparty systems often emerge in plurality systems are exaggerated.

Intergroup bias in third-party punishment stems from both ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination

Social norms pervade almost every aspect of social interaction. If they are violated, not only legal institutions, but other members of society as well, punish, i.e., inflict costs on the wrongdoer. Sanctioning occurs even when the punishers themselves were not harmed directly and even when it is costly for them. There is evidence for intergroup bias in this third-party punishment: third-parties, who share group membership with victims, punish outgroup perpetrators more harshly than ingroup perpetrators. However, it is unknown whether a discriminatory treatment of outgroup perpetrators (outgroup discrimination) or a preferential treatment of ingroup perpetrators (ingroup favoritism) drives this bias. To answer this question, the punishment of outgroup and ingroup perpetrators must be compared to a baseline, i.e., unaffiliated perpetrators. By applying a costly punishment game, we found stronger punishment of outgroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators and weaker punishment of ingroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators. This demonstrates that both ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination drive intergroup bias in third-party punishment of perpetrators that belong to distinct social groups.

Review of the Government's rights and practices concerning recovery of the cost of hospital and medical services in negligent third-party cases /

"May 1960."

Third-party movements in the United States.

Includes bibliography.