The impact of high involvement human resources practices on resistance to change: The mediator effect of commitment to change and the influence of ethical leadership

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Report on the UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on HIV and AIDS

Report on the UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on HIV and AIDS The epidemiological development of HIV and AIDS is similar to that experienced in other Western European countries. The condition was originally viewed as an imported virus but this view changed in 1985 when it became clear that the HIV virus had become endemic in Ireland and that Ireland had become part of the global crisis. Click here to download PDF 373kb

De-escalation of commitment management strategy in IT project management methodology: case of ERP implementation project by IT consulting company

According to several surveys and observations, the percentage of successfully conducted IT projects without over-budgeting and delays in time schedule are extremely low. Many projects also are evaluated as failures in terms of delivered functionality. Nuldén (1996) compares IT projects with bad movies; after watching for 2 hours, one still tries to finish it even though one understands that it is a complete waste of time. The argument for that is 'I've already invested too much time to terminate it now'. The same happens with IT projects: sometimes the company continues wasting money on these projects for a long time, even though there are no expected benefits from these projects. Eventually these projects are terminated anyway, but until this moment, the company spends a lot. The situation described above is a consequence of “escalation of commitment” - project continuation even after a manager receives negative feedback of the project’s success probability. According to Keil and Mähring (2010), even though escalation can occur in any type of project, it is more common among complex technological projects, such as IT projects. Escalation of commitment very often results in runaway projects. In order to avoid it, managers use de-escalation strategies, which allow the resources to be used in more effective. These strategies lead to project termination or turning around, which stops the flow of wasted investments. Numbers of researches explore escalation of commitment phenomena based on experiments and business cases. Moreover, during the last decade several frameworks were proposed for de-escalation strategy. However, there is no evidence of successful implementation of the de-escalation of commitment strategy in the literature. In addition, despite that fact that IT project management methodologies are widely used in the companies, none of them cover the topic of escalation of commitment risks. At the same time, there are no researches proposing the way to implement de-escalation of commitment strategy into the existing project management methodology The research is focused on a single case of large ERP implementation project by the consulting company. Hence, the main deliverables of the study include suggestions of improvement in de-escalation methods and techniques in the project and in the company. Moreover, the way to implement these methods into existing project management methodology and into the company general policies is found.

The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements

This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamic international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollutant and the emission rate as a function of the length of the period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the period of commitment can have very significant effects on the equilibrium. Three distinct intervals for the length of the period of commitment are identified, across which the equilibrium and its dynamic behavior differ considerably. Whereas for sufficiently high values of the period of commitment only self-enforcing agreements of two countries are possible, for sufficiently low such values full cooperation can be generated. Lengths of periods of commitment between those two thresholds are characterized by an inverse relationship between the length of commitment and the membership size of the agreement. This suggests that considerable attention should be given to the determination of the length of such international agreements.

Rawls and Rousseau: 'amour-propre' and the strains of commitment

In this paper I try to illuminate the Rawlsian architectonic through an interpretation of what Rawls’ Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy say about Rousseau. I argue that Rawls’ emphasis there when discussing Rousseau on interpreting amour-propre so as to make it compatible with a life in at least some societies draws attention to, and helps explicate, an analogous feature of his own work, the strains of commitment broadly conceived. Both are centrally connected with protecting a sense of self which is vital for one’s own agency. This allows us to appreciate better than much of the literature presently does the requirement for Rawls that justice and the good are congruent, that a society of justice does not disfigure citizens’ ability to live out lives relatively unmarked by relations of domination. Some comments on G. A. Cohen’s critiques of Rawls are made.

A Study in the Theology of Christian Social Action

In this paper I have attempted to present a summary of my exposition of the theology of Rauschenbusch and Niebuhr, and of my own understanding of the issues of Christian Social Action. I have tried to reproduce in this short space the thought of these men, in a manner which should make it comprehensible and which should relate it to the larger questions of social action. This year’s work as a Senior Scholar has proved invaluable because of the discipline of self-directed study which the work taught, and because of myriad possibilities of future investigation which it has suggested. I hope that someday this present manuscript may be expanded into something more substantial. The personal value of such a project, in my opinion, must be measured by the contribution which the project makes to the individual’s general experience, and not merely by the written work which is produced. Therefore, although this manuscript is rather brief, it represents a great deal of value which I feel that I can measure only by my own experience.

Learning-by-employing: the value of commitment

We analyze a dynamic principal–agent model where an infinitely-lived principal faces a sequence of finitely-lived agents who differ in their ability to produce output. The ability of an agent is initially unknown to both him and the principal. An agent’s effort affects the information on ability that is conveyed by performance. We characterize the equilibrium contracts and show that they display short–term commitment to employment when the impact of effort on output is persistent but delayed. By providing insurance against early termination, commitment encourages agents to exert effort, and thus improves on the principal’s ability to identify their talent. We argue that this helps explain the use of probationary appointments in environments in which there exists uncertainty about individual ability.