Constituting religion after Williams: The false dichotomy of theocracy and secularism

The Williams case is a relevant segue to consider the broader issue of constitutional relations between church and state in Australia. This paper argues that the dichotomous approach of theocracy as opposed to secularism is false and actually undermines the proper operation of s 116. A theocracy would contravene s 116 as an establishment of religion, but secularism also amounts to a conflict with s 116 as prohibiting the free exercise of religion. The necessary alternative is to find a middle ground compatible with s 116, one which will not establish any single state religion but will allow the contribution of different religious perspectives in the process of policy-making. This paper briefly considers how such an approach may be implemented.

The New England theocracy. A history of the Congregationalists in New England to the revivals of 1740,

Translation of Geschichte der congregationalisten in Neu-England bis zu den erweckungen um das jahr 1740.

The beginnings of New England; or, The Puritan theocracy in its relations to civil and religious liberty,

Mode of access: Internet.

The beginnings of New England; or, The Puritan theocracy in its relations to civil and religious liberty,

"This book contains the substance of the lectures originally given at the Washington university, St. Louis ... 1887." -- Pref.

The beginnings of New England, or, The Puritan theocracy in its relation to civil and religious liberty,

"Bibliographical note": p. [279]-287.

The history of Israel /

Vol. 1-2 edited by R. Martineau; v. 3-5 translated by J. Estlin Carpenter; v. 6-8 translated by J. Frederick Smith.

Die Lehre vom göttlichen Reiche /

Mode of access: Internet.

The history of Israel. Translated from the German. /

Vols. 1-2 edited by R. Martineau; v. 3-5 translated by J. Estin Carpenter; v. 6-8 translated by J. Frederick Smith.

Plato's Cretan Colony: Theology and Religion in the Political Philosophy of the Laws

The Laws is generally regarded as Plato’s attempt to engage with the practical realities of political life, as opposed to the more idealistic, or utopian, vision of the Republic. Yet modern scholars have often felt disquieted at the central role of religion in the Laws’ second-best city and regime. There are essentially the two dominant interpretations on offer today: either religion supports a repressive theocracy, which controls every aspect of the citizens’ lives to such an extent that even philosophy itself is discouraged, or religion is an example of the kind of noble lie, which the philosopher must deceive the citizens into believing—viz., that a god, not a man, is the author of the regime’s laws. I argue that neither of these interpretations do justice to the dialogue’s intricately dramatic structure, and therefore to Plato’s treatment of civil religion. What I propose is a third position in which Plato both takes seriously the social and political utility of religion, and views theology as a legitimate, and even necessary, subject of philosophical inquiry without going so far as to advocate theocracy as the second best form of regime.

I conclude that a proper focus on the dialogue form, combined with a careful historical analysis of Plato’s use of social and political institutions, reveals an innovative yet traditional form of civil religion, purified of the harmful influence of the poets, based on the authority of the oracle at Delphi, and grounded on a philosophical conception of god as the eternal source of order, wisdom, and all that is good. Through a union of traditional Delphic theology and Platonic natural theology, Plato gives the city of the Laws a common cult acceptable to philosopher and non-philosopher alike, and thus, not only bridges the gap between religion and philosophy, but also creates a sense of community, political identity, and social harmony—the prerequisites for political order and stability. The political theology of the Laws, therefore, provides a rational defense of the rule of law (νόμος) re-conceived as the application of divine Reason (νοῦς) to human affairs.