909 resultados para The Thing
Resumo:
This paper reads season 1 of the critically-acclaimed Canadian television series “Slings & Arrows” (2003). This six-episode series is set in a fictionalised version of the Stratford Festival, and tells the story of a plagued production of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. It follows the play’s rehearsal after the death of the festival’s artistic director; Geoffrey Tennant (himself a plagued Hamlet) takes over the role of director, and must face his past in order to produce a Hamlet that will save the festival, redeem his reputation, and repair his interpersonal relationships. Drawing on popular and theatrical understandings of Shakespeare’s play, the series negotiates tropes of metatheatre, filiality, cultural production and consumption, in order to demonstrate the ongoing relevance and legitimacy of “Shakespeare” in the twenty-first century. The “Slings & Arrows” narrative revolves around the doubled-plot of Hamlet and the experiences of the company mounting Hamlet. In quite obvious ways, the show thus thematises ways in which Shakespeare can be used to read one’s own life and world. In the broader sense, however, the show also offers theatre/performance as a catalyst for affect. In doing so, the show functions as a relatively straight adaptation of Hamlet, and a metatheatrical/metafictional commentary on the functions of Hamlet within contemporary culture. In Shakespeare’s play, the production of “The Mouse-Trap” proves, both to Hamlet and the audience, the legitimacy of the ghost’s claims. Similarly, in “Slings & Arrows”, the successful performance of Hamlet legitimises Geoffrey’s position as artistic director of the festival, and affirms for the viewer the value of Shakespearean production in contemporary culture. In each text, theatre/performance enables and legitimises a son carrying out a dead father’s wishes in order to restore or reproduce socio-cultural order. The metatheatrics of these gestures engage the reader/viewer in a self-reflexive process whereby the ‘value’ of theatre is thematised and performed, and the consumer is positioned as the arbiter and agent of that value: complicit in its production even as they are the site of its consumption.
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This article discusses implications of participant withdrawal for inductive research. I describe and analyze how a third of my participants withdrew from a grounded theory study. I position my example, ensuing issues, and potential solutions as reflective of inductive methodologies as a whole. The crux of the problem is the disruption inflicted by withdrawal on inductive processes of generating knowledge. I examine the subsequent methodological and ethical issues in trying to determine the best course of action following withdrawal. I suggest three potential options for researchers: Continuing the study with partial data, continuing the study with all data, and discontinuing the study. Motivated by my experience, and wider theoretical considerations, I present several suggestions and questions, with the aim of supporting researchers in determining the best course of action for their individual field circumstances.
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This essay examines the themes of paranoia and claustrophobia as elements of horror in John Campbell’s novella “Who Goes There?” (1938) and John Carpenter’s film-adaptation of said novella, called The Thing (1982). The novella and the film utilize the lack of trust and reliability in between the characters as elements of fear as well as supernatural elements in the form of a monster. This essay focuses on the different parts of the story running through both versions, mainly the setting, the characters and the monster, to show how the themes of paranoia and claustrophobia are used throughout these as elements of fear and horror. With the help of Sigmund Freud’s concept of the uncanny, as well as other sources, this essay argues that while the monster plays an important role throughout the story, the threats created by the paranoia and claustrophobia are equal to the monster itself.
Resumo:
While my PhD is practice-led research, it is my contention that such an inquiry cannot develop as long as it tries to emulate other models of research. I assert that practice-led research needs to account for an epistemological unknown or uncertainty central to the practice of art. By focusing on what I call the artist's 'voice,' I will show how this 'voice' is comprised of a dual motivation—'articulate' representation and 'inarticulate' affect—which do not even necessarily derive from the artist. Through an analysis of art-historical precedents, critical literature (the work of Jean-François Lyotard and Andrew Benjamin, the critical methods of philosophy, phenomenology and psychoanalysis) as well as of my own painting and digital arts practice, I aim to demonstrate how this unknown or uncertain aspect of artistic inquiry can be mapped. It is my contention that practice-led research needs to address and account for this dualistic 'voice' in order to more comprehensively articulate its unique contribution to research culture.
Resumo:
THE MACHINIST LANDSCAPE: AN ENTROPIC GRID OF VARIANCE
‘By drawing a diagram, a ground plan of a house, a street plan to the location of a site, or a topographic map, one draws a “logical two dimensional picture”. A “logical picture” differs from a natural or realistic picture in that it rarely looks like the thing it stands for.’
A Provisional Theory of Non-Sites, Robert Smithson (1968)
Between design and ground there are variances, deviations and gaps. These exist as physical interstices between what is conceptualised and what is realised; and they reveal moments in the design process that resist the reconciliation of people and their environment (McHarg 1963). The Machinist Landscape interrogates the significance of these variances through the contrasting processes of coppice and photovoltaic energy. It builds on the potential of these gaps, and in doing so proposes that these spaces of variance can reveal the complexity of relationships between consumption and remediation, design and nature.
Fresh Kills Park, and in particular the draft master plan (2006), offers a framework to explore this artificial construct. Central to the Machinist Landscape is the analysis of the landfill gas collection system, planned on a notional 200ft grid. Variations are revealed between this diagrammatic grid measure and that which has been constructed on the site. These variances between the abstract and the real offer the Machinist Landscape a powerful space of enquiry. Are these gaps a result of unexpected conditions below ground, topographic nuances or natural phenomena? Does this space of difference, between what is planned and what is constructed, have the potential to redefine the dynamic processes and relations with the land?
The Machinist Landscape is structured through this space of variance with an ‘entropic grid’, the under-storey of which hosts a carefully managed system of short-rotation coppice (SRC). The coppice, a medieval practice related to energy, product, and space, operates on theoretical and programmatic levels. It is planted along a structure of linear bunds, stabilized through coppice pole retaining structures and enriched with nutrients from coppice produced bio-char. Above the coppice is built an upper-storey of photovoltaic (PV); its structures fabricated from the coppiced timber and the PV produced with graphene from coppice charcoal processes.
Resumo:
The world is all that there is. In the world, ontology and epistemology coincide. The thing and the perspective are part of it, scale is ingested in its multiplicity, communication stops at the world's edge. By reading together Deleuze and Guattari's plane of immanence and Niklas Luhmann's proto-global concept of Weltgesellschaft (“world society”), I suggest a conceptualisation of the world as the materiality of the multiple spaces of creation in an insular, all-inclusive immanence. Deprived of an outside, the world pushes its own understanding of circumference through, first, the expansion of its own limits through the process of worlding, and, second, the multiplication of modes of material (self-)production through its process of othering. Thus, the world swells up from the inside and expands on both the material and the semantic level, producing a multiplicity of fractal microcosms. Issues of responsibility and justice arise that are intricately linked to the materiality of the world and take place in and between the various bodies and spaces of the world but without an overarching hierarchy or principle. This approach is a way of counteracting the all-pervasive Hegelian understanding of synthesis, arguing instead for a plenitude that brims with positivity and that can never become fully complete. The world remains its own infinite process of worlding.
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I. The types of philosophic thinking.--II. Monistic idealism.III. Hegel and his method.--IV. Bergson and his critique of intellectualism.--VII. The continuity of experience.--VIII. Conclusions. Notes.--Appendices. A. The thing and its relations. B. The experience of activity. C. On the notion of reality as changing.-- Index.
Resumo:
Robbery under law.--The hazard of the die.--The temple of Apollo and the muses.--Ali Baba and the forty thieves.--The prison house.--Aladdin and his wonderful lamp.--Scorpio.--"The play's the thing."--"The shaving of Shagpat."--In re the Paris prize.--"Brer Fox and Brer Rabbit."--Isis unveiled.--Newspaper reviews [etc.]--David-up-to-date.
Resumo:
If one clear argument emerged from my doctoral thesis in political science, it is that there is no agreement as to what democracy is. There are over 40 different varieties of democracy ranging from those in the mainstream with subtle or minute differences to those playing by themselves in the corner. And many of these various types of democracy are very well argued, empirically supported, and highly relevant to certain polities. The irony is that the thing which all of these democratic varieties or the ‘basic democracy’ that all other forms of democracy stem from, is elusive. There is no international agreement in the literature or in political practice as to what ‘basic democracy’ is and that is problematic as many of us use the word ‘democracy’ every day and it is a concept of tremendous importance internationally. I am still uncertain as to why this problem has not been resolved before by far greater minds than my own, and it may have something to do with the recent growth in democratic theory this past decade and the innovative areas of thought my thesis required, but I think I’ve got the answer. By listing each type of democracy and filling the column next to this list with the literature associated with these various styles of democracy, I amassed a large and comprehensive body of textual data. My research intended to find out what these various styles of democracy had in common and to create a taxonomy (like the ‘tree of life’ in biology) of democracy to attempt at showing how various styles of democracy have ‘evolved’ over the past 5000 years.ii I then ran a word frequency analysis program or a piece of software that counts the 100 most commonly used words in the texts. This is where my logic came in as I had to make sense of these words. How did they answer what the most fundamental commonalities are between 40 different styles of democracy? I used a grounded theory analysis which required that I argue my way through these words to form a ‘theory’ or plausible explanation as to why these particular words and not others are the important ones for answering the question. It came down to the argument that all 40 styles of democracy analysed have the following in common 1) A concept of a citizenry. 2) A concept of sovereignty. 3) A concept of equality. 4) A concept of law. 5) A concept of communication. 6) And a concept of selecting officials. Thus, democracy is a defined citizenry with its own concept of sovereignty which it exercises through the institutions which support the citizenry’s understandings of equality, law, communication, and the selection of officials. Once any of these 6 concepts are defined in a particular way it creates a style of democracy. From this, we can also see that there can be more than one style of democracy active in a particular government as a citizenry is composed of many different aggregates with their own understandings of the six concepts.
Resumo:
A travel article about touring in New Zealand. ‘What’s the best thing about England?’ asked the Englishman next to me, quite suddenly, as we came out of a tunnel. ‘Well?’ I didn’t know. ‘Answer,’ he said, ‘is France.’ Here was the thing. My companion was a tennis pro, and these days he divided his time between London and Paris. Because you could. ‘Nothing big, which suits me: I am only moderately successful. Mainly rich ladies, if you know what I mean. Much prefer the French side, if you know what I mean.’ I think I knew what he meant...
Resumo:
This study focuses on the theory of individual rights that the German theologian Conrad Summenhart (1455-1502) explicated in his massive work Opus septipartitum de contractibus pro foro conscientiae et theologico. The central question to be studied is: How does Summenhart understand the concept of an individual right and its immediate implications? The basic premiss of this study is that in Opus septipartitum Summenhart composed a comprehensive theory of individual rights as a contribution to the on-going medieval discourse on rights. With this rationale, the first part of the study concentrates on earlier discussions on rights as the background for Summenhart s theory. Special attention is paid to language in which right was defined in terms of power . In the fourteenth century writers like Hervaeus Natalis and William Ockham maintained that right signifies power by which the right-holder can to use material things licitly. It will also be shown how the attempts to describe what is meant by the term right became more specified and cultivated. Gerson followed the implications that the term power had in natural philosophy and attributed rights to animals and other creatures. To secure right as a normative concept, Gerson utilized the ancient ius suum cuique-principle of justice and introduced a definition in which right was seen as derived from justice. The latter part of this study makes effort to reconstructing Summenhart s theory of individual rights in three sections. The first section clarifies Summenhart s discussion of the right of the individual or the concept of an individual right. Summenhart specified Gerson s description of right as power, taking further use of the language of natural philosophy. In this respect, Summenhart s theory managed to bring an end to a particular continuity of thought that was centered upon a view in which right was understood to signify power to licit action. Perhaps the most significant feature of Summenhart s discussion was the way he explicated the implication of liberty that was present in Gerson s language of rights. Summenhart assimilated libertas with the self-mastery or dominion that in the economic context of discussion took the form of (a moderate) self-ownership. Summenhart discussion also introduced two apparent extensions to Gerson s terminology. First, Summenhart classified right as relation, and second, he equated right with dominion. It is distinctive of Summenhart s view that he took action as the primary determinant of right: Everyone has as much rights or dominion in regard to a thing, as much actions it is licit for him to exercise in regard to the thing. The second section elaborates Summenhart s discussion of the species dominion, which delivered an answer to the question of what kind of rights exist, and clarified thereby the implications of the concept of an individual right. The central feature in Summenhart s discussion was his conscious effort to systematize Gerson s language by combining classifications of dominion into a coherent whole. In this respect, his treatement of the natural dominion is emblematic. Summenhart constructed the concept of natural dominion by making use of the concepts of foundation (founded on a natural gift) and law (according to the natural law). In defining natural dominion as dominion founded on a natural gift, Summenhart attributed natural dominion to animals and even to heavenly bodies. In discussing man s natural dominion, Summenhart pointed out that the natural dominion is not sufficiently identified by its foundation, but requires further specification, which Summenhart finds in the idea that natural dominion is appropriate to the subject according to the natural law. This characterization lead him to treat God s dominion as natural dominion. Partly, this was due to Summenhart s specific understanding of the natural law, which made reasonableness as the primary criterion for the natural dominion at the expense of any metaphysical considerations. The third section clarifies Summenhart s discussion of the property rights defined by the positive human law. By delivering an account on juridical property rights Summenhart connected his philosophical and theological theory on rights to the juridical language of his times, and demonstrated that his own language of rights was compatible with current juridical terminology. Summenhart prepared his discussion of property rights with an account of the justification for private property, which gave private property a direct and strong natural law-based justification. Summenhart s discussion of the four property rights usus, usufructus, proprietas, and possession aimed at delivering a detailed report of the usage of these concepts in juridical discourse. His discussion was characterized by extensive use of the juridical source texts, which was more direct and verbal the more his discussion became entangled with the details of juridical doctrine. At the same time he promoted his own language on rights, especially by applying the idea of right as relation. He also showed recognizable effort towards systematizing juridical language related to property rights.