Limiting rights, Canadian style : the Supreme Court of Canada, American jurisprudence and section 1 of the Charter /

The addition of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms represented a fundamental shift in Canadian governance. Many saw the tabling of such a document as a further, even fmal, step towards the Americanization of the Canadian polity. While the Charter's presence has significantly altered the relationship between citizens, government and the courts, it has done so by maintaining the traditional values and experiences that has been the hallmarks of Canadian constitutionalism. This is in contrast to the fears harboured by critics suggesting that the Charter was a further Americanization of the Canadian Polity, notwithstanding the very different natures of the American Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter. Analyzing American Supreme Court precedent use by the Canadian Supreme Court has demonstrated that such an Americanization has not, in fact, occurred. In the present analysis of American precedent use in section 1 limitation of rights cases, the citation of these precedents are at best episodic, at least on the quantitative level. Qualitatively, the Canadian Supreme Court generally uses American jurisprudence to further support broad definitions of 'great rights' . As for the more intricate details of rights limitations and the process involved in detennining how Charter rights are limited, one would be hard pressed to find even cursory references to American case law.

A review of the case of Alexander McLeod: recently determined in the Supreme Court of Judicature of the state of New York (1841)

Alexander McLeod, a British subject, was tried for the murder of Amos Durfee and as an accomplice in the burning of the steamer Caroline, in the Niagara River, during the Canadian rebellion in 1837-1838.

Driedger's 'Modern Principle' at the Supreme Court of Canada: Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization

Un résumé en français est également disponible

The Supreme Court of Canada Ruling in Carter v. Canada: A New Era of End-of-Life Care for Canadians

La tribune de l'éditeur / Editor's Soapbox

The Supreme Court Confirmation Process and Its Implications

In recent history, there has been a trend of increasing partisan polarization throughout most of the American political system. Some of the impacts of this polarization are obvious; however, there is reason to believe that we miss some of the indirect effects of polarization. Accompanying the trend of increased polarization has been an increase in the contentiousness of the Supreme Court confirmation process. I believe that these two trends are related. Furthermore, I argue that these trends have an impact on judicial behavior. This is an issue worth exploring, since the Supreme Court is the most isolated branch of the federal government. The Constitution structured the Supreme Court to ensure that it was as isolated as possible from short-term political pressures and interests. This study attempts to show how it may be possible that those goals are no longer being fully achieved. My first hypothesis in this study is that increases in partisan polarization are a direct cause of the increase in the level of contention during the confirmation process. I then hypothesize that the more contention a justice faces during his or her confirmation process, the more ideologically extreme that justice will then vote on the bench. This means that a nominee appointed by a Republican president will tend to vote even more conservatively than was anticipated following a contentious confirmation process, and vice versa for Democratic appointees. In order to test these hypotheses, I developed a data set for every Supreme Court nominee dating back to President Franklin D. Roosevelt¿s appointments (1937). With this data set, I ran a series of regression models to analyze these relationships. Statistically speaking, the results support my first hypothesis in a fairly robust manner. My regression results for my second hypothesis indicate that the trend I am looking for is present for Republican nominees. For Democratic nominees, the impacts are less robust. Nonetheless, as the results will show, contention during the confirmation process does seem to have some impact on judicial behavior. Following my quantitative analysis, I analyze a series of case studies. These case studies serve to provide tangible examples of these statistical trends as well as to explore what else may be going on during the confirmation process and subsequent judicial decision-making. I use Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, and Alito as the subjects for these case studies. These cases will show that the trends described above do seem to be identifiable at the level of an individual case. These studies further help to indicate other potential impacts on judicial behavior. For example, following Justice Rehnquist¿s move from Associate to Chief Justice, we see a marked change in his behavior. Overall, this study serves as a means of analyzing some of the more indirect impacts of partisan polarization in modern politics. Further, the study offers a means of exploring some of the possible constraints (both conscious and subconscious) that Supreme Court justices may feel while they decide how to cast a vote in a particular case. Given the wide-reaching implications of Supreme Court decisions, it is important to try to grasp a full view of how these decisions are made.

In the Supreme Court of the United States, October term, 1980, Héctor García, petitioner v. Alton V.M. Gloor ... [et al.], respondents : on writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit : petition for writ of certiorari /

At head of title: no.

Revised rules of the Supreme court of the United States : Adopted February 13, 1939. Effective February 27, 1939. (The Acts of February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936, January 31, 1928, c. 14, 45 Stat. 54, April 26, 1928, c. 440, 45 Stat. 466, and August 24, 1937, c. 754, 50 Stat. 751, are printed in an appendix.).

Cover-title.

Revised rules of the Supreme court of the United States : Adopted June 5, 1928. Effective July 1, 1928. Amended June 1, 1931, and May 31, 1932. (The Acts of February 13, 1925, c.229, 43 Stat. 936, January 31, 1928, c. 14, 45 Stat. 54, and April 26, 1928, c. 440, 45 Stat. 466, are printed in an appendix.).

Act of February 13, 1925: An act to amend the Judicial code, and to further define the jurisdiction of the Circuit courts of appeals and of the Supreme court, and for other purposes; Act of January 31, 1928: An act in reference to writs of error; Act of April 26, 1928: An act to amend section 2 of an act entitled "An act in reference to writs of error" (12 pages at end) Eighty pages: "Amendments effective Sept. 1, 1932" inserted. (c.1).

The Tasmanian law reports : cases determined in the Supreme Court of Tasmania.

Earlier reports in: Reports of cases determined in the Supreme Court of Tasmania / Herbert Nicholls and W. J. T. Stops.

Reports of cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Mode of access: Internet.

Reports of cases determined in the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico.

Reporters: v. 1-10, C. H. Gildersleeve; v. 11-13, A. J. Abbott; v. 14-16, P. A. F. Walter.